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 Abstract  
Deflationism about Truth and Meaning  
By  
Onyoung Oh  
 
Adviser: Professor Paul Horwich  
Abstract 
The aim of my thesis is to defend a deflationary view of truth and meaning. I characterize 
the view as a doctrine holding that truth is a purely logical notion, and truth-theoretic notions 
don’t play a serious explanatory role in an account of meaning and content. We use truth-terms 
(e.g. ‘true’) everywhere, from the discourse of ordinary conversation to those of the hard science 
and morality. The ubiquity of truth-terms gives rise to the impression that truth is a profound 
notion playing substantive explanatory roles. This impression, say deflationists, is unduly 
inflated—the ubiquity of truth-terms is not a sign of the richness but thinness of the concept of 
truth. In my thesis, I aim to defend this view by responding to some of its well-known objections. 
To defend a view often involves a modification, which is especially relevant to the case of 
deflationism due to the plethora of its variants. I have chosen two variants—Horwich’s and 
Field’s—in order to find out what features are to be had by a well-rounded variant of 
deflationism.  My special interest is on the merits of a deflationary theory of truth as it is applied 
to an account of meaning and content. The specifics of each chapter are summarized in the 
following.  
In chapter 1, I discuss the background of a deflationary theory of truth by examining the 
problems with a correspondence theory of truth. I divide a correspondence theory into two kinds: 
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a fact-based theory and an object-based theory.  As examples of a fact-based correspondence 
theory, Russell’s and early Wittgenstein’s theories are given a critical examination. I then turn to 
Tarski’s semantic definition of truth. I argue that Tarski’s definition has offered a way to develop 
a correspondence theory without invoking a fact or fact-like entity. I argue, however, that even a 
correspondence theory of a Tarski-style is vulnerable to a certain problem—the problem raised 
by Field. I then turn to reductive/physicalistic theories of reference—Kripke-Putnam’s causal 
theory of reference, the information theory, and the teleological theory of representation. By 
arguing against each of these theories, I conclude that the prospect of a correspondence theory of 
truth is dim. I end this chapter by discussing how the dismal prospect of a correspondence theory 
of truth has motivated a deflationary theory of truth. 
In chapter 2, I embark upon the core project of my thesis—developing and defending a 
deflationary theory of truth and meaning. I devote chapter 2 mainly to the discussion of Field’s 
pure disquotational theory of truth.  According to this view of truth, the concept of truth is at 
bottom purely disquotational.  In this chapter, I try to elaborate and clarify the central ideas 
underlying this radical version of a deflationary theory of truth. To do so, I focus on some 
objections leveled against this view: that it cannot accommodate the modal properties of truth 
and logical derivations involving an attribution of truth to sentences that one does not understand. 
After criticizing Field’s solutions to these problems, I propose my own solutions.  
The topic of chapter 3 is the success argument against a deflationary theory of truth, 
according to which a deflationist cannot make sense of the explanatory role of truth in an account 
of the success of behavior or theories. In the first half of this chapter, I examine Nic 
Damnjanovic’s supervenience/compatibilist objection to deflationism. I argue that a 
supervenience approach to truth is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. In the second 
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half, I discuss Kitcher’s realist objection to deflationism. Drawing upon the role of truth in an 
account of the success of scientific theories, Kitcher contends that realism requires a non-
deflationary—correspondence—concept of truth. I criticize Kitcher’s argument on the grounds 
that it conflates the objectivity requirement with the systematicity requirement. I argue that only 
the first is needed to accommodate the role of truth in an account of the success of a scientific 
theory.  
In chapter 4, I aim to defend a deflationary theory of meaning and content. To this end, I 
carry out three projects—first, defending Horwich’s use theory of meaning against Kripke’s 
skeptical challenge; second,  bringing out the commonalities between Horwich’s and Field’s 
views of meaning and content; and third, arguing for Field’s deflationary analysis of the role of 
truth-conditions in psychological explanations. More precisely, I try to bring out the core ideas 
running through some deflationists’ views of meaning and content such as late Wittgenstein, 
Horwich, and Field. By doing so, I aim to explain what it involves to state that truth-theoretic 
notions don’t play a central role in an account of meaning and content, which is the main thesis 
of Horwich’s and Field’s deflationary views. I end this chapter by defending Field’s view of 
truth-conditions—not only truth but also truth-conditions are expressive, not explanatory, 
devices aiding generalization. 
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Introduction 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine what a deflationary theory of truth and 
meaning is about. The term ‘deflationary’ is now used so abundantly that it may have little 
explanatory function—to call a theory ‘deflationary’ may say little about the theory. That said, in 
a debate about truth, it has a well-rounded meaning—that truth is a purely logical concept whose 
sole purpose is to express generalizations over statements, beliefs, sentences, propositions, 
claims or assertions. To take a mundane example, we sometimes wish to express our attitude 
toward a belief, claim or proposition, but we find ourselves not being able to articulate the belief, 
claim or proposition because we don’t clearly remember it. In such a case, the notion of truth is 
handy—by uttering a truth-statement such as   
 
      What John said is true,  
 
we can avoid making an infinite conjunction such as  
 
     If John believes that snow is white, then snow is white; if John believes that grass is green, 
then grass is green; and so on.  
 
To say that truth is a purely logical notion or property is to say that the role of truth is exhausted 
by a generalization of this kind.  
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An advocate of a deflationary theory of truth defends the deflationary conception of truth 
just characterized—that truth is nothing but a logical concept the sole purpose of which is to 
express generalizations over beliefs, sentences, or propositions. There are both positive and 
negative sides of this theory. The positive side is that if this deflationary concept of truth is 
accepted, it should be quite easy to develop an adequate theory of truth—an adequate theory of 
truth just needs to explain how the notion of truth has the generalizing function. Thus, a 
deflationary theory typically offers a very simple explanation of the concept of truth; for example, 
the disquotational schema such as ‘p’ is true iff p or the equivalence schema such as the 
proposition that P is true iff P. The negative side of the deflationary conception of truth is that it 
doesn’t square well with the time-honored view of truth in western philosophy. The time-
honored view is that truth plays important roles in explaining certain aspects of thoughts and 
language; for example, the notion of truth plays an important role in explaining the effectiveness 
of beliefs in achieving our goals; it plays a central role in explaining the meaning of an 
expression and the content of a cognitive state (e.g., a belief or desire state); it plays an important 
role in explaining the reasonableness of logical principles; and so on. The notion of truth also 
appears in almost all philosophical discussions of importance; for example, the debates such as 
whether moral claims can be said to be true, whether we have an access to truths about 
unobservable entities, whether there is an objective truth in an absolute sense, etc. Even outside 
philosophy, truth is deemed as a serious and preponderant notion; truth is considered as having 
an important value (e.g. ‘true friend’, ‘truthful mind’, etc.).  
 From a deflationist point of view, however, it is merely a misconception to consider the 
frequent employment of a truth-term as the sign for truth being a deep philosophical concept 
waiting for a substantive analysis. The reason why the notion of truth is invoked so frequently is 
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not that truth is a property with a deep nature but that it has the generalization function. Truth 
pervades philosophical discussions and ordinary conversations for the same reason that 
expressions such as ‘it’ and ‘that’ appear frequently in English language; it is a generalizing 
device.   
A deflationary theory comes in a wide variety.
1
 The discussions in this thesis will mainly 
be concerned with the ones developed by two contemporary deflationists—Paul Horwich and 
Hartry Field. I will defend their views—in particular, I will defend their views by arguing against 
some objections raised about them. Given that the notion of truth is invoked in the discussions of 
all major philosophical topics, the implication of endorsing a deflationary theory can be 
discussed with respect to a wide range of philosophical problems. In discussing Horwich’s and 
Field’s deflationary theories, however, I will only be concerned with its application to semantic 
problems—the problems of meaning and content. It is undeniable that the notions of truth and 
meaning are closely connected. For this reason, it is inevitable that a theory of meaning be 
affected by a theory of truth; for example, a theory of meaning presupposing a correspondence 
theory of truth is expected to meet certain conditions that are not required when a deflationary 
theory is assumed. An aim of this thesis is to examine what a theory of meaning should be like 
                                                          
1
 Some of the varieties of deflationary theories of truth are the redundancy (or the disappearance) theories of truth 
advocated by Ramsey and Frege; the performative theory of truth formulated by Strawson; the prosentential theory 
of truth developed by Belnap, Camp, and Grover; the simple theories of Prior and Williams; the disquotational 
theory of truth that can be found in Quine, Tarski, Ayer, and Field; and Horwich’s minimalist or deflationary theory 
of truth. See F. Ramsey, “Facts and Propositions,” 1927, in D. H. Mellor, ed., Philosophical Papers. Cambridge 
University Press, 1990; G. Frege, “The Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic,” The Monist 25(4), 1915, pp. 481-194, 
“The Thought,” 1956, in P. F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press, 1973; D. Grover, J. 
Camp, N. Nelnap, “The Prosentential Theory of Truth,” Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, pp. 73-125;  A. Prior, 
Object of Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; M. Williams, W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970; A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of Semantics,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 1944, pp. 341-376; A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2
nd
 ed., 
London: Gollancz, 1946; P. Horwich, Truth, 2
nd
 ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1999 (1990); H. Field, “The Deflationary 
Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science, and Value, Oxford; Blackwell, 1986, pp. 
55-117 and “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2001.  
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when the notion of truth is construed in the deflationary sense. Both Horwich and Field have 
advanced their own views of meaning to match their deflationary theories of truth. There are 
differences between their views; there seem to be more disagreements in their views of meaning 
than there are in their views of truth. My aim, however, isn’t to take sides with one of them; it is 
to find some important commonalities between their theories that can help us have an 
overarching outlook on a deflationary theory of meaning and truth. More specifically, what I will 
argue in each chapter is briefly as follows:  
In chapter 1, the background of the deflationary conception of truth will be discussed. 
Although a non-deflationary or inflationary theory of truth means any theory that doesn’t 
endorse the deflationary conception of truth, a correspondence theory of truth is considered the 
major opponent of a deflationary theory of truth. The intuitive appeal of the correspondence 
conception of truth is that it is grounded on our basic conception of truth exemplified as follows: 
 
‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white,   
or  
The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white.  
 
Unlike a deflationist, a correspondence theorist attempts to justify this basic conception of truth 
by defining truth in terms of a correspondence relation. I will explain why this attempt hasn’t 
succeeded by discussing the problems with correspondence theories developed by Russell, the 
early Wittgenstein, and Field in his inflationary phase. Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory of 
truth and the problems with reductive theories of reference will be discussed as a way of 
criticizing a correspondence theory. I will argue that the problems with a correspondence theory 
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and the deflationist view of the role of truth constitute two motivations for a deflationary theory 
of truth.  
 In chapter 2, I will discuss Field’s disquotational theory. During his deflationary phase, 
Field has defended a theory called ‘pure disquotationalism’. It is difficult to say what this theory 
is in one sentence, because Field has kept changing his view of it. Initially, Field characterized it 
as a theory stating that the notion of truth is at bottom purely disquotational, where purely 
disquotational truth is characterized as a use-independent notion. It was also characterized as one 
that can meaningfully be ascribed only to sentences that one understands. This view, however, 
has confronted serious objections one of which is the modal objection, and the other is that it 
cannot explain logical derivations involving an ascription of truth to sentences one doesn’t 
understand. I shall explain what these objections are, and how Field has responded to them. In 
particular, I will argue that his latest response is still short of resolving the problems. I will 
propose my own solution to the problems.  
 In chapter 3, the so-called success argument against a deflationary theory of truth will be 
examined. What I mean by ‘the success argument’ is one that argues for a non-deflationary 
theory of truth on the basis of the role played by truth in an account of the success of behavior. In 
the first of the chapter, I discuss Nic Damnjanovic’s argument according to which a Horwich-
style deflationist theory of truth shows that truth plays a causal-explanatory role in an account of 
the success of behavior. To argue for this unusual view, Damnjanovic invokes Jackson and 
Pettit’s program explanation of a mental property (a sort of supervenience theory of a mental 
property). I argue against Damnjanovic’s view on the grounds that Jackson and Pettit’s program 
explanation cannot be applied to the deflationary conception of truth. In the second half of this 
chapter, I discuss Kitcher’s argument according to which scientific realism requires a 
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correspondence theory of truth. In defending this view, Kitcher appeals to the success 
argument—that a deflationary theory of truth cannot make sense of the role played by truth in an 
account of the success of a scientific theory. On Kitcher’s view, a deflationary theory isn’t 
neutral between scientific realism and scientific anti-realism, because a deflationist cannot make 
sense of the role played by truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory. I argue 
against Kitcher—I argue that Kitcher’s demand for an account of systematic success is 
orthogonal to explaining the role of truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory. 
Kitcher assumes that the success of all scientific theories can and should be explained by a small 
number of basic principles. Kitcher then argues that a deflationist cannot explain the systematic 
success. I argue, however, that a deflationist doesn’t have to explain systematic success in order 
to make sense of the role played by truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory.  
 In chapter 4, I discuss deflationary theories of meaning advanced by Horwich and 
Field—Horwich’s use theory of meaning and Field’s linguistic view of meaning attributions. 
Both Horwich and Field defend theories of meaning in which truth-theoretic notions don’t play 
important roles. Applying what he calls ‘the deflationary spirit’ to an account of meaning, 
Horwich aims to show that skepticism about a theory of meaning is largely due to “pseudo-
constraints” imposed on an adequate theory of meaning. I shall concentrate on two of the six 
pseudo-constraints discussed by Horwich—the relationality and representation constraints. 
Horwich’s treatment of these constraints shows a way in which a theory of meaning becomes 
free of misconstrued presupposition by having the deflationary concept of truth. To make the 
point vivid, I discuss Horwich’s solution to Kripke’s skeptical argument against Wittgenstein’s 
use theory of meaning. In the second part of this chapter, I compare Horwich’s deflationary 
theory of meaning with Field’s. I compare their theories with respect to two issues—the issues 
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about meaning-entities and a fact of the matter by virtue of which a meaning-attribution is true. 
Viewed superficially, their theories of meaning are opposed to each other with respect to these 
issues. I will argue, however, that important similarities are hidden under superficial differences. 
By arguing for the hidden similarities between Horwich’s and Field’s theories of meaning, I 
intend to find some core ideas that can characterize a deflationary theory of meaning and content. 
In the last part of this chapter, I examine Field’s response to the success argument. Field’s 
response to the success argument is different from Horwich’s in that it is more concentrated on 
the role of truth conditions than that of truth in an account of the success of behavior. I will argue 
that the moral to be drawn from Field’s response to the success argument is that not only truth 
but also truth conditions are to be construed as purely expressive devices in a deflationary theory 
of truth and meaning.  
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Chapter1. The Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Motivations for Deflationism 
 
1.1 The Correspondence Theory of Truth 
The topic of this section and the section following it is the correspondence theory of truth. The 
purpose of discussing the correspondence theory isn’t, however, to examine the features and 
prospect of the theory per se; it is to explain the transition from the correspondence theory to the 
deflationary theory of truth. To do so, I will concentrate on some of the objections raised of the 
correspondence theory. I have a very modest ambition in carrying out this task. As with any 
theory of truth, the correspondence theory of truth is based on the correspondence concept of 
truth: the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality. Presumably, this concept of truth is the 
very one that ordinary people associate with ‘is true’. As a result, numerous accounts have been 
proposed to clarify and systematize the correspondence concept of truth. Due to the lack of 
knowledge and space, it is impossible for me to go over all the different theories of 
correspondence truth. In the following, I will discuss only some of the most often-discussed 
versions of the correspondence theory of truth and their problems.  
 In order to avoid an unnecessary confusion, I will first clarify the meaning of the 
‘correspondence concept’ of truth. To say that truth is a correspondence notion doesn’t just mean 
that the notion of truth is closely related to the notion of reality. As Horwich points out, no one—
including the deflationist—denies that the proposition that snow is white is true because snow is 
white.
2
 Kunne makes a similar point; he says, “[Y]ou do not become a partisan of a 
                                                          
2
 Horwich distinguishes the correspondence intuition from the correspondence theory of truth. By ‘correspondence 
intuition’ he means the sentiment that statements owe their truth to the nature of reality. The correspondence theory 
of truth is based on this correspondence intuition, but it must go far beyond merely accommodating this intuition. 
Most of all, the correspondence theory of truth—if it is to be called a ‘theory’—must define truth by invoking the 
correspondence intuition. The difference is huge. When we say that the ordinary notion of truth accommodates the 
correspondence intuition, it doesn’t necessarily imply that the correspondence intuition is built into the definition of 
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correspondence conception of truth simply by assenting to the slogan that what somebody 
thought or said is true if and only if it agrees with reality.”3 According to Kunne, one becomes a 
partisan of a correspondence conception by taking the truth predicate ‘is true’ as expressing a 
relational property; i.e., a seriously dyadic relation.
4
 Put more precisely, to say that truth is to be 
understood as a correspondence notion is to say that a sentence of the form ‘x is true’ is to be 
understood in the way a sentence such as ‘Mary loves a musician’ is understood. From ‘Mary 
loves a musician’, we can infer ‘There is someone in the world whom Mary loves’. Similarly, to 
accept the correspondence theory of truth—to construe truth as a correspondence notion—
implies that we should be able to infer, from a truth sentence of the form ‘x is true’,  a sentence 
of the form ‘There is something in the world which x corresponds to’.  
 There is a wide variety of truth-bearers; the truth predicate can be applied to sentences, 
utterances, statements, propositions, beliefs, assertions, and so forth. Therefore, in discussing a 
theory of truth, it is important to specify what the truth predicate is primarily ascribed to. In this 
thesis, I will assume that the truth predicate is primarily ascribed to a sentence or sentence-like 
entity. The reason is heuristic. First, the version of the correspondence theory that will be 
discussed below is mainly characterized as a theory of truth for sentences. Second, two 
deflationists whose theories I will concentrate on—Horwich and Field—disagree on this very 
issue.
5
 While Horwich takes propositions as primary truth-bearers, Field objects to characterizing 
the deflationary theory of truth as a theory of truth for propositions. Given that there is such a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
truth.  It only means that there is room for making sense of the correspondence intuition. To say that truth is defined 
in terms of correspondence notion is to say that truth is a correspondence property. There will be more discussion on 
this point later in this chapter. See P. Horwich, Truth, 2
nd
 ed., Oxford University Press, 1998, Ch. 1 and Ch. 7.  
3
 W. Kunene, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch. 3.  
4
 By ‘seriously dyadic relation’, Kunene means a property that obtains two objects or entities in the world. Kunne 
says that from ‘Bell fell into oblivion’, nobody would seriously conclude ‘There is something into which Bell fell’. 
But from ‘Mary loves a psychopath’, we conclude ‘There is someone whom Mary loves’. So, ‘love’ expresses a 
seriously dyadic relation. See W. Kunne, ibid. 
 
5
 See H. Field, “Critical Notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1992.  
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disagreement, it is better to characterize a theory of truth for an entity that both deflationists can 
accept. Moreover, ‘proposition’ is a term of art—it is a term that is introduced to do a specific 
job.
6
 As such, there is a disagreement among philosophers about how ‘proposition’ is to be 
understood.
7
 To avoid being tangled into such a complicated issue from the beginning, I decided 
to take sentences or sentence-like entities as the primary truth-bearers. So, in the following, I will 
apply the correspondence theory to sentences, not to propositions.    
 Since there are many varieties of the correspondence theory, let’s begin with the idea that 
all the correspondence theories are committed to. 
8
As was mentioned above, the correspondence 
theorist construes ‘is true’ as expressing a seriously dyadic relation. In this sense, in the 
correspondence theory, the logical form of a truth-statement of the form 1)  
 
1) x is a true sentence 
 
is 2) below: 
 
2) True (x, y).  
 
‘True’ here expresses a two-place, correspondence relation. So, 2) should be in turn understood 
in terms of 3) in the following:  
 
3) Corresponds (x, y). 
 
                                                          
6
 See S. Schiffer, The Things We Mean, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch.1.  
7
 See S. Schiffer, ibid.  
8
 See W. Kunne,  Conceptions of Truth, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch. 3 (“Varieties of Correspondence”).  
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Two questions arise immediately. First, what substitutes for ‘y’ in 3)?  Put differently, what is the 
relatum of the correspondence relation? According to the correspondence theory, to say that a 
sentence is true is to say that there is something that the sentence corresponds to. What is the 
thing that a true sentence corresponds to? Second, what does it mean to say that a true sentence 
corresponds to something? What is the nature of the correspondence relation? An acceptable 
correspondence theory must address both of these questions. In the following I will examine how 
and whether these questions can be answered by the correspondence theory. 
Let’s first deal with the question of the relatum of the correspondence relation; what does a true 
sentence correspond to? Broadly, correspondence theorists have been trying to answer this 
question in one of the following two ways: one is that the relatum of the correspondence relation 
is a fact (or fact-like entity), and the other is it is an object.
9
 Following Kunne, I will call the first 
‘the fact-based correspondence theory’ and the latter ‘the object-based correspondence theory’.10 
According to Kunne, the object-based correspondence theory has a much longer history; 
basically, most correspondence theories developed before the 20 century should be considered 
object-based correspondence theories.
11
 In the following, I will ignore the traditional, object-
based correspondence theory, and focus on the fact-based correspondence theory developed by 
the 20century philosophers. That said, it is not necessary that a correspondence theory invoke 
fact-like entities. As will be explained later, Tarski’s definition of truth provides a way of 
developing a correspondence theory of truth without invoking fact-like entities.  
                                                          
9
 This categorization is not mine; I referred to Kunne’s Conceptions of Truth. I found this categorization very helpful 
to have a better understanding of a correspondence theory of truth. Marian David also makes this distinction in “The 
Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002/2009. But David didn’t make this 
distinction in his Correspondence and Disquotation, Oxford University Press, 1994.  
10
 W. Kunne, ibid.  
11
 See W. Kunne, ibid. Also see Marian David, “The Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2002/2009. Some exceptions are (according to Kunne and David) correspondence conceptions of truth 
entertained by Aristotle, Hume, and Mill. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, D. Hume,  A Treatise of Human Nature (1749), 
and J. S. Mill, System of Logic (1843).  
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1.1 Fact-Based Correspondence Theories: Russell and Wittgenstein  
According to the fact-based correspondence theory, to say that a sentence is true is to say that it 
corresponds to a fact. This theory was proposed by some of the most prominent philosophers in 
the early 20
th
 century; e.g. Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein.
12
 In particular, Russell and 
Wittgenstein developed the fact-based correspondence theory in carrying out their bigger 
philosophical project: logical atomism. 
13
 Put roughly, logical atomism is the idea that the world 
at its most fundamental level is constituted by simple entities (logical atoms), and these simple 
entities form complex entities.
14
 The notion of a fact figures prominently in the formulation of 
this idea. Although Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s theories have a lot in common, there are some 
important differences between them. One of the differences is that while Russell’s theory mainly 
appeals to the notion of a fact, Wittgenstein’s appeals to the notion of a state of affairs as well as 
the notion of a fact. So, in the following I will consider Russell’s theory is best captured by the 
formulation (CF) while Wittgenstein’s by the formulation (CS):  
                                                          
12
 B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” The Monist, 1918, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University 
Press,1912, “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,” Proceedings from Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 2, 1919. pp. 1-43, “On the Nature of Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
7: 28-49, 1906; G. E. Moore, “Truth and Falsity,” in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1901-2, 
reprinted in:  Selected Writings, edited by T. Baldwin.  London and New York: Routledge 1993, 20-22; L. 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus, trans., by Pears and McGuinness, side-by-side-by-side edition, version 
0.24 (August 1, 2011).  
13
 G. E. Moore subscribed to the identity theory (in “Truth and Falsity”, although it is said that he later repudiated 
it). The identity theory of truth is considered an opponent of the correspondence theory of truth (Moore writes it that 
way in “Truth and Falsity”). Contemporary advocates of the identity theory of truth include J. Hornsby and J. Dodd. 
See J. Hornsby, ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XCVII: 1–24, 1997; reprinted 
in M. Lynch, ed., The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT 
Press, 2001, pp. 663–81. 
14
 Russell says that the goal of philosophical analysis is to arrive at logical, not physical, atoms. This makes it 
difficult to understand the metaphysics of logical atomism; what does it mean to say that the world is constituted of 
logical, not physical, atoms? What underlies this peculiar metaphysics of logical atomism is Russell’s (and 
Wittgenstein’s) naïve representationalism (as I call it). Russell believed that the logical structure of an ideal 
language represents the logical structure of the world. This is a suspicious idea for many reasons. First, there is no 
reason to believe that a linguistic analysis can reveal the true, metaphysical, nature of the world. Second, it is not 
clear what is meant by ‘the logical structure of the world’. See B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” 
The Monist, 1918.  
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(CF)   x is a true sentence =Df there is some fact y such that x corresponds to y; 
           x is a false sentence =Df there is no fact y such that x corresponds to y.  
 
(CS)   x is a true sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and  
          y obtains.  
         x is a false sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and  
         y doesn’t  obtain.  
 
I will discuss Russell’s theory first, and then turn to Wittgenstein’s.  
1.1.1 Russell’s Correspondence Theory of Truth 
 According to Russell, the relatum of the correspondence relation is a fact; that is to say, a true 
sentence corresponds to a fact, but a false sentence doesn’t. Russell also says that a fact is what 
makes a sentence (proposition) true or false; in other words, a fact is a truth-maker.
15
 But what is 
a fact? What is the ontological or metaphysical nature of a fact? How many different kinds of 
fact are there? On what grounds can we distinguish one fact from another? Russell never 
provided satisfactory answers to these questions. So, one of the major problems with Russell’s 
fact-based correspondence theory is that the nature of a fact is entirely obscure. To see why let’s 
first examine what Russell himself says of the nature of a fact. According to Russell, a fact is a 
complex entity constituted of simpler entities; Russell says, “I mean by a “fact” anything that is 
                                                          
15
 See B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1912, Ch. 12 “Truth and Falsehood”. 
As is well known, Russell kept changing his philosophical views throughout his career. His views of a proposition 
often shift as well. Indeed, it seems that Russell is simply careless in his use of this term. He sometimes identifies a 
proposition with a fact (B. Russell, “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,” Proceedings from 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 2, 1919, pp. 1-43). At other times (“The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism,” The Monist, 1918) he simply means an indicative sentence by a ‘proposition’. I here follow the second 
meaning of Russell’s notion of a proposition. 
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complex.”16 But of course this explanation is far too thin to individuate facts; i.e., to distinguish 
one fact from another. Without having identity criteria for facts, it is entirely vacuous to say that 
a sentence is true or false by virtue of corresponding to a fact. In order for the notion of a fact is 
to be of explanatory value, we should be able to identify the fact that a given sentence is 
supposed to correspond to. As was mentioned earlier, if truth is a correspondence relation, a 
truth-statement of the form ‘x is true’ should be understood on the par with a statement such as 
‘Mary loves Tom’. Suppose we have no idea how to distinguish Tom from other people. We 
would not be able to determine whether Mary loves Tom or not; in other words, we cannot say 
whether the loving-relation holds between Mary and Tom. Similarly, if the notion of a fact is to 
be of an explanatory value, we need know how to distinguish one fact from another; we need 
identity criteria for facts.  
Unfortunately, Russell never provides a proper account of the identity criteria for facts. Indeed, 
Russell’s explanation of facts is so confusing that it makes us doubt whether it is beneficial to 
invoke the notion of facts in defining the truth and falsity of a sentence. A place to see the 
confusion is Russell’s explanation of a negative fact. According to Russell, facts of the 
rudimentary kind are atomic facts, where atomic facts are defined as the ones constituted of an n-
place relation and n particulars. Russell says that atomic facts are those “contain only one verb 
and neither generality nor its denial.”17 Atomic facts, however, are of two varieties: positive and 
negative. It is relatively easy to understand what positive atomic facts are, but it is by no means 
easy to understand what negative atomic facts are.
18
 He sometimes says that a negative fact is 
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 B. Russell, “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,” p. 1.  
17
 B. Russell, ibid., p.3.  
18
 There are, however, unsettled questions about positive atomic facts as well. First, according to Russell, ordinary 
proper names are not logically proper names; they are disguised definite descriptions. But if ordinary proper names 
are not names, what should count logically proper names? Only expressions that cannot further be analyzed into 
other expressions—for example, ‘this’ or ‘that’—may count  logically proper names. But in such a case how are to 
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what a true negative sentence corresponds; for example, ‘Socrates isn’t alive’ corresponds to the 
negative fact that Socrates isn’t alive. But what is this negative fact? What is it constituted of? 
Since Russell denies that there is something in the world that corresponds to ‘not’, this negative 
fact is constituted of Socrates and the property being alive. But then, how does this negative fact 
differ from the positive fact that Socrates is alive? Is the negative fact that Socrates isn’t alive the 
same as the fact that Socrates is dead?
19
 At other times, Russell invokes a negative fact in order 
to explain the falsity of an atomic sentence; for example, ‘Socrates is alive’ is false because it 
corresponds to the negative fact that there isn’t such a fact that Socrates is alive.20 
When things are this complicated, we may need to suspect the plausibility of the basic 
assumption; in this case, the assumption is that a fact is what makes a sentence true or false. 
Does the notion of a fact do any explanatory work in an explanation of the truth and falsity of a 
sentence? Aren’t we (as Quine once complained) just projecting a fact from a true sentence 
merely for the sake of correspondence?
21
 The murkiness surrounding Russell’s notion of a 
negative fact supports this suspicion. Another factor contributing to this suspicion is that Russell 
invokes a general fact to explain the truth of a general sentence.
22
 Russell’s argument for 
invoking a general fact is that the truth of ‘All men are mortal’ cannot be inferred from the truth 
of each and every sentence such as ‘Socrates is mortal’, ‘Plato is mortal’, and so on. This claim 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
determine the fact that an atomic sentence corresponds to? If we have to appeal to “direct acquaintance”, most facts 
would be beyond our reach. Another problem is that it is not clear how far in space and time we should extend the 
range of positive atomic facts. Do facts include facts in the past and future? Do facts include those in a possible or 
counterfactual world?  
19
 Russell says that the sentence ‘Socrates is dead’ is the conjunction of ‘Socrates was alive’ and ‘Socrates isn’t alive 
now.’ But this answer isn’t satisfactory, since we have another negative sentence ‘Socrates isn’t alive’. See B. 
Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.”  
20
 Russell says, “[T]he absence of a fact is itself a negative fact.” See B. Russell, “On Propositions: What They Are 
and How They Mean,” p.5.  
21
 W. V. Quine, Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1987, p. 213.  
22
 See B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”. It seems, however, that Russell changed his view of 
negative and general facts later. There are also disagreements among Russell’s commentators. Some say that Russell 
accepted the existence of molecular facts as well (see “B. Russell”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).   
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is true in itself. But what reasons do we have to infer from this the conclusion that there is a 
general fact such as the fact that all men are mortal? We have no reason other than the question-
begging one that a true sentence corresponds to a fact. If we accept Russell’s fact-based 
correspondence theory, we have to invoke facts of many different kinds to explain the truth of 
sentences. For example, we need to invoke mathematical facts in order to explain the truth of 
mathematical sentences; we need to invoke moral facts in order to explain the truth of moral 
sentences; we have to invoke aesthetic facts in order to explain the truth of aesthetic sentences; 
and so on.
23
 Indeed, we have to keep invoking a fact of a new kind whenever we confront a non-
truth-functional compound sentence; i.e., a sentence of which the truth isn’t the function of the 
truth of its constituent sentences. Russell denies that there is a molecular fact (such as a 
disjunctive or conjunctive fact) because the truth of a disjunctive or conjunctive sentence can be 
explained in terms of the truth of its constituents. But there are many molecular (compound) 
sentences that are not truth-functional; for example, modal sentences, counterfactual sentences, 
belief-sentences, and so forth. Does that mean we have to invoke modal facts, counterfactual 
facts, belief-facts, and so forth? We may do so, but what explanatory gain is accrued if we do so? 
Does invoking facts explain the truth of sentences at all?  
The answer seems no, because we have no clear idea of how these facts make relevant sentences 
true. While we don’t have any clear idea of what facts are, it is impossible to comprehend how 
facts make sentences true. If facts come in such a wide variety of ways—negative, general, 
mathematical, moral, counterfactual, etc.—then facts cannot be spatio-temporal entities. As 
                                                          
23
 Russell says that there are mathematical facts (See B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” Lecture 1, 
The Monist, 1918). I don’t know whether Russell acknowledged the existence of ethical and aesthetic facts.  
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Kunne says, facts, if they exist, should be abstract entities.
24
 But if facts are abstract entities, in 
what sense do facts make sentences true? In what sense do mathematical facts make 
mathematical sentences true? Similar questions should be raised about facts of other kinds. In 
this way, the problem concerned with the nature of facts gives rise to another major problem 
with the correspondence theory; how sentences and facts are related to each other. Before 
discussing this problem, however, I would like to examine another type of the fact-based 
correspondence theory: the one that defines truth along the lines of (CS).
25,26
 
1.1.2 Wittgenstein’s Correspondence Theory of Truth 
According to Wittgenstein—who may be the first defining truth along the lines of (CS)—an 
atomic sentence represents a state of affairs, and the atomic sentence is true if and only if the 
state of affairs actually obtains in the world.
27
 A state of affairs that actually obtains (or exists) in 
the world is defined as a fact. So, like (CF), (CS) defines truth in terms of correspondence to a 
fact. Unlike (CF) however, (CS) invokes the notion of a state of affairs. By invoking this 
additional notion, (CS) earns some advantages over (CF). One of the advantages is that (CS) has 
a better grip on falsehood than (CF); (CS) provides a simpler way of defining falsehood.
28
 
According to (CF), falsehood is a lack of correspondence to a fact, and this, according to Kunne, 
                                                          
24
 W. Kunne, ibid., p. 144.  
25
 For readers’ convenience, I here reiterate (CS):  
 
(CS)   x is true =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and y obtains.                                   x is 
false =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and y doesn’t obtain.  
 
26
 It may be better to call (CS) ‘the state-affairs-based correspondence theory’ in order to distinguish it from (CF). I 
may use the label in discussing Wittgenstein’s version of the correspondence theory of truth.  
27
 Wittgenstein doesn’t explain what he means by ‘a state of affairs that obtains.’ The only account he gives is that a 
fact, by definition, is a state of affairs that exists. See L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, first 
published by Kegan Paul (London)1922. I referred to Pears/McGuinness English translation; Side-by-side-by-side 
edition, version 0.24 (August 1, 2011).  
28
 I referred to Marian David (Correspondence and Disquotation) on this point. But the argument presented below 
isn’t from David. His reason is that (CS), unlike (CF), can define truth as well as falsehood as relations to reality, 
where truth is a relation to those parts of reality that we refer to as facts. See Marian David, Correspondence and 
Disquotation, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.34.  
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means that a false sentence is in a discordance-relation with the same fact that a true sentence 
corresponds to: 
Russell maintains that not only true sentences, but also false ones correspond to facts. 
In the case of ‘Socrates is dead’ the correspondence is accordance with the fact that Socrates is 
dead, in the case of ‘Socrates is not dead’ it is discordance with the same fact. (For Russell in 
1918 the difference between a true belief and a false belief isn’t like that between a wife and a 
spinster but like that between friend and foe—of the same person.)29 
 
But then, we would have to map even a false sentence onto a fact; even a false sentence is related 
to a fact, where the nature of the relation is explained in terms of “discordance”. An obvious 
problem with this definition of falsehood is that it cries for an explanation of the nature of a 
discordance relation. What does it mean to say that a sentence is in discordance relation with a 
fact? While we don’t have a clear understanding of what is meant by “correspondence relation”, 
it is even harder to understand what is meant by “discordance relation”. By defining falsehood in 
this way, Russell added another obscurity to an already obscure situation. To see how hopeless 
the situation is, let’s consider a sentence such as ‘Madonna is 7 feet tall’. We know that this 
sentence is false. But what fact does this sentence is in discordance with? We cannot say that this 
sentence is in discordance with the fact that Madonna is 7 feet tall, because there is no such fact 
that Madonna is 7 feet tall. Presumably, the most plausible answer is that the sentence ‘Madonna 
is 7 feet tall’ is false because it is in discordance with the fact that Madonna is ___ feet tall, 
where the blank is to be filled by her exact height. But we may not know here exact height 
whereas we know that the sentence is false.  
Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory averts this problem by defining truth and falsehoold in the 
manner of (CS):  
                                                          
29
 W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, pp.118-119.   
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      (CS)   x is a true sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and  
          y obtains.  
         x is a false sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and  
         y doesn’t  obtain.  
 
According to Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory, even a false sentence represents a state of 
affairs, but the state of affairs represented by a false sentence doesn’t obtain (or exist) in this 
world. Hence, if we define falsehood along the lines of (CS), we don’t have to map a false 
sentence onto a fact; we don’t have to invoke a fact in order to define a false sentence. Instead, 
we can define a false sentence as a sentence that represents a possible condition that isn’t 
actualized in the world.
30
 Besides, (CS) explains how a false sentence can still be meaningful 
although it doesn’t correspond to a fact.  Consider the following remark made by Russell:  
[T]he components of the fact which makes a proposition true or false, as the case may be, are the 
meanings of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the proposition.
31
 
 
What Russell is saying here is that the meaning of an atomic sentence is the fact that the sentence 
corresponds to.
32
 So, if an atomic sentence doesn’t correspond to a fact, the atomic sentence is 
                                                          
30
 It seems that Wittgenstein states of affairs are possible situations in which the basic constituents of this word are 
combined in ways that are different from the way they are combined in this world. Facts are just small parts of all 
possible situations. But then, Wittgenstein’s states of affairs may be construed as possible worlds of a certain kind; 
possible worlds that are composed of the same basic ingredients constituting the actual world. The actual world 
differs from possible worlds not in terms of its basic ingredients but in terms of the ways in which those basic 
ingredients are combined.  
31
 B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: Lecture 2,” The Monist, 1918. Russell says that the only 
exception is a logical constant.  
32
 Russell’s theory of meaning and reference is based on the principle of compositionality; the meaning and 
reference of a complex expression is determined by the meanings and references of the symbols that constitute the 
complex expression. The compositionality principle holds not only at the level of a language but also at the level of 
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meaningless. But atomic sentences can be false as well as true. Therefore, in order to make sense 
of the meaningfulness of a false atomic sentence, Russell had to relate such a sentence with a fact 
of some sort; e.g. a negative fact. 
 A major advancement of Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory over Russell’s theory is 
that Wittgenstein doesn’t invoke a fact to explain the meaningfulness of an atomic sentence. 
What makes an atomic (simple) sentence meaningful isn’t a fact but a state of affairs that is 
represented by it  Indeed, Wittgenstein defines the notion of a state of affairs as the meaning of 
an atomic sentence. Wittgenstein says:  
2.201 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents. 
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space. 
. 
2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.
33
 
 
A picture here is an atomic sentence, and the possibility of the situation is the existence or non-
existence of the state of affairs represented by an atomic sentence. According to Wittgenstein, an 
atomic sentence, like a picture, comes to have a meaning by representing a state of affairs. So, 
the state of affairs represented by an atomic sentence is the meaning of the atomic sentence. 
What constitutes a state of affairs, however, isn’t something like a Fregean sense; i.e., an 
intensional entity such as a mode of presentation or way of thinking of an object. Rather, it is an 
extensional entity such as the referent of a name and the property (or class) determined by a 
predicate. For example, an atomic sentence such as ‘Madonna is a dog’ represents a state of 
affairs that is constituted of Madonna and the property doghood (or the class of dogs). So, if a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reality. In other words, a fact is a complex entity, and it is constituted of entities to which simple symbols 
correspond. From these, we can infer that a fact is the meaning of an atomic sentence to which it corresponds.  
33
 What Wittgenstein means by ‘picture’, of course, is an atomic sentence. See L. Wittgenstein, ibid.  
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state of affairs is the meaning of an atomic sentence, it should be a meaning of a particular kind; 
the meaning that constitutes the truth condition of an atomic sentence. According to Wittgenstein, 
an atomic sentence represents a possible situation—state of affairs—and the atomic sentence is 
true if and only if the possible situation obtains. So, the state of affairs represented by an atomic 
sentence is the condition to be met in order for the sentence to be true; i.e., a truth-condition. If 
we put this together with what was stated in the previous paragraph—that a state of affairs is the 
meaning of an atomic sentence—we arrive at the conclusion that a state of affairs in Wittgenstein 
in Tractatus is both the meaning and the truth condition of an atomic sentence. 
 One may consider it an advantage that Wittgenstein’s notion of a state of affairs has this 
double function. The fact of the matter, however, is just the opposite; it makes identity criteria 
for states of affairs impossible. To see why let’s consider a pair of sentences involving co-
referential singular terms such as ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’.34 Do ‘Superman flies’ and 
‘Clark Kent flies’ represent the same state of affairs or not? On the one hand, it seems they 
should represent the same state of affairs, since states of affairs, according to Wittgenstein, are 
the truth conditions of atomic sentences. ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent flies’ must have the 
same truth condition, since ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are co-referential singular terms.  
A state of affairs, however, is also the meaning of an atomic sentence. Do ‘Superman flies’ and 
‘Clark Kent flies’ have the same meaning? By almost any standard, the correct answer should be 
‘No.’ I said “almost” because some philosophers insist that the meaning of a singular term is 
simply its reference and the meaning of a predicate the extension it is true of.
35
 But as is argued 
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 Let’s here assume, for the sake of argument, that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are not fictional but real names.  
35
 The advocates of the so-called ‘direct-reference view of proper names’ (e.g. Soames and Nathan Salmon) are of 
this view. According to the direct-reference view of proper names, the semantic content of a proper name is simply 
its referent, and the semantic content of a sentence containing a proper name is simply a Russellian proposition—a 
proposition composed of n-objects and an n-place property. Russell advocated this view, hence the name ‘Russellian 
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by Devitt, the meaning of an expression should be a property that is concerned with causing 
behavior.
36
 ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent flies’ can cause vastly different behavior; for 
example, Lois Lane assents to the former, but dissents to the latter. So, if a state of affairs is the 
meaning of an atomic sentence, these sentences must represent distinct states of affairs.  
 Thus, we are split between two mutually incompatible identity criteria for states of affairs; 
one is that a state of affairs is the truth condition of an atomic sentence, and the other is that it is 
the meaning of an atomic sentence. It seems that we cannot keep both. To be sure, the truth-
condition of a sentence is part of the meaning of the sentence. The problem with Wittgenstein’s 
notion of a state of affairs, however, is that a state of affairs is identified with the meaning of a 
sentence; it is as a whole the meaning of a sentence. This makes it impossible to sustain the 
notion of a state of affairs as it is characterized by Wittgenstein. The notion of a state of affairs in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is supposed to be both an extensional and an intensional entity at the 
same time, but this doesn’t seem a viable idea. Something has to be given up, and what needs to 
be given up is the idea that the state of affairs represented by an indicative sentence is as a whole 
the meaning of the sentence. Instead, a state of affairs needs to be characterized as an entity that 
encapsulates only the truth condition of an indicative sentence, and a representational relation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proposition’. Wittgenstein also advocated this view. It should be noted, however, that Russell and Wittgenstein 
didn’t consider most proper names in ordinary language proper names in a strict, logical, sense. See M. Devitt, “Still 
Against Direct Reference,” in Prospects for Meaning, ed., R. Schantz, Berlin” Walter de Gruyter, 2010.  
36
 According to Devitt, a semantic property—meaning—should be a property of an expression that plays the 
following two roles: explaining behavior and guiding us to reality. Devitt defends himself a truth-referential or 
representational view of semantic content—the view that the semantic content of an expression is entirely 
constituted by representational properties. But Devitt’s view is different from the direct-reference view of a proper 
name. According to Devitt, the semantic content of a name is a property of referring to an object under a specific 
mode. See M. Devitt, ibid.  
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needs to be characterized in a purely truth-conditional way as well. Contemporary advocates of a 
state of affairs seem to accept this modified Wittgensteinian notion of a state of affairs.
37
  
 So, let’s recast Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory of truth using this modified notion 
of a state of affairs. On this modified theory, a true sentence is still defined as a sentence that 
represents a state of affairs that exists in the world. But the state of affairs that is represented by a 
sentence doesn’t exhaust the meaning of the sentence; it is simply an entity that encapsulates the 
truth condition of the sentence. But even in this modified sense, Wittgenstein’s theory has 
problems. First, a state of affairs is still an ontologically dubious entity.  Let’s reconsider the 
sentence ‘Madonna is 7 feet tall’. According to Wittgenstein’s theory, this sentence is false 
because it represents the state of affairs that Madonna is 7 feet tall, and this state of affairs 
doesn’t exist in the world. But what is the state of affairs that Madonna is 7 feet tall? It is one 
thing to say that the sentence ‘Madonna is 7 feet tall’ has as its truth condition that Madonna is 7 
feet tall, and another to say that the sentence represents the state of affairs that Madonna is 7 feet 
tall. According to Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory, we have to understand the first (the 
truth condition of the sentence) in terms of the second (the state of affairs represented by the 
sentence). But what do we gain by doing so? Instead of gaining anything, we only seem to create 
unnecessary problems. This raises the suspicion that a state of affairs—just like a fact—is a 
theoretically vacuous notion; i.e., a notion that doesn’t do any explanatory work.  
           The second problem with the Wittgensteinian correspondence theory is derivative of the 
first problem. Given that the ontological status of a state of affairs is obscure, it is hard to explain 
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 For example, according to the view that defines a state of affairs as a state of a possible world, the state of affairs 
that Madonna is 7 feet tall is true if and only if there is a possible world in which Madonna is 7 feet tall. When a 
state of affairs is defined this way, it has only a minimal connection with the meaning of a sentence; that is, if two 
sentences have the same meaning, then they should represent the same state of affairs. On the possible world 
account of states of affairs, a state of affairs is a conceptual apparatus that is employed to specify the truth condition 
of a sentence involving modality.  
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the nature of the representational relation between a sentence and a state of affairs. Wittgenstein 
avoided addressing this question entirely by saying that language can only show, but cannot say, 
how it represents the world. This is a quite an implausible idea which is based on an incorrect 
analogy between a picture and a language. In order to explain the representational relation 
between a sentence and a state of affairs, it is essential to define it recursively in terms of the 
representational relations between the constituents of a sentence and the constituents of a state of 
affairs. But even this is not enough, since a state of affairs isn’t simply a conglomeration of 
entities; it is supposed to have a structure. For example, the state of affairs that Tom loves Mary 
is supposed to be distinct from the state of affairs that Mary loves Tom. Moreover, a state of 
affairs isn’t necessarily part of the actual world; if it were, it couldn’t be distinguished from a 
fact. This makes it even harder to explain the nature of the representational relation between a 
sentence and a state of affairs. Without an account of the nature of the representational relation, 
the nature of the correspondence relation couldn’t be explained. That means the Wittgensteinian 
correspondence theory would have a hard time in explaining the nature of the correspondence 
relation. So, for the life of the correspondence theory, it would be better to advance the theory 
without invoking an entity such as a fact or state of affairs. In the next section, I will explain how 
Tarski’s definition of truth shed light on that idea.   
 
1.2 Field’s Criticism of Tarski’s Theory of Truth 
The purpose of this section is to motivate the motivation for the deflationary theory of truth. As 
will be discussed in the next section, one of the chief motivations for the deflationary theory is 
that there is a serious problem with the correspondence theory of truth. In explaining what this 
problem is, it is essential to discuss Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory of truth. The reason isn’t 
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so much that Tarski’s theory of truth is in itself a correspondence theory of truth. As is well 
known, there have been many controversies whether Tarski really intended to give a 
correspondence theory of truth with his definition of truth.
38
 The merit of Tarski’s theory of truth, 
however, seems that it is neutral between the correspondence theory and the deflationary theory. 
Being neutral, it has an affinity both with the deflationary theory and the correspondence theory. 
In this section, I will mostly focus on its affinity with the correspondence theory of truth. More 
precisely, I will focus on how the technique employed in Tarski’s definition of truth can be of 
use to develop the correspondence theory of truth that is free from the problems with the fact-
based correspondence theory. Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory needs to be appreciated from 
that perspective as well; namely, from the perspective of the correspondence theory of truth 
developed out of Tarski’s definition of truth.39 
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 Popper, Gila Sher, and the earlier Davidson understand Tarski’s definition of truth as a version of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Soames, the later Davidson, Etchemendy, and many others, however, don’t think 
that there is any interesting connection between Tarski’s definition of truth and the correspondence theory of truth. 
In my view, Devitt’s understanding of Tarski’s definition of truth seems most adequate: although Tarski intended his 
theory to be a version of the correspondence theory, the theory that he actually presented is more like a version of 
the deflationary theory of truth. See K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London, 1963,  G. Sher 
“On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth”, Synthese 117, 1998, H. Putnam, “A Comparison of 
Something with Something Else”, New Literary History17: 61-79, 1985, S. Soames, “What is a Theory of Truth?”, 
Journal of Philosophy 81, 411-429, 1984, S. Soames, Understanding Truth, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1999, J. Etchemendy, “Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 53,51-79, 1989, M. 
Devitt, “The Metaphysics of Truth,” in The Nature of Truth, ed. Michael Lynch, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, 
579-61. 
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 As for the references for Tarski’s own work, I referred to A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the 
Foundation of Semantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 1944; “The Concept of Truth in 
Formalized Languages,” Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956; and “The 
Establishment of Scientific Semantics,” Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. I 
also referred to secondary sources; S. Soames, ‘What is a Theory of Truth?’ The Journal Of Philosophy, Vol. 80. 
No. 8. 1984: 411-429, Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press, 1998; J. McDowell, ‘Physicalism and 
Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski’. Erkenntnis Vol. 13. 1978: 131-152; H. Putnam, ‘A Comparison of 
Something with Something Else’. New Literary History17, 1985: 61-79; G. Sher, ‘What is Tarski’s Theory of 
Truth’. Topoi 18,1999: 149-166; P. Raatikainen,  “Truth, Meaning, and Translation,” New Essays on Tarski and 
Philosophy. (Douglas Patterson, Ed.) Oxford University Press, 2008; W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford 
University Press, 2003; J. Etchemendy, “Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, 
1988:51-79.  
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 Tarski’s definition of truth is intended as a definition of truth for sentences. A sentence in 
Tarski’s semantic concept of truth is not an uninterpreted syntactic entity; it is a fully interpreted 
entity with its meaning built into it. It makes sense to talk about the meaning of a sentence only 
when it is relativized to a language. So, Tarski’s definition of truth is relativized to a specific 
language. There is of course an even more important reason why Tarski’s definition of truth is 
relativized to a specific language: to avoid a semantic paradox. One of the main objectives of 
Tarski’s definition of truth is to define truth in such a way that when we employ the concept of 
truth in accordance with his definition, we can avoid a semantic paradox. According to Tarski, 
our ordinary notion of truth gives rise to a semantic paradox because we ascribe the truth-
predicate without making a hierarchical order of languages. In order to avoid a semantic paradox, 
Tarski suggests that we make distinctions between an object-language and a meta-language. In 
Tarski’s theory, an object-language is characterized as the language for which truth is defined, 
whereas a meta-language as the language in terms of which the truth for the object-language is 
defined. But then, in order for the truth of an object-language to be defined in terms of the 
expressions of a meta-language, the vocabulary of a meta-language should always be richer than 
the vocabulary of an object-language. More precisely, a meta-language should involve semantic 
expressions that are ascribed to expressions of an object-language; it should involve either 
object-language expressions themselves or their translations; it should involve names or 
structural descriptions of object-language sentences; etc. As a result, a truth predicate that is 
defined in a Tarski-style cannot be legitimately ascribed a language it belongs to. Tarski’s truth-
definition doesn’t permit an ascription of a truth predicate to a sentence that already involves a 
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truth predicate unless there is a difference between the levels of the truth predicates. For example 
a Tarski-style truth definition doesn’t allow us to ascribe ‘T1’ (the truth predicate of the level 1) 
to a sentence of the form ‘‘s’ is T1’ or ‘‘s’ is not T1’. Since self-ascription of this kind is the 
ultimate source of a semantic paradox, and a failure of making a hierarchical order of languages 
yields a semantic paradox, Tarski’s definition of truth showed a way to avoid a semantic paradox.  
 In addition to the requirement of making a hierarchical order of languages, Tarski 
imposed two further conditions that an adequate definition of truth must satisfy; namely, 
material adequacy and formal correctness. According to Tarski, a definition of truth for a 
specific language L is materially adequate if it satisfies Contention T; that is, if it implies an 
instance of the following schema for each and every indicative sentence of L:  
 
(T)    s is true in L iff p,  
 
where ‘s’ is to be replaced by the quotation-name (structural description) of an object-language 
sentence s, and ‘p’ is to be replaced by a meta-language sentence that means the same as ‘s’ in an 
object-language L. The rationale for the condition of material adequacy is that an adequate 
definition of truth must correctly determine the extension of true sentences in an object-language 
L. The correct extension of true sentences in an object-language is in turn determined by ordinary 
speakers’ intuition of truth; the class of true sentences in an object-language L is the class of 
sentences that the speakers in L consider to be true. So, the definition of truth for an object-
language L should satisfy Convention T so that it can determine the correct extension of true 
sentences in L. In addition, Convention T is imposed on the definition of truth for L so that the 
definition squares with the ordinary intuition of truth that had by the speakers of L.  
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 Tarski’s condition of formal correctness states that an adequate definition of truth for an 
object-language L should not employ in its definiens a semantic concept that isn’t previously 
defined in terms of a non-semantic term. The motivation for this condition may be understood in 
two different ways. First, it may be designed to make sure that the definition of truth isn’t 
circular. Tarski characterizes his definition of truth as the ‘semantic definition of truth’. Since 
semantic concepts are inter-connected, if an undefined semantic concept is employed in the 
definition of truth, the definition will be circular. Second, as Field emphasizes, it may be that 
Tarski was really serious about the harmony between semantic concepts and the postulates of the 
unity of science and physicalism.
40
 In other words, the condition of formal correctness may have 
been motivated by the desire to incorporate semantic concepts into a physicalistic view of the 
world.  
 Now, how is Tarski’s definition of truth relevant to the discussion of the correspondence 
theory? Its relevance is that the recursive method (or technique) Tarski employs in his definition 
of truth introduces a new way in which the correspondence theory can be developed.  Of course, 
it isn’t Tarski who introduced a recursive method to the definition of truth. As was explained in 
the previous section, Russell and Wittgenstein also employs a recursive technique in 
characterizing their correspondence theories of truth. Tarski’s definition of truth incorporates this 
idea but pushes this method further—into the definition of the truth of a simple sentence. In 
Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s theories, only the truth of a compound sentence is recursively 
defined. In their theories, a simple sentence is the smallest unit of a language, and so, the truth of 
a simple sentence isn’t defined recursively. Instead, the truth of a simple sentence is defined in 
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 Field asks what the purpose Tarski’s explicit definition of truth can serve that cannot be served by a definition of 
truth that employs an unexplicated semantic notion. Field finds the answer in Tarski’s attempt to bring semantics 
into harmony with the postulates of the unity of science and physicalism. See H. Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.” 
Kunene, however, says that Field overreacted to Tarski’s somewhat incidental remark on physicalism. See W. 
Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, Ch.4, Oxford University Press, 2003.  
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terms of the correspondence relation to a fact or state of affairs. What makes Tarski’s definition 
of truth ingenious, however, is that he applies the recursive technique to the definition of a 
simple sentence. To be more precise, in Tarski’s semantics, the smallest unit of language isn’t a 
simple sentence but a sentential function; i.e., an open sentence. And then, in order to define the 
truth of a sentence in terms of a sentential function, Tarski brings in the notion of satisfaction. 
Satisfaction is a relation between a sentential function and an object in the world, and it is itself 
recursively defined as follows:  
 
(S)    An open sentence ‘Pxk’ in an object-language L is satisfied by a sequence of objects <a1, . . , 
an>  iff Pak (where ak is the k-th member of the sequence of objects).
41
  
 
In Tarski’s semantics, satisfaction is the most fundamental semantic notion in terms of which 
other semantic concepts such as the concepts of truth and denotation are defined. By invoking 
the notion of satisfaction, Tarski’s recursive definition of truth comes to have two virtues that are 
lacked by Russell-and-Wittgenstein’s recursive definition. One is that it better handles the 
definition of truth for a universally quantified sentence, and the other is that Tarski’s definition 
provides the correspondence theorist with a way of dispensing with facts or states of affairs. 
These two features are related, since Russell had to invoke a general fact in order to define the 
truth of a universally quantified sentence. Wittgenstein denied the existence of a general fact; 
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 If the meta-language is not an expansion of the object-language L, we have to use an expression that translates ‘P’. 
So, Kunne says that a definition of satisfaction is materially adequate if it meets Convention S (instead of 
Convention T):  
 
Convention S: A definition of satisfaction for an object-language L is materially adequate iff it implies all sentences 
that can be obtained from  the schema (S):  
 
      (S) For any object y, y satisfies ɸ in L iff p ,  
 
if one replaces ‘ɸ’ with a revealing designator of an open sentence in L and ‘p’ with a meta-language expression that 
translates the open sentence. See W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, 198.   
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instead, he regarded a universally quantified sentence as equivalent to infinite conjunctions of 
simple sentences. Tarski’s strategy is more in line with Wittgenstein’s, but it has more generality 
and so is simpler. Tarski defines the truth of a universally quantified sentence in the way below:  
 
(S
u
)   ∀xkA is true in L iff, for every sequence s' that is different from s at most in the k-th place, 
A is true.  
 
The difference between a variable and a name is that a variable can be replaced by any name; i.e., 
both by a name that is included in an object language and by a name that will be included in the 
language. So, by taking a sentential function (open sentence) as the fundamental unit of a 
language, Tarski could give an explicit definition of truth for a sentence involving universal 
quantification. Last, the truth of a sentence is defined, and in Tarski’s formalized language, the 
truth of a sentence is taken care of as a limiting case. Tarski says,  
It turns out that for a sentence only two cases are possible: a sentence is either satisfied by all 
objects, or by no objects. Hence we arrive at a definition of truth and falsehood simply by saying 
that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise.
42
 
 
 In order to see, however, the full implication of Tarski’s definition of truth on the 
correspondence theory, we have to consider how Tarski’s definition can be extended to a natural 
language. Tarski’s theory was originally put forward as a definition of truth for a sentence in a 
formalized language. The basic principles of Tarski’s theory, however, can be used to define the 
truth of a sentence in natural language. Unlike a formalized language, a natural language has 
names, which means that a theory of reference or denotation is required. Tarski in effect defines 
the notion of denotation in terms of the notion of satisfaction as follows:  
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 A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of Semantics,” p. 353.  
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To say that the name x denotes a given object a is the same as to stipulate that the object a . . . 
satisfies a sentential function of a particular type. In colloquial language it would be a function 
which consists of three parts in the following order: a variable, the word 'is' and the given name 
x.
43
 
 
If we add to this Tarski’s characterization of satisfaction, and we get 1):            
  
1) To say that the name ‘N’ in English denotes a given object a is the same as to 
stipulate that ‘N’s ‘France’ and a is France; ‘N’ is ‘Germany’ and a is Germany; or . . . 
or ‘N’ is ‘Korea’ and a is Korea.  
 
A statement such as 1) is Tarski’s theory of denotation for names in one’s own language. For 
foreign names, Tarski’s theory of denotation goes in the manner of 2):  
 
2) To say that the name ‘N’ in German denotes a given object a is the same as to 
stipulate that ‘N’ is ‘Frankreich’ and a is France; ‘N’ is ‘Deutschland’ and a is 
Germany; or . . . or ‘N’ is ‘Korea’ and a is Korea. 
 
Once the notion of denotation is defined in the manners of 1) and 2), the truth of a simple 
sentence in a natural language L is recursively defined. In other words, a T-sentence of the form 
such as  
 
3) ‘P(e)’ in L is true iff P(e) 
 
or  
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 This is Field’s quote of Tarski. See H. Field “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, 
p.15. It is originally from A. Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in Logic, Semantics, and 
Metamathematics, p. 194.  
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4) ‘P*(e)’ in L* is true iff P(e)  
 
is derived from the definitions of denotation (such as 1) or 2) and of satisfaction.
44
  
 Presented this way, it is clear that Tarski’s theory of truth isn’t per se a version of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Although Tarski called his theory of truth ‘the semantic 
definition of truth,’ there is nothing so much semantic about his definition of truth.45 The reason 
has mainly due to the way he characterizes the notion of satisfaction. As was mentioned earlier, 
in Tarski’s theory, satisfaction is the most fundamental semantic notion in terms of which all the 
other semantic notions are defined. The way Tarski characterizes the notion of satisfaction, 
however, makes his theory almost (if not entirely) circular. To see why let’s consider (S) that 
was illustrated above: (S) An open sentence ‘Pxk’ in an object-language L is satisfied by a 
sequence of objects <a1, . . , an>  iff Pak (where ak is the k-th member of the sequence of objects. 
This characterization of satisfaction assumes that the predicate ‘P’ in the object-language L 
stands for the property being P. Tarski makes this assumption but not in these semantic terms; he 
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 3) is a case in which the object-language L is the same as the meta-language; that is, L is the truth-ascriber’s own 
language. 4) is a case in which the object-language L* is a foreign language.  
45
 This is a well-known criticism of Tarski’s theory of truth. For example, Putnam states that Tarski’s truth 
predicates have nothing to do with semantics or the ordinary conception of truth. (H. Putnam, “A Comparison of 
Something with Something Else”, New Literary History 17: 61-79, 1985). Davidson agrees with this criticism in his 
later years (in “The Structure and the Content of Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 6, 1990,  pp. 279-
328). The point of the criticism is that Tarski’s theory of truth doesn’t make any systematic connection between 
meaning- or use-properties with the concept of truth. Putnam’s criticism is that Tarski’s theory cannot explain why 
‘Snow is white’ would have had been true iff snow is black if ‘white’ had meant the same as ‘black’ (or if ‘white’ 
had been used in the way we use ‘black’). As I stated at the outset, however, Tarski’s sentences are fully interpreted 
ones (Soames makes this point in his “What is a Theory of Truth?,” The Journal of Philosophy 81, 411-429, 1984). 
Tarski’s theory of truth assumes that the semantic properties of sentences are fully determined and explained by 
something other than the definition of truth. Indeed, Tarski’s theory cannot even explain why a certain sentence in 
an object-language L has the truth condition that it has. In that sense, Putnam’s criticism is correct; Tarski’s theory 
doesn’t provide any answer to usual semantic questions. But then, why did he call his theory ‘the semantic 
conception of truth’? I am not sure; it seems that he didn’t think hard enough when he used the term ‘semantic’. 
That said, nobody can deny Tarski’s contribution to semantics. Tarski’s theory seems to provide a logical tool for 
the development of semantic theories. If the logical tool (his logical-recursive analysis of language) is not of use to a 
theory of truth, it is still of use to a theory of meaning.  
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rather appeals to the notion of translation.
46
 The fact that he appeals to the notion of translation 
doesn’t make his definition of truth circular as long as the notion of translation isn’t defined in 
terms of semantic notions (such as reference, denotation, or truth). But if Tarski really meant his 
theory of truth to be a semantic definition of truth, he eventually had to deal with a semantic 
question; for example, what makes the predicate ‘P’ in L stand for the property being P? Tarski, 
however, never addressed semantic questions of this kind, and this makes his theory vulnerable 
to Field’s criticism that I will introduce shortly.  
 Of course, Tarski’s theory many be defended in the way Soames or Etchemendy does; in 
other words, by construing the goal of Tarski’s theory in a deflationary way. Or as Devitt says, 
Tarski intended to give a correspondence theory of truth but ended up presenting a deflationary 
theory. But if so, what’s the point of talking about Tarski’s theory in discussing the 
correspondence theory of truth? The point is that the reductive technique found in Tarski’s 
theory enables the correspondence theorist to develop the correspondence theory without 
invoking cumbersome entities such as facts or states of affairs. Russell and Wittgenstein had to 
invoke these entities as the relata of simple sentences mainly because they didn’t have Tarski’s 
ingenious recursive technique. Since Tarski defines the truth of a simple sentence in terms of the 
satisfaction of a predicate by an object, it isn’t necessary to hypostasize entities such as facts or 
states of affairs. Instead, the correspondence theory of truth of a Tarski-style needs to invoke 
only the objects that are referred to by names and the properties that are stood for by predicates. 
This is a huge advantage because these entities—compared to entities such as facts or states of 
affairs—are both ontologically and conceptually less troublesome. So, the correspondence theory 
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 Tarski assumes that an object-language sentence that replaces ‘s’ and a meta-language sentence that replaces ‘p’ 
in an instance of T-sentence of the form ‘‘s’ is true in L iff p’ have the same meaning. Tarski, however, didn’t build 
the notion of meaning or translation into the definition of truth. Nor did he attempt to give an account of the 
meaning of an object-language sentence. He rather assumed that the meaning of an object-language sentence is 
already well defined, and used it in his definition of truth.  
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of a Tarski-style doesn’t need to define the truth of a sentence in terms of correspondence to a 
fact or state of affairs that exists. Instead, it can define the truth of a sentence along the lines of 5) 
as follows:  
 
5) ‘Pa’ is true in L =Df the object referred to by ‘a’ in L has the property that the 
predicate ‘P’ in L stands for.  
 
A definition of truth along the lines of 5), however, cannot by itself be considered a 
correspondence theory of truth, because it doesn’t say anything about the nature of the semantic 
relations between objects and names and predicates and the properties that the predicates stand 
for. In effect, 5) is it itself compatible with both the correspondence and the deflationary 
conceptions of truth.
47
 In order to develop 5) into a correspondence theory of truth, we need a 
theory that explains the nature of the semantic relation between objects and names and predicates 
and properties in a correspondence way. Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory can be appreciated 
from this perspective. According to Field, Tarski failed to meet his own stated policy: that he 
will not make use of any semantic concept if he is not able previously to reduce to other 
concepts.”48 This shouldn’t be taken as implying that Tarski’s definition of truth explicitly 
violated this policy. A definition of truth along the lines 5) explicitly violates Tarski’s stated 
policy, since 5) employs semantic terms in the definition of truth.
49
 Unlike 5), Tarski’s definition 
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 It depends on how the notions of reference and standing for are further defined. If these notions are defined in a 
minimalistic way—in terms of implicit definitions involving infinite lists—then 5) is compatible with the 
deflationary notions of truth and reference. If the notions of reference and standing for are explicitly defined, 5) isn’t 
compatible with the deflationary theory.  
48
 H. Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, p.7.  
49
 A definition of truth along the lines of 5) is not Tarski’s definition of truth. Indeed, a definition of truth along the 
lines of 5) is what Field calls ‘Tarski*s theory of truth’—the truth definition that Field calls ‘T1’. In “Tarski’s 
Theory of Truth,” Field compares two truth definitions: T1 and T2. T2 is Tarski’s theory of truth, and T1 is similar 
to Tarski’s theory, but it explicitly employs semantic concepts such as ‘denotes’ and ‘applies to’ in the definition of 
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eliminates all the semantic terms in the definition of truth by replacing them with extensionally 
equivalent concepts. More precisely, Tarski succeeds in eliminating the notion of truth by 
defining it in terms of satisfaction and denotation, and then he eliminates the notion of denotation 
by giving extensionally correct definitions such as 1) and 2). Definitions such as 1) and 2) satisfy 
Tarski’s conditions of material adequacy and formal correctness; they determine the correct 
extension of ‘N refers to a’ in an object-language L; they are also formally correct since no 
semantic term is explicitly employed in their definiens. So, it appears that Tarski lived up to his 
stated policy; he eliminated all the semantic concepts by replacing them with extensionally 
equivalent concepts that don’t explicitly involve semantic terms. So, why does Field say that 
Tarski failed to meet his own standard?  
The reason, in short, is that to replace a concept with an extensionally equivalent concept isn’t 
the same as reducing the concept into another concept. To argue for this point, Field appeals to 
an analogy to the concept of valence. Consider the following definition of the concept of valence:  
 
6) (∀E) (∀n) (E has a valence n = C is potassium and n is +1, or …or E is sulphur and 
n is -2).50 
 
This definition is extensionally correct, and thus it enables us to replace the concept of valence 
with its extensional equivalents. This definition, however, doesn’t reduce a chemical fact into a 
non-chemical fact; i.e., a physicalistic fact of a more fundamental kind. But why is it necessary 
to reduce a chemical fact into a non-chemical/physicalistic fact? The rationale is derived from 
the idea of physicalism: the idea that chemical facts, biological facts, psychological facts, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
truth. Interestingly, Field says that Tarski should have offered the truth definition T1 instead of T2. Field’s point is 
that T1 plus a physicalistic reduction of primitive denotation would constitute an ideal correspondence theory of 
truth.  
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semantical facts are all explicable in terms of physical facts.
51
 Field says that if 6) had been the 
only definition available for the concept of valence, scientists would have eventually had to give 
up the concept of valence.
52
 Fortunately, chemists could establish the reduction of the concept of 
valence to physical properties, and so the concept of valence was saved from being thrown away. 
 So, there are two reasons why Field demands a physicalistic reduction of semantic 
concepts, especially, the concept of denotation (or reference). First, Tarski said himself that he 
would not employ any previously unreduced semantic concept in his definition of truth. More 
importantly, if the notion of truth plays an explanatory role that is similar to that of the notion of 
valence, the notion of truth should be explicated in terms of physicalistic concepts. The notion of 
valence, being a chemical concept, enters into causal explanations of chemical elements. So, to 
say that the notion of truth plays the kind of explanatory role played by the notion of valence is 
to say that truth plays a causal-explanatory role. But if truth plays a causal-explanatory role, then 
there has to be an explanation of how it plays the role. Such an explanation requires a 
physicalistic reduction of the property of truth.  
 So, Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory of truth may be best appreciated not as a criticism 
of Tarski’s theory per se but as a criticism of a correspondence theory of truth of a Tarskian style 
without a theory of primitive denotation. Whether or not Tarski aimed to give a correspondence 
theory of truth, Tarski’s theory isn’t of itself a correspondence theory. The recursive technique 
that Tarski uses in his theory, however, offers an invaluable tool for the development of a 
correspondence theory. Field recognized this value, but he also recognized that a correspondence 
theory of a Tarskian style without a theory of primitive denotation cannot satisfy the demands of 
a correspondence theory of truth.  
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 See H. Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.”  
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 H. Field, ibid.  
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1.3. The Motivations for the Deflationary Theory of Truth 
Motivations for a theory are not the same as the arguments for it; the former usually alludes to 
the problems that the theory aims to solve, while the latter alludes to the reasons that support the 
theory. They sometimes, however, overlap with each other, and this is the case with one of the 
motivations for the deflationary theory.  
There are at least two major motivations for the deflationary theory. One is that the prospect of 
constructing its major rivalry theory—the correspondence theory—is very dim. The other is that 
the role of truth, as Horwich says, isn’t as it appears to be; the role of truth isn’t what Field 
thought it was when he demanded a reductive/correspondence theory of truth in his ‘Tarski’s 
Theory of Truth.” According to deflationists, the role of truth is purely logical, and therefore, the 
theory of truth has only a minimal theoretical duty to satisfy—to explain what makes the concept 
of truth serve relevant logical functions. This means that if deflationists’ view of the role of truth 
is correct, all the inflationary theories of truth—including the correspondence theory—are 
inherently wrongheaded.  
The two motivations for deflationism are complementary. Anomalies accumulated in searching 
for an adequate correspondence theory may have inspired a new paradigm of the concept of truth. 
That said, they are concerned with significantly different problems with the correspondence 
theory of truth. The first motivation addresses a problem that arises within the correspondence 
theory of truth. In other words, it addresses a problem that arises when we accept the idea that 
truth is a correspondence notion. The second motivation, by contrast, challenges the very idea 
that truth is a correspondence notion. So, the second motivation stands even without the first 
motivation, although not vice versa. Despite so, I will discuss both motivations in the following. 
38 
 
Deflationism, as I understand, isn’t just about the concept of truth but about a host of related 
concepts. The deflationary theory of truth can properly appreciated only against the rich history 
of theories of meaning and content that goes back to Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. A 
discussion of the problems with the correspondence theory will hopefully shed some light on 
understanding the historical background of the deflationary theory of truth.  
 
1.3.1. Motivation 1—Problems with Reductive Theories of Reference 
  
Let’s say that we accept the correspondence conception of truth. Let’s also say that an adequate 
correspondence theory of truth should be developed in a Tarskian style for the reason that was 
explained above; that is, to eschew mysterious entities such as facts or states of affairs. In 
addition, let’s suppose that Field is right in saying that a correspondence theory of truth needs a 
reductive theory of primitive denotation. Then, the next question to be answered is what it takes 
to give a reductive theory of reference. In this subsection, I will discuss the problems that arise in 
answering this question.  
 According to Devitt, there are at least three reductive/physicalistic theories of reference 
advanced in the 20
th
 century; the first is Kripke-Putnam’s causal-historical theory, the second is 
the informational theory of representation, and the third is the teleological theory of 
representation.
53
 All these theories appeal to the notion of a causal relation between an 
expression (either a linguistic or mental expression) and an object in the world.  Besides, they are 
chronologically and theoretically related to each other; in particular, the teleological theory is a 
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development of the informational theory of representation. Each of these theories has many 
variants and has been subject to wild discussions. Since it is beyond capacity to examine the 
details of these theories, I will concentrate on one question that all these theories ultimately have 
to deal with; namely, the question whether any of these theories succeeds in justifying the truth 
of a disquotational reference-statement such as 1) below:  
 
1) ‘cat’ (in English) refers to a cat. 
 
Like Tarski’s theory of truth, a reductive theory of reference aims to give an explicit definition of 
reference; it aims to define the notion of reference in terms of non-semantic terms in the style of 
(R
C
):  
       (R
C
)   x refers to y =Df x bears a non-semantic/physical relation R to y.  
 
Given that a reductive theory of reference aims to offer an explicit definition of reference, we 
may speak of some conditions that these theories must satisfy. These conditions are parallel to 
the two conditions that Tarski imposes on a definition of truth; formal correctness and material 
adequacy. The formal correctness of a theory of reference is already characterized by Field; 
namely, a reductive theory of reference should not employ undefined semantic terms in its 
definiens. Hence, we have (R
C
) above.  
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A reductive theory of reference, however, should also be materially adequate if it is to correctly 
determine the extension of the reference.
54
 Tarski characterizes material adequacy for a theory of 
truth in terms of Contention T: that is, an adequate theory of truth for an object-language L 
should entail all the instances of (T) below:  
 
(T)    s is true in L iff p,  
 
where ‘s’ is to be replaced by the quotation-name (structural description) of an object-language 
sentence s, and ‘p’ is to be replaced by a meta-language sentence that means the same as ‘s’ in an 
object-language L. What this implies, among others, is that a theory of truth for one’s own 
language is materially adequate if all the instances of the schema (DS) below are derived from 
the theory:  
 
(DS)   ‘p’ is true iff p,  
 
where ‘p’ is replaced by an indicative sentence in my own language.55 More precisely, a theory 
of truth for English satisfies Tarski’s Contention T if it entails truth-statements such as ‘‘Snow is 
white’ is true in English iff snow is white’, ‘‘Grass is green’ is true in English iff grass is green’, 
and so forth.  
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is materially adequate if and only if objects satisfying ɸ are the objects that we would intuitively count as being true 
sentences in L.  
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 Parallel to Tarski’s Contention T, we may say that a reductive theory of reference for an 
object-language L is materially adequate if all the instances of the schema (DR) below are 
derived from the theory:  
 
(DR) (If r exists) ‘r’ refers to r and nothing else.56 
 
So, Contention R, parallel to Convention T, may be characterized as follows:  
 
Convention R: All the legitimate instances of the schema (DR) are to be derived from the 
definition of reference of the form below:  
 
                For all x, Refers(x) iff ϕ(x).  
 
If a reductive theory of reference is to be adequate, it has to satisfy Contention R. The question is 
whether there is any reductive theory that satisfies Contention R.  
I used to think, among those three variants of the causal theory of reference, that Kripke-
Putnam’s theory has the least chance of satisfying Convention R. But now I think the opposite; 
Kripke-Putnam’s causal theory seems to have the best chance of satisfying Convention R if the 
theory is true. In order for a reductive theory of reference to satisfy Contention R, it has to cope 
with Fodor’s disjunction problem. As I will argue below, it is very unlikely that either the causal-
information theory or the teleological theory of reference will ever be able to cope with Fodor’s 
disjunction problem. Kripke-Putnam’s theory, if it turns out to be true, can solve Fodor’s 
disjunction problem. The theory, however, isn’t true. So, none of the three variants of the causal 
                                                          
56
 An assumption here is that an expression substituting for ‘r’ is an expression as I understand it.  
42 
 
theory of truth can satisfy Contention R. Therefore, none of the causal theories of reference can 
be considered an adequate theory of reference. This is what I will argue in the following.  
 
Fodor’s Disjunction Problem, and the Causal-Informational and Teleological Theories57 
Fodor initially raised the disjunction problem for the causal-informational theory of 
representation. So, to explain what the problem is, I will briefly explain what the causal-
informational theory of representation is.  
The causal-information theory is a physicalistic theory of mental representation that reduces the 
semantic/intentional content of a mental representation to an external condition that is reliably 
correlated with the mental representation. This theory is based on the perfectly plausible idea that 
A carries information about B if A is reliably caused by B; for example, smoke carries the 
information that there is a fire because smoke is reliably caused by a fire. The causal-
informational theory is the result of applying this idea to an account of the semantic/intentional 
content of mental representations. Thus, the core idea of the causal-informational theory is that 
the semantic or intentional content of a mental representation R reduces to the type of external 
conditions that reliably cause the tokens of the mental representation R.  
According to Fodor, however, this theory faces a serious problem—the “disjunction problem”.58 
This problem arises because a mental representation of the same type can be reliably caused by 
external conditions of distinct types. For example, tokens of ‘cat’ are caused not only by cats but 
also by cat-like dog. But if the semantic or intentional content of a mental representation reduces 
to external conditions that reliably cause the tokens of the mental representation, on what ground 
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should we say that a token of ‘cat’ is about a cat and not about a cat-like dog? Given that the 
tokens of ‘cat’ are reliably caused both by cats and cat-like dogs, a token of ‘cat’ carries both the 
information that there is a cat around and the information that there is a catlike dog around. In 
order to say that a token of ‘cat’ is about or represents a cat, and not a cat-like dog, we should be 
able to select the causal relation between a token of ‘cat’ and a cat as the semantically and 
intentionally relevant relation. The causal-informational theory, however, is helpless in this 
respect. The theory cannot explain what makes the causal relation between the tokens of ‘cat’ 
and cats the semantically and intentionally relevant relation.  
 One may ask here why we have to select only one of the causal relations as the 
semantically and intentionally relevant relation. Why can’t we say that a token of ‘cat’ is about a 
cat or a cat-like dog? Why can’t we allow a mental or linguistic representation have disjunctive 
content? As was mentioned earlier, the core idea of the causal informational theory is derived 
from the relationship between the information carried by a natural sign and external conditions 
that reliably cause the occurrence of the natural signs. With respect to natural signs, however, we 
have no problem with the multiplicity of informational content. For example, smoke indicates 
not only that there is a fire but that there is oxygen. But here, unlike in the case of ‘cat’, we don’t 
have to choose one of them as the information carried by the natural sign smoke. So, why is the 
multiplicity of information a problem only when it occurs with regard to a mental or linguistic 
representation?  The most convincing answer that I can think of is a pragmatic one; that is, it is 
simply too inconvenient to allow disjunctive content. Suppose my friend visited a remote island 
and called me saying ‘There is no cat in this island’. Suppose I think what he is saying is true. If 
we allow an expression to have disjunctive content, then the information that I can obtain from 
what he uttered would be as follows: Either there is no cat or cat-like dog in the island. To make 
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matters worse, let’s say that my friend also said ‘But there is a dog in this island’. But then, the 
information that I infer from what my friend said would be: Either there is no cat or catlike dog, 
but there is a dog in the island. There is no logical contradiction here, and we might even give a 
more accurate characterization of the semantic content of my friend’s utterance by allowing 
disjunctive content. But to allow disjunctive content isn’t a good idea for the pragmatic purposes 
of ordinary conversation.  
 At this point, the deflationist will immediately step in claiming that this is the reason why 
it is a wrong idea to reduce the notions of truth and reference into physical notions. Those who 
try to reduce the notions of truth and reference, says the deflationist, got the role of these notions 
entirely wrong. But not everyone agrees with the deflationist’s analysis of the role of truth and 
reference. So, those who try to explicate the notions of truth and reference in terms of 
physicalistic notions developed the causal-informational theory into a more sophisticated 
theory—the teleological theory of intentionality. Fodor was himself drawn to this approach, but 
he later abandons it.
59
 In this thesis, I will not discuss the details of the teleological theory.
60
 I 
will point out, though, one crucial problem with the theory. 
According to the teleological theory, we can isolate the causal relation between ‘cat’ and cats 
from the causal relation between ‘cat’ and catlike-dogs by appealing to the teleological function 
served by the causal relation between ‘cat’ and cats. So, the core idea of the teleological theory is 
that there is a special function—biological function—served only by a semantically relevant 
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causal relation, and we can reduce the truth-referential (intentional or representational) relation 
to the causal relation that has this special biological function. As Godfrey-Smith has points out, 
however, this theory has a serious problem when it is applied to a particular state of a 
mechanism.
61
 It makes sense to say that a mechanism has a function; for example, our belief- and 
desire-mechanism must have a specific biological function. It doesn’t make sense, however, to 
say that a belief- or desire-state of each type has a distinct biological function or purpose. Let’s 
assume, for arguments’ sake, a sort of language of thought hypothesis: believing that p is 
believing* a mental sentence δ means that p.62 According to the teleological theory, the semantic 
or intentional relation between δ and the external condition that p reduces to a causal relation that 
has a special biological function. More specifically, on this theory, what makes δ have the 
representational/intentional/semantic/truth-conditional content that p is that an organism has a 
better chance of surviving when the tokens of its mental sentence δ are caused by the external 
condition that p than any other external conditions.  In this sense, the external condition that p is 
defined as the “normal cause” of the mental sentence δ, and the normal cause of a mental symbol 
determines its semantic/intentional content.  
So, according to this theory, a token of ‘cat’ refers to a cat,  not a catlike-dog, because the causal 
relation between the tokens of ‘cat’ and cats has a special biological function that is lacked by 
other causal relations such as the one between the tokens of ‘cat’ and catlike-dogs. But what is 
this special biological function that can be served only by a semantically or intentionally relevant 
causal relation?  If the nature of this special function is vaguely characterized such as 
‘contributing to the survival of an organism’, then the teleological theorist cannot isolate the 
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causal correlation between ‘cat’ and cats from other causal correlations. There is simply no 
reason to believe that for each mental symbol there is a causal relation of a certain type such that 
the occurrences only of that type contribute to the survival of an organism. For example, a frog’s 
mental symbol δ can be tokened either by the presence of a fly or a flylike mosquito. According 
to the teleological theory, however, the presence of a fly is the normal cause of the frog’s mental 
symbol δ because the causal relation between the tokens of δ and flies has a special biological 
function that cannot be served by the causal relation between the tokens of δ and fly-like 
mosquitoes. There is, however, little evidence to think this way, because the frog’s biological 
purpose can be equally well served by the frog’s actions that are performed when the tokens of  δ 
are caused by the presence of fly-like mosquitoes.   
 The problem here is that an advocate of the teleological theory should spell out the nature of the 
special function without appealing to a semantic or intentional notion. To see why this is 
important, consider Papineau’s solution to the disjunction problem.  According to Papineau, the 
disjunction problem can be solved only when the content of a belief-state is considered in liaison 
with a desire-state. Papineau says,  
 
[B]iological functions are always a matter of effects; functions are effects in virtue of which traits 
are selected. Beliefs, however, do not have any effect to call their own. Rather, their biological 
purpose is to produce whichever result will fulfill the purposes of the desires they are acting in 
concert with. And then it will then explain the contents of beliefs derivatively, by saying that the 
purpose of beliefs is to generate actions that will produce desired results in such-and-such 
conditions, which conditions will therefore counts as the truth conditions of those beliefs.
63
 
 
Papineau is right in saying that the content of a belief-state and the content of a desire-state are 
interdependent. He is wrong, however, in saying that the content of a belief-state can be 
derivatively determined by the content of a desire-state. The moment we determine the content of 
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a desire-state so do we determine the content of a belief-state. That is to say, to determine the 
content of a belief is of itself to determine the content of a desire-state.. 
 So, Papineau’s solution to the disjunction problem assumes the very thing that the 
solution is supposed to answer—on what ground should we say that the frog desires that it wants 
to eat a fly instead of wanting to eat a fly-like mosquito? Why can’t we say, as Neander claims, 
that the frog desires that it wants to eat a small, dark, and moving insect?
64
 Papineau claims that 
Neander begs the question by characterizing the frog’s desire-state in this way. But the burden of 
proof is on Papineau’s claim, not on Neander’s claim. It is Papineau who claims that the frog’s 
desire state has a determinate content, and Neander’s job is just to offer a reason to doubt it. Her 
reason is that we can characterize the frog’s desire-state in a way that doesn’t invoke a fly. A 
small, dark, and moving insect can be a fly or flylike mosquito; therefore, the content of the 
frog’s desire-state is indeterminate. Now, it is Papineau’s turn to explain why it is necessary that 
we invoke a fly in characterizing the frog’s desire-state.  Papineau, however, doesn’t seem to 
have an explanation. Instead, he makes a dubious claim; that content becomes determinate if we 
move away from frogs toward beings with more complicated psychologies.
65
 But this is a naïve 
view; there is no fundamental difference between a frog’s psychology and a human’s psychology. 
If there were, the teleological theory wouldn’t have got off the ground in the first place.   
 
 Fodor’s Asymmetric Dependence 
Before I discuss Kripke-Putnam’s theory, I will discuss briefly Fodor’s own solution to the 
disjunction problem: the theory of asymmetric dependence. Interestingly indeed, there are some 
similarities between Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence and Kripke-Putnam’s causal 
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theory of reference. Both theories heavily rely on the conceptual fundamentality of the instances 
of the disquotational reference (DR):  
 
(DR)  (If r exists) ‘r’ refers to r and nothing else.  
 
 No physicalist including the advocates of the causal-informational theory and teleological theory 
would deny that the instances of (DR) are true. But the causal-informational theory or the 
teleological theory wasn’t designed to explain the instances of (DR). The motivations of these 
theories come from somewhere else, and to accommodate the instances of (DR) is just one of the 
desiderata of these theories. Fodor’s theory and Kripke-Putnam’s theory, however, are designed 
to accommodate the instances of (DR). So, if these theories are true, the disjunction problem will 
be solved. The problem, however, is that it is doubtful that any of these theories is actually 
true.
66
 
 First, according to Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence, although tokens of ‘cat’ 
can be caused by non-cats, a token of ‘cat’ refers to a cat, not a catlike dog, because the causal 
connection between the tokens of ‘cat’ and the property of being a cat is metaphysically 
fundamental. That is to say, the causal connection between the tokens of ‘cat’ and the property of 
being a catlike dog is asymmetrically dependent on the causal connection between the tokens of 
‘cat and the property of being a cat.67 The crucial notion here is ‘asymmetric dependence’, and 
Fodor explicates this notion in terms of a subjunctive conditional: if the nomic (lawlike) relation 
between P1 and P2 is asymmetrically dependent on the nomic relation between P3 and P4, then 
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ceteris paribus, breaking the relation between P3 and P4 would break the relation between P1 
and P2.
68
 To elaborate it as Block does, ‘cat’ refers to a cat if and only if although there are 
nomologically possible worlds in which cats cause ‘cat’ but catlike dogs don’t, there are no 
nomologically possible worlds in which catlike dogs cause ‘cat but cats don’t.69 There are many 
complicated questions to be discussed about this theory, but the most important question seems 
the following: why do we have to believe that these counterfactuals are true? Fodor asks this 
question himself, and his own answer, as Devitt says, is strange:  
 
Don’t forget, this stuff is supposed to be philosophy. In particular, it’s an attempt to solve 
Brentano’s problem by showing that there are naturalistically specifiable, and atomistic, and 
sufficient conditions for a physical state to have an intentional content. In that context, I get to 
stipulate the counterfactuals. . . . That is, solving Brentano’s problem requires giving sufficient 
conditions for intentionality, not sufficient and necessary conditions.
70
 
 
Philosophy, however, is concerned not only with the validity of an argument but also with the 
soundness of an argument. In order for Fodor’s argument to be sound, the antecedent of his 
argument should be true. The antecedent of the argument is Fodor’s theory of asymmetric 
dependence. So, the question re-arises: why do we have to believe that the counterfactuals being 
invoked are true? To say that the relevant counterfactuals are true entails that there is no 
nomologically possible world in which ‘cat’-tokens are caused by catlike dogs while ‘cat’-tokens 
are not caused by cats. There seems, however, that there is such a possible world. All we need is 
a possible world in which the property that causes the tokens of ‘cat’ is nomologically connected 
to the property of being a non-cat but isn’t nomologically connected to the property of being a 
cat.  A good example is Putnam’s Twin-Earth.  
                                                          
68
 J. Fodor, ibid., p. 95.  
69
 J. Fodor, ibid., p. 111.  
70
 J. Fodor, ibid., 96.  
50 
 
 In Putnam’s Twin-Earth example, my doppelganger lives in the twin-earth in which the 
stuff that looks like water is of a different chemical structure—XYZ. By assumption, my 
doppelganger is in the brain-states that are type-identical to my brain-states.  So, she acts and 
talks like me; she even uses the (phonetically and typographically) same word ‘water’ to pick out 
the stuff that looks like water. Despite so, it is obvious that the reference of my doppelganger’s 
word ‘water’ is different from the reference of my word ‘water’; any sane ordinary person would 
agree with this.  So, the reference isn’t determined by what is in the head. Meaning and reference, 
says Putnam, aren’t just in the head no matter how we cut the pie.71  
I will discuss Putnam’s theory of reference shortly. But let me first explain why this example 
repudiates Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence. In this example, my doppelganger is in the 
same brain-state that I am in; we are molecule-by-molecule duplicates. So, the property that 
causes the tokens of my doppelganger’s ‘water’ in the twin-earth is the same as the property that 
causes the tokens of my word ‘water’ in the earth.72 In the twin-earth, however, there is no H2O. 
So, in this world, the same brain-state (or brain-property) is caused by XYZ although it isn’t 
caused by H2O. But according to Fodor’s theory, for each brain-state B, there has to be one and 
only one type of an external condition E to which B bears a special causal connection. What 
makes this causal relation special is that the brain-state B wouldn’t be caused by other external 
conditions unless it is caused by the external condition E. As was stated above, what this means 
is that there is no possible world in which B is caused by an external condition E* but isn’t 
caused by the external condition E (where E ≠ E*), although there is a possible world in which B 
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is caused by E but not caused by E*. Putnam’s twin-earth argument, however, offers a counter-
example to this theory. Putnam’s twin-earth example shows that there is simply no special 
external condition E to which a brain-state B bears a special causal connection. In this world, the 
brain state that causes the tokens of ‘water’ is caused by H2O but it isn’t caused by XYZ. In the 
twin-earth, the same brain-state is caused by XYZ while it isn’t caused by H2O. If there is a third 
possible world, it may be caused by another external property. This seems enough to show that 
Fodor’s thesis is incorrect; there is no metaphysically special causal relation on which other 
causal connections are dependent. The causal relation between the tokens of ‘water’ and XYZ 
isn’t metaphysically dependent on the causal relation between the tokens of ‘water’ and H2O. 
Fodor’s theory doesn’t give any reason to think that the causal relation between the tokens of ‘cat’ 
and cats is metaphysically fundamental in such a way that other causal relations are dependent 
on it. But if we cannot single out the causal relation between the tokens of ‘cat’ and cats as 
metaphysically fundamental, Fodor’s theory cannot solve the disjunction problem.  
 
Kripke-Putnam’s Causal Theory of Reference 
Now, let’s consider whether Kripke-Putnam’s causal historical theory of reference can help 
solving the disjunction problem. As I stated above, if Kripke-Putnam’s causal historical theory is 
correct, it can. What I mean by this conditional statement is that if proper names and natural-kind 
terms are rigid designators as they are claimed by Kripke-Putnam’s theory, the disjunction 
problem will be solved. But then, the question is whether proper names and natural-kind terms 
are rigid designators.  
First, let’s examine what it means to say that an expression is a rigid designator. According to 
Kripke, to say that an expression is a rigid designator is to say that it has the same reference or 
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extension in every (relevant) possible world. More specifically, according to this theory, a proper 
name such as ‘Aristotle’ is a rigid designator because it refers to one and the same person in all 
possible worlds in which Aristotle exists. A natural-kind term such as ‘water’ is also construed as 
a rigid designator because ‘water’, according to this theory, determines the same extension in 
every possible world in which water exists. Some definite descriptions are also construed as rigid 
designators although most definite descriptions are not; for example, the number succeeding 2’ 
refers to 3 in every possible world, and so, it is a rigid designator.  
This simple definition of a rigid designator, however, raises many complicated questions. First, 
what is exactly referred to by an expression that is characterized as a ‘rigid designator’? 
According to this theory, a proper name and a natural-kind term are rigid designators, and 
therefore, they refer to the same entity in every possible world. But what is exactly referred to by 
a proper name or natural-kind term? Second, what is the nature of the semantic relation between 
a rigid designator and its reference? What makes a proper name or a natural-kind term refer to 
whatever entity that it refers to? These two questions are related, since we cannot determine the 
reference of a rigid designator unless we can characterize the nature of the semantic relation 
between a rigid designator and it reference. Notice that the conception of reference advertised by 
Kripke-Putnam’s theory is by no means deflationary; in Kripke-Putnam’s theory, an instance of 
(DR)  
 
(DR) (If r exists) ‘r’ refers to r 
 
isn’t considered true a priori. The conception of reference advertised by Kripke-Putnam’s theory 
is inflationary, and so, it doesn’t consider the trivialities of the instances of (DR)—‘Aristotle’ 
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refers to Aristotle, ‘water’ refers to water, etc.—as constituting the whole story of a theory of 
reference.
73
 Moreover, the idea of reference in Kripke-Putnam’s theory is very specific; namely, 
a proper name or a natural-kind term is considered as referring to that very specific thing in the 
actual world. As will be discussed, however, Kripke-Putnam’s theory never offers a clear 
explanation of what that specific thing is. Considering what is advertised by this theory, what 
this theory really offers is very meager. I will explain why.  
First, according to Kripke-Putnam’s theory, the entity that is referred to by a rigid designator is 
what is related to the rigid designator in terms of an actual causal history. An actual causal 
history is composed of two steps: the reference-fixing step and the reference-transferring step. 
What is crucial in the reference-fixing step is a non-descriptive way of referring to an entity. A 
typical example of a non-descriptive way of referring to an entity is direct or indirect (deferred) 
ostension.
74
 According to Kripke-Putnam’s theory, the reference of a proper name is fixed by 
direct ostension; the reference of a proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ is fixed when someone 
directly points at a certain baby dubbing him ‘Aristotle’. Once the reference of a proper name is 
fixed by direct ostension, the semantic relationship between the name and its reference has to be 
properly transferred to the other members of a linguistic community. Indirect or deferred 
ostension is involved in fixing the reference of a natural-kind term. For example, when someone 
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first introduced the term ‘water’ by pointing at a particular instance, the reference of ‘water’ was 
fixed by deferred ostension; ‘water’ refers to the natural kind that the particular instance belongs 
to. In explaining the reference of a natural-kind term Kripke and Putnam also appeal to the view 
called ‘scientific essentialism’; the view that that the essential properties of natural kinds are to 
be discovered a posteriori by scientific investigations. For example, we couldn’t have known a 
priori that water is H2O. So, if the current theory of water is true, then an identity-statement such 
as ‘Water is H2O’ is metaphysically necessary but epistemologically a posteriori.   
It should be noted, however, that although both Kripke and Putnam endorse scientific 
essentialism, scientific essentialism is orthogonal to their theory of reference. There are two 
reasons for this; first, as Kripke admits himself, any scientific theory may turn out to be false. 
For example, water may not turn out to be H2O. But then, we cannot rely on scientific theories to 
connect a natural-kind term to its reference. If we did, we could no longer consider a natural-kind 
term a rigid designator; the reference of a natural-kind term would keep changing with the 
vicissitudes of scientific theories. Another reason that scientific essentialism isn’t central to 
Kripke-Putnam’s theory of reference is that this theory was motivated to refute Frege-Russell’s 
description theory of reference. One of Kripke’s major complaints of the description theory is 
that if the references of a proper name and a natural-kind term were determined via satisfying 
definite descriptions, then the references of these expressions would vary from world to world. 
But if we turn to an essential property of a natural kind in picking out the reference of a natural-
kind term, we would have to treat the natural-kind term as an abbreviation of a definite 
description. Suppose we pick out the reference of ‘water’ by investigating its chemical structure. 
In such a case, we would have to consider anything that satisfies ‘the stuff that is H2O’ to be the 
reference of ‘water’. There is no guarantee, however, that the stuff that satisfies this definite 
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description in a possible world is the same stuff that satisfies the definite description in the actual 
world. Therefore, scientific essentialism isn’t central to Kripke-Putnam’s theory of reference; to 
the contrary, it may result in a consequence that is contradictory to the idea that proper names 
and natural-kind terms are rigid designators.  
 What is central instead to Kripke-Putnam’s theory of reference is the idea that the reference of a 
rigid designator is fixed by direct or indirect (deferred) ostension. Kripke makes this point very 
clear with the following consideration. Suppose a cat doesn’t turn out to be an animal but turns 
out to be an automaton. In such a case, says Kripke, the correct thing to say isn’t that a cat 
doesn’t exist but that a cat isn’t an animal as we originally thought it was. Kripke says,  
 
The original concept of cat is: that kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by 
paradigmatic instances. It is not something picked out by any qualitative dictionary definitions.
75
 
 
But how can direct or indirect (deferred) ostension fix the references of a proper name and a 
natural-kind term in a way that can make them rigid designators? Kripke-Putnam’s idea is that a 
proper name and a natural-kind term rigidly designate the entities that they refer to in the actual 
world. But if the reference-relation in the actual world is to be explicated in terms of direct or 
indirect ostension, the reference of a proper name or a natural-kind term would be highly 
indeterminate. One can refer to many different things by direct or indirect ostension. The only 
way to solve this problem, as Kripke admits himself, is to appeal to a speaker’s intention. But by 
appealing to a speaker’s intention, we would give up much of Kripke-Putnam’s theory of 
reference. There is simply no way of appealing to a speaker’s intention without associating a 
proper name or natural-kind term with definite descriptions; we cannot articulate a speaker’s 
intention merely by invoking direct or indirect ostension. In the passage quoted above, Kripke 
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says that the original concept of cat is that kind of thing. But that kind of thing is almost an 
empty concept. What is the reference of ‘water’? According to Kripke-Putnam’s theory, it is also 
that kind of thing, since reference cannot be picked out by any “qualitative dictionary 
definitions”. The semantic machinery provided by Kripke-Putnam’s theory is so barren that it 
seems almost meaningless to say that a proper name or natural-kind term is a rigid designator. 
With such a skimpy explanation, we have little idea of what an expression refers to even in the 
actual world. But then, to say that an expression refers to the same entity in every possible world 
seems of little semantic importance. 
 The initial question that drove us here is whether a causal theory of reference can provide 
a reductive account of the reference relation; the relation between ‘Aristotle’ and Aristotle, 
‘water’ and water, ‘cat’ and the class of cats, etc. None of the causal theories of reference that 
have been examined—the causal-informational theory, the teleological theory, Fodor’s 
asymmetric dependence theory, and Kripke-Putnam’s causal-historical theory—fills the bill. 
This raises the doubt for the sustainability of the correspondence theory of truth.  According to 
Marian David, one of the chief motivations for the deflationary theory is “that no physicalistic 
explanation of semantic and intentional notions—a fortiori no physicalistic explanation of 
representation and similar relations—is forthcoming.”76 But why is it such a big problem? 
Because without a reductive theory of reference the correspondence theory would fail internally. 
The correspondence theory of truth for sentences stems from the idea that truth is a dyadic 
relation, and as such the theory is intended to provide an account of the nature of the semantic 
relation between indicative sentences and external conditions. Since the number of indicative 
sentences is infinite, such an account should be given in a systematic/recursive way—via an 
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account of the nature of the semantic relation between the constituents of indicative sentences 
and external conditions. This is the reason that a physicalistic explanation of the notion of 
reference is required by the correspondence theory of truth. Unfortunately, no physicalistic 
explanation of reference, and this motivates a search for an alternative theory of truth; i.e., the 
deflationary theory of truth.  
 This internal problem of the correspondence theory, however, stirred even a greater 
suspicion about the correspondence theory of truth; that this theory may be based on a wrong 
conception of truth. This is the second motivation of the deflationary theory of truth.  
 
1.3.2. The Motivation II—The Role of Truth 
 Devitt says that one of the major differences between the correspondence theory and the 
deflationary theory of truth is that whereas the focus of the correspondence theory is on the 
nature and the role of truth, the focus of the deflationary theory is on the nature and the role of 
the truth term; for example, of ‘true’.77 What Devitt says here tells us something important about 
the deflationary theory of truth. To see why let’s take a look at what Horwich says about the 
problems with the inflationary theory of truth including the correspondence theory. Horwich 
states that the inflationary theory of truth is based on two related misconceptions: first, truth has 
some hidden structure that needs to be discovered; and secondly, we can explain central 
principles employing the term ‘true’, and thereby solve a host of problems in logic, semantics, 
and epistemology.
78
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 According to Horwich, however, such an idea is based on the misconception of the truth 
term, and this misconception is caused by an incorrect application of a linguistic analogy. 
Predicates such as ‘is magnetic’ and ‘is diabetic’ ascribe substantive properties to their bearers in 
the sense that the properties ascribed by these predicate are real ingredients of the world. Since 
‘is true’ is linguistically similar to these substantive predicates, it has traditionally thought 
thought that the truth predicate also ascribes a substantive property to its bearers.  
 If we go beneath the surface, however, we find that the truth predicate serves a very 
different function. Despite its surface structure, the function of the truth predicate is not to 
ascribe a substantive property to its bearers. The function of the truth predicate is simply “to 
permit the formulation of generalizations (including laws of logic) that would otherwise call for 
substitutional quantification, or some alternative device of 'infinite conjunction.”79 This idea—or 
some ideas similar to it—was already defended by those philosophers whose views of truth 
sowed the seeds for contemporary deflationism. For example, Ramsey’s redundancy theory of 
truth (or “no-theory” of truth), Strawson’s performative theory of truth, the prosentential theory 
of truth developed by Belnap, Camp, and Grover, and last but not least Quine’s thesis of truth as 
a device of semantic ascent offered dramatically deflated analyses of the function of truth.
80
 As 
Devitt points out, they all focused on the truth term, not truth itself; more precisely, their 
attitudes are that the nature of truth can only be revealed through the analysis of the nature and 
the role of the truth term. This attitude is also adopted by contemporary deflationists such as 
Horwich, Field, Williams, Leeds, Hill, and so forth. In this sense, it may be said that the 
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deflationary theory of truth is the result of applying the time-honored philosophical method that 
has been employed by analytically-minded philosophers to truth terms.
81
 
 So, the deflationist focuses on the question of how we use the truth term or what we use 
the truth term for. The deflationist’s answer is that we use the truth term simply as “ersatz” for 
substitutional quantifiers or infinite conjunctions (or disjunctions). In other words, the purpose 
for which we employ the truth predicate is “purely logical”. For example, when we want to 
endorse, agree, or affirm what someone stated, but we don’t remember exactly the sentence he 
uttered, we employ the truth predicate: e.g. ‘What Oscar said is true’. We also employ the truth 
predicate when we want to generalize an infinite (or a finite) of sentences or propositions. For 
example, instead of stating that if John is tall, then John is tall, if Mark is a man, then Mark is a 
man, and so forth, we state that any statement of the form “If P, then P” is true. Or we may 
employ the truth predicate when we want to say that a theory is true when we cannot state each 
and every statement that constitutes the theory. For example, when we state that Einstein’s 
theory is true while we don’t know each and every statement constituting his theory, we employ 
the truth predicate as an ersatz for substitutional quantification or any alternative device enabling 
us to express the generalization.  
In each of these cases, we don’t employ the truth predicate to ascribe a substantive property to a 
statement, proposition, or a sentence. For example, when we state that what Oscar said is true, 
we don’t ascribe to the sentence that Oscar uttered a property that is part of the world. This is the 
difference between the truth predicate and other predicates such as ‘is magnetic’ and ‘is diabetic’, 
since when we employ the latter predicates, we ascribe properties that are part of the world to the 
bearers of these predicates. For example, when we state a sentence of the form  
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1) X is magnetic,  
 
we ascribe to X the property of being magnetic that is part of the physical world. On the other 
hand, when we state a sentence of the form  
 
2) X is true,  
 
we don’t ascribe to X (a sentence, statement, or proposition) a property that is part of the physical 
world. Superficially, both 2) and 3) have the linguistic form 3) as follows:  
 
3) X is F.  
 
The property of truth, however, is an entirely different kind from the property of being magnetic; 
whereas being magnetic is a physical property, being true or truth isn’t. Truth is a purely logical 
property in the sense that it is a purely inferential property. The only function served by ‘is true’ 
in a statement of the form 2) is that it enables us to infer X itself. So, if we know that  
 
4) X = ‘Snow is white’ (or X = the proposition that snow is white) 
 
we can infer 5) from 2):  
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5) Snow is white.82  
 
Of course, the term ‘is magnetic’ also has an inferential function; we can infer from 1) a 
statement of the form 6):  
 
6) X is not a plastic.  
 
The question, however, is what makes these inferences possible. In order to infer 6) from 1), we 
need to make an empirical investigation of the nature of the property of being magnetic; we need 
empirical tests and observations to connect the property of being magnetic to the property of not 
being a plastic. That’s not the case, however, with the inferential relation between 2) and 5). In 
order to infer 5) from 2), we only need to understand English and the non-theoretical 
identification 4). None of them requires an empirical investigation or a theoretical justification. 
Anyone who understands English would agree that ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white; 
‘Grass is green’ is true iff grass is green; and so forth. Put simply, whereas the inference of 6) 
from 1) is made possible by a physical theory of magnetism, the inference of 5) from 2) is made 
possible by infinite conjunctions such as 7) and 8) that we trivially accept:  
 
7) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white; ‘Grass is green’ is true iff grass is green; and so 
forth.  
 
 
8) The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white; the proposition that grass is 
green is true iff grass is green; and so forth.  
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So, one of the two core theses of the deflationary theory is that what we mean by a truth-
statement of the form 1)—X is true—is  exhausted by 1*) in the following:  
 1*)   If X = ‘Snow is white’ (or the proposition that snow is white), then snow is white; if X = 
‘Grass is green’ (or the proposition that grass is green), then grass is green; and so on. 
 
 We cannot generalize 1*) in the usual way by invoking objectual quantification, since objectual 
quantification doesn’t permit quantifying into expressions that occur inside quotation marks. We 
may appeal to substitutional quantification, but even if we did, we would still want to express the 
generalization in ordinary language. The truth predicate serves this purpose with the help of 
some ancillary devices; e.g. quotation marks or a nominalizing phrase (‘the proposition that’). As 
Quine says, to express the generalization of 1*), we engage in semantic ascent by using ancillary 
devices while we use the truth predicate to cancel off the effect of semantic ascent. Moreover, 
what enables the truth predicate to serve this purpose is our willingness to accept the instances of 
the disquotational schema (DS) and the equivalence schema (E):  
 
(DS)   ‘p’ is true iff p.  
(E)   <P> is true iff P.  
 
The instances of these schemas are epistemologically (or conceptually) fundamental; we accept 
them trivially or a priori. Besides, truth has no other role to play; the sole purpose of truth 
consists in facilitating generalizations. So, no inflated theory—a theory of truth that says more 
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than what is stated by an instance of (DS) or (E)—is needed. This is the second core thesis of the 
deflationary theory of truth.  
 Presented this way, what is stated by the deflationary theory is so thin that one may 
wonder how such an impoverished theory can produce a fruitful discussion. When it comes to 
deflationism, however, a fruitful discussion isn’t so much generated by what is stated by the 
theory as what is denied by the theory. Since the deflationary theory of truth isn’t of one kind, 
what is denied by the deflationary varies from theory to theory. That said, there are some claims 
commonly denied by deflationary theories of almost any kind. First, deflationism denies the idea 
that truth has a serious explanatory role to play. To say that truth has a serious explanatory role 
to play is to say that the role of truth goes beyond expressing generalizations. So, in order to 
defend deflationism, it must be shown that the truth predicate, in all the contexts in which it is 
used, is employed merely as a device of expressing generalizations. In particular, the deflationist 
must make sense of all the major philosophical principles involving the notion of truth without 
inflating the role of truth beyond what is acknowledged by the deflationary theory. This is a 
difficult task, because the use of the truth predicate is paramount. Consider some examples of 
philosophical principles involving the notion of truth: ‘The meaning of a sentence involves its 
truth condition’; ‘True beliefs facilitate successful behavior’; ‘The success of a scientific theory 
is best explained by its truth’; ‘Psychological laws essentially involve truth and reference’; and 
so forth. The deflationary theory must accommodate all these principles without assigning any 
additional role to the notion of truth.  
What makes the deflationist project even more difficult is that many philosophically important 
notions—such as the notions of representational or semantic content, intentionality, meaning, 
realism, and anti-realism—have been deployed in a very close connection with the notion of 
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truth. In particular, the notions of representational content and intentionality are so tightly 
connected with the notion of truth that it would be inconsistent if one adopts a deflationary 
attitude toward the notion of truth while one adopts an inflationary attitude towards the notions 
of representational content and intentionality. The question is then what it is to give a 
deflationary account of the notions of representational content and intentionality. The two 
deflationists that I will discuss in this thesis—Horwich and Field—offer slightly different 
answers to this question. I will discuss it in Chapter 4.  
 The deflationist adopts a similar attitude toward the notion of reference as she does 
toward truth. For example, Horwich sees that the role of reference terms (such as ‘refers to’, ‘is 
about’, etc.) consists in enabling us to obtain valuable information from other people’s beliefs. 
Suppose someone said ‘John is the inventor of Viagra’. By knowing that ‘John’ refers to the guy 
living next door, I can learn that the guy living next door invented Viagra.
83
 The whole point of 
de re, as opposed to de dicto, attribution of content is simply to make such an inference possible. 
But if this is the only function served by reference terms, then all we need is an instance of the 
reference schema (R) below:  
 
(R)  (x)(Tokens of *n* refer to x iff n = x). 
84
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characterizes the deflationary theory of reference in the same manner.  
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Just as the function or utility of the truth predicate determines the kind of a theory of truth that is 
needed, so does the function or utility of the reference predicate determine the kind of a theory of 
reference that is needed.  
 To sum up, the gist of the second motivation for the deflationary theory of truth is that the 
roles of truth terms and reference terms are not such that they require substantive/deductive 
theories. Given the roles that truth terms and reference terms play, theories of truth and reference 
need nothing more than what is stated by the instances of the disquotational or equivalence 
schemas for truth and reference. This is also the reason why Field eventually got to renounce the 
view he defended in “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.” In “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” Field assumed 
that the role of truth is similar to the role of valence; that is, just like the notion of valence, the 
notion of truth has a causal-explanatory role. Construing the role of truth on a par with the role of 
valence, Field argued for the need of a reductive theory of reference. Field no longer defends the 
view; he now construes the role of truth as a purely logical device. In the next chapter, we will 
see how radically Field changed his view of truth from the days of “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.” 
He says that he’d like to think that by advocating radically opposed views he’d have gotten it 
right once. Let’s see whether his wish can come true.  
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Chapter 2. Field’s Pure Disquotationalism 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss Field’s version of deflationism—the theory he calls ‘pure 
disquotationalism’. I do not intend to give a full characterization of Field’s theory from the 
beginning; I intend it to be unfolded as the discussion of the theory evolves. So, at the outset, I 
will only give a brief account of Field’s pure disquotationalism. 85   
Field defines pure disquotationalism as the view that the notion of truth is at bottom 
purely disquotational. To understand what Field means by this claim, we first need to understand 
what he means by the ‘purely disquotational’ notion of truth. According to Field, to say that the 
notion of truth is purely disquotational is to say that the notion of truth has the following two 
features:  
 
i)  ‘true’ as it is understood by a given person applies only to an utterance (or a sentence) 
that that person understands, and  
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ii) for any utterance (or a sentence) ‘p’ that a person X understands, a truth-ascription of 
the form ‘‘p’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent for X to the utterance ‘p’ itself; for X, to 
say that ‘p’ is true is to say that p.86 
 
As will be explained later, Field changes his view on the feature i) in response to the criticism 
raised of it. I will also argue later in this chapter that pure disquotationalism doesn’t need the 
feature i) and will be better off without it. For these reasons, a more detailed explanation of the 
feature i) will be saved for a later discussion.  
 Unlike the feature i), the feature ii) will be with Field’s disquotational theory of truth as 
far as this theory goes—it is the core feature of the purely disquotational notion of truth. As a 
version of deflationism about truth, Field’s pure disquotationalism defends certain ideas of truth 
that are shared by other types of deflationism—truth is a purely logical notion in the sense that 
its role is expressive, and not explanatory; truth is not a notion of which the nature has to be 
explained by a substantive.
87
  Here, a ‘substantive’ theory can be understood as any theory of 
                                                          
86
 Surely, to say that two sentences are cognitively equivalent implies a much stronger claim that they merely have 
the same truth value. Field defines the notion of cognitive equivalence in terms of the conceptual and computational 
roles of sentences; to say that the truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less 
claim ‘Snow is white’ is to say that they have the same inferential patterns. See H. Field, “Disquotational Truth and 
Factually Defective Discourse,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 405.  
87
 Most of all, this view of truth accords with Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth; Horwich also construes 
truth as a purely logical notion serving as a device of endorsing propositions and expressing generalizations (see P. 
Horwich, Truth. 2
nd
 ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). Field’s view of truth, however, also accords with Stephen 
Leeds’s and Michael Williams’s views of truth (see S. Leeds, “Theories of Reference and Truth,” Erkenntnis 13, 
1978, pp.111-129 and “Truth, Correspondence, and Success,” Philosophical Studies79, 1995, pp.1-36; M. Williams, 
“Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?” Philosophical Topics 14, 1986, pp. 223-242, “Meaning and 
Deflationary Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 96, 1999, pp. 545-564, and “Context, Meaning, and Truth,” 
Philosophical Studies 117, 2004, pp. 107-130). In particular, Leeds’s influence on Field’s deflationism seems 
important; I got the impression that Leeds woke Field from an inflationary slumber (see Field’s “The Deflationary 
Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Value, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 
55-117). Field’s deflationary view of truth is in line with Grover, Camp, and Belnap’s prosententialist view of truth, 
according to which ‘is true’ isn’t a predicate but a prosentence-forming operator (see D. Grover, J. Camp and N. 
Belnap, “A Prosentential Theory of Truth,” Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, pp. 73-125). Although it is hard to 
68 
 
truth that gives a more inflated account of truth than what is stated by instances of the pure 
disquotational schema (DS) in the following:  
 
(DS)  ‘p’ is true iff p.88  
 
By stating that a truth-claim—for example, ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’—is  as a whole cognitively 
equivalent to a truth-less claim— ‘Snow is white’—the pure disquotationalist makes it clear that 
a substantive theory of truth is not called for when the notion of truth is construed in the purely 
disquotational sense.  If the truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ is as a whole cognitively 
equivalent to ‘Snow is white’, then the following biconditional is true as a matter of simple 
identity:  
 
     ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
accept the claim that ‘is true’ isn’t a predicate, the prosententialist analysis of the function of truth terms sheds light 
on the understanding of the deflationary conception of truth; in particular, on the understanding of deflationist view 
of the role of truth. The prosententialist view of truth seems to have been inspired by Strawson’s view of truth (see 
See P. Strawson, “Truth,” Analysis, Vo. 9, 1949, pp. 83-97, and P. Strawson, “Truth,” Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume, 1950). Given the close connection between Grover, Camp, and Belnap’s prosententialist 
view of truth and Brandon’s view’s, it may be said that Field’s view of truth is in line with Brandom’s view as well, 
although Field rarely mentions Brandom (see R. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and 
Discursive Commitment, Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction 
to Inferentialism, Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000).  
88
 A ‘substantive theory of truth’ can also be understood as any theory of truth in which an instance of the schema 
(DS) ‘p’ is true iff p isn’t considered an analytic truth (see H. Field, “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective 
Discourse,” (1994), in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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So, on the purely disquotational conception of truth, an instance of (DS) is a logical truth; it is 
tautologous to say that ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. But then, no further 
explanation is needed for why ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white. In this sense, the concept 
of truth is exhausted by what is implied by the instances of (DS) when truth is construed in the 
purely disquotational sense. Also in this sense, no substantive theory of truth is needed that 
analyzes the nature of truth in terms of other concepts.   
 In Field’s pure disquotationalism, the feature ii) is also at the heart of the claim that truth 
is nothing but a logical device. This can be explained as follows. In order to make sense of the 
logical function served by the notion of truth, the cognitive equivalence thesis isn’t required. To 
say that the notion of truth has a logical function is to say that we appeal to the notion of truth as 
a device of expressing generalizations.  For example, we appeal to the truth predicate when we 
want to express our agreement with an utterance, but we cannot articulate it.  Suppose I want to 
express my agreement with what John said, but I don’t remember exactly the sentence he uttered. 
In such a case, the truth predicate is indispensable—by saying ‘What John said is true’, I can 
express my agreement, which I couldn’t do if I didn’t have the truth predicate.89 Taking another 
example, suppose we want to generalize an infinite conjunction such as ‘If 1+2 =3, then 1+2=3; 
if Fido is an animal, then Fido is an animal; and . . .’ We cannot generalize this infinite 
conjunction by appealing to usual, objectual quantification (e.g. (p)(if p, then p)), because we 
cannot quantify into sentential positions—sentences are not names. The truth predicate is handy 
in these cases, because the truth predicate enables us to talk about sentences while it also cancels 
                                                          
89
 Here, the notion of truth serves as a device of generalization in the following sense—the truth-claim ‘What John 
said is true’ is analyzed into ‘ ‘Snow is white’ is the sentence that John uttered, and snow is white; ‘Grass is green’ 
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out the effect of talking about sentences. As Quine says, we can talk about sentences by using 
quotations—quotations are devices for naming sentences.90 But the truth predicate has the force 
of canceling the effect of talking about sentences—by saying that the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is 
true, we can say that snow is white. In this sense, the truth predicate is a device for disquotation.  
That the truth predicate has this feature is made explicit by the disquotational truth schema (DS): 
‘p’ is true iff p.  As long as we accept the instances of this schema, we can explain the logical 
function served by the notion of truth. But an instance of (DS) doesn’t by itself imply that a 
truth-claim of the form ‘‘p’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to a truth-less claim ‘p’; it only 
implies that they have the same truth-value.
91
  
 So, in order to make sense of the logical function served by the notion of truth, we don’t 
need the cognitive equivalence thesis. The pure disquotationalist’s claim, however, isn’t simply 
that the notion of truth has a logical function—his claim is that there is no other function served 
by the notion of truth. Here, the cognitive equivalence thesis is required—more precisely, it is 
required because truth isn’t construed as an explanatory notion in Field’s purely disquotational 
theory of truth. According to Field, truth doesn’t play a causal-explanatory role in explanations 
of meaning and the success of behavior.
92
 If the notion of truth had a causal-explanatory role, the 
truth predicate would express a causal-explanatory property. But then, the notion of truth would 
be construed on the par with the notions of being magnetic, being H2O, and so forth. The result 
would be totally inconsistent with the core thesis of pure disquotationalism—no theory of truth 
other than what is implied by the instances of the pure disquotational schema (DS) is needed. If 
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 W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.  
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 Quine also says that (in Philosophy of Logic, p. 11) the disquotational feature of the truth predicate is made 
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the notion of truth is construed on the par with the notions of being magnetic, being H2O, etc., 
then the nature of truth couldn’t be exhausted by the instances of the disquotational schema. So, 
from the purely disquotationalist point of view, the cognitive equivalence schema is needed to 
make sure that truth is nothing but a logical notion; that it isn’t an explanatory notion.  
  The cognitive equivalence thesis, however, confronts several difficult problems. One of 
them is that it conflicts with the modal properties of truth. If a truth-claim such as ‘‘Snow is 
white’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to ‘Snow is white’, then an instance of (DS) is a 
necessary truth; it is a logical truth. This feature of the purely disquotational truth, however, 
doesn’t go well with the modal properties of the ordinary notion of truth. This problem will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 Another problem with the cognitive equivalence thesis is related to the feature i) 
mentioned above—that  ‘true’ as it is understood by a given person applies only to an utterance 
(or a sentence) that that person understands. Field needed this feature to defend the cognitive 
equivalence thesis; that is, the feature i) is subordinate to the feature ii).
93
 In order to say that the 
left-hand side and the right-hand side of ‘iff’ in  
      ‘p’ is true iff p 
are cognitively equivalent, it is essential that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the left side means the 
same as the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the right side. There is more than one way to have this 
condition met; for example, the pure disquotationalist may say that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at 
the left side belongs to the same language that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the right side does, 
and there is interpersonal synonymy within a language. In other words, if the pure 
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 The reason the past tense is used here is that Field later changes his view on the feature i).  The change of Field’s 
view on i) will be discussed in this chapter.  
72 
 
disquotationalist assumes that the same sentence-type is understood in the same way by different 
speakers in a language, he can easily have the condition met.  
 This road is blocked to Field—he skeptical of interpersonal synonymy.94 As a skeptic of 
interpersonal synonymy, Field looked to another way of having the condition met. Thus, Field 
characterizes the purely disquotational truth predicate as one that is ascribed to a sentence as it is 
understood by a speaker—he says, “As a rough heuristic, we could say that for a person to call 
an utterance true in this pure disquotational sense is to say that it is true-as-he-understands-it.”95 
So, Field needed the feature i) as a way of making sense of the feature ii).  
 The feature i), however, causes a serious problem—probably an even more serious 
problem than the problem with not accommodating the modal properties of truth.  If we accept 
Field’s characterization of the purely disquotational notion of truth, then we wouldn’t be able to 
ascribe the truth predicate to a sentence in a language that we don’t understand. Initially, Field 
wasn’t so much worried about this problem; his initial attitude was that if the purely 
disquotational notion of truth diverges from the ordinary notion of truth in this respect, then it is 
not a problem with pure disquotationalism but a problem with how ordinary people use the truth 
predicate. 
96
 This attitude had to be changed when he confronted the objection raised by Shapiro. 
This will be discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  
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 See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” and “Attributions of Meaning and Content” in his 
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 H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p. 106.  
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 In responding to the objection raised by Shapiro, Field makes a considerable change to 
his initial thesis of disquotationalism.
97
 Field doesn’t state explicitly how his ideas have changed, 
but I will try to make it clear in the section 2.2.3. Although the changes Field makes to his initial 
thesis is helpful to solve the objection raised by Shapiro, they are not enough to entirely fix the 
problem. So, in the last section of this chapter, I will propose a different solution to the problem 
from Field’s. This new solution proposes a disquotational theory of truth that doesn’t have the 
feature i). I will argue that the disquotational notion of truth isn’t immanent to a truth-ascriber’s 
understanding of a language. In pure disquotationalism, it is the notion of truth-conditions—not 
the notion of truth itself—that has to be construed as being immanent to a language that a truth-
attributor understands.
98
 By making the distinction between the notion of truth and the notion of 
a truth condition, the disquotationalist may resolve some of the most vexing problems with the 
theory.  
 
2.2 The Modal Objection  
2.2.1 The Problem and a Misunderstanding 
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 The modal objection to Field’s pure disquotationalism is that Field’s theory of truth gets 
the modal properties of the truth predicate wrong. The objection was raised by various people; 
for example, Marian David, Vann McGee, W. Kunne, Ray Buchanan, and, most of all, Field 
himself.
99
 Interestingly, Putnam raised the same objection to Tarski’s definition of truth—that in 
Tarski’s definition of truth, a biconditional such as  
 
1) ‘Snow is white’ is true (in English) iff snow is white 
 
becomes a logical, thereby, necessary truth.
100
 The modal objection raised to Field’s 
disquotational theory is basically to the same effect. That is to say, in Field’s theory, an instance 
of (DS) such as ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white is construed as having the following 
modal status:  
 
2)  (‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white).  
 
The reason why the modal status of an instance of the disquotational schema is construed along 
the lines of 2) is that an instance of (DS) is considered a logical truth—it is a tautology.  Given 
the cognitive equivalence thesis that was explained previously, the truth-claim that ‘Snow is 
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white’ is true is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less claim that snow is white. In Field’s 
disquotationalism, an instance of (DS) is true as a matter of simple identity.
101
 But then, an 
instance of (DS) is a logical truth, and therefore, the modal status of an instance of (DS) should 
be understood along the lines of 2).  
Field’s position on the modal properties of the notion of truth has gone through some 
changes. At first, Field took a radical position—he said that the purely disquotational notion of 
truth is the one that makes counterfactual claims C1 and C2 come out equivalent:   
 
C1:  If we had used the word ‘white’ differently, ‘Grass is white’ might have been true. 
C2:  If we had used the word ‘white’ differently, grass might have been white.
102
  
 
To say that the counterfactual claims C1 and C2 are equivalent is to say that the way we use the 
word ‘white’ doesn’t affect the truth condition of ‘Grass is white’. To say that C1 and C2 are 
equivalent implies that it is necessary that ‘Grass is white’ has the truth condition that grass is 
white. But that is possible only if the way we use words doesn’t affect the truth condition of a 
sentence. So, by claiming that the purely disquotational notion of truth is the one that renders C1 
and C2 equivalent, Field wanted to make it clear that purely disquotational truth is a use-
independent notion. More precisely, Field’s point is that when the notion of truth is understood 
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in the purely disquotational sense, the truth condition of a sentence is characterized 
independently of the semantic—meaning or use properties—of a sentence.103 
 To say that C1 and C2 are equivalent is obviously at odds with the ordinary notion of truth. 
That is to say, ordinary folks would hardly take ordinary subjunctive conditionals C1 and C2 to 
be equivalent or the subjunctive statement 2) above to be true. Consider Marian David’s 
objection to Field’s disquotationalism:  
 
So maybe (D) (‘p’ is true if and only if p) has to be understood as the statement of a law-like 
regularity. Such an interpretation would perhaps permit the definition to occupy some middle 
ground between a necessary equivalence and a material biconditional. But this interpretation 
is not plausible either, for (D) supports the wrong subjunctives:  
 
a) If ‘Snow is green’ were true, then snow would be green.104  
b)  If ‘Snow is white’ were not true, then snow would not be white. 
 
Both subjunctives are false. If the sentence ‘Snow is green’ were indeed true, then that would 
be so either because we would be using the word ‘green’ as we do now and snow would be 
green or because snow would be white and we would be using the word ‘green’ to mean 
what we now mean by ‘white’. If a) were correct, we could make snow green quite easily, 
namely simply by choosing to use ‘green’ from now on as we used ‘white’ until now. 
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Similarly for b); if it were correct, we could make snow stop becoming white simply by 
using ‘white’ to refer to, say, the color of fruit bars.105  
 
 
According to David’s argument, ordinary folks consider subjunctive conditionals such as 
a) and b) false because we understand the subjunctive clauses such as ‘If ‘Snow is green’ were 
true’ and ‘If ‘Snow is white’ were not true’ as describing counterfactual situations in which we 
use the words differently. In other words, according to David, ordinary folks understand 
subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) and 4) as expressing 3
o
) and 4
o
) in the following 
respectively:  
 
3) ‘Snow is green’ might have been true.  
4) ‘Snow is white’ might not have been true.  
3
o)   In some possible world, we might have used the word ‘snow’ or ‘green’ in such a way 
that the sentence ‘Snow is green’ is true in the world. 
4
o
)   In some possible world, we might have used the word ‘snow’ or ‘white’ in such a way 
that the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is not true in the world 
 
To say that we ordinary folks understand 3) and 4) in terms of 3
o
) and 4
o
) respectively is to say 
that ordinary people’s understanding of the modal properties of ‘true’ is different from the pure 
disquotationalist’s. According to the pure disquotationalist, the modal property of ‘true’ is such 
that an instance of (DS) is necessarily true; for example, it is a necessary truth that ‘Snow is 
white’ is true iff snow is white. According to David, however, this isn’t the way we, ordinary 
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folks, understand the modal properties of ‘true’. Ordinary folks understand the modal properties 
of ‘true’ as having to do with the meta-linguistic, semantic, or use properties that words might 
have. Therefore, we don’t consider subjunctive conditionals such as a) and b) to be true. To think 
that a) and b) are true, says David, is to have the crazy idea that if we had used words differently, 
snow might have been green or snow might not have been white.
106
 In other words, to think that 
a) and b) are true is to think that we could change world easily by changing the way we use 
words.
107
  
Is David’s argument sound? Although this argument succeeds in posing a serious 
challenge to Field’s theory, it has its own flaw. I will discuss its flaw before discussing its merit.  
According to David, a subjunctive truth-statement such as a) or b)—‘If ‘Snow is green’ 
were true,  snow would be green’ or ‘If ‘Snow is white’ were not true, snow would not be 
white’—is “unambiguously” false.108 The fact of the matter, however, is much more complicated 
than that—the meaning of a subjunctive truth-statement is ambiguous. David’s understanding of 
a subjunctive truth-statement reveals only one aspect of the meaning of a subjunctive truth-
statement; it doesn’t exhaust the entire meaning of a subjunctive truth-statement.  Granted, we 
sometimes understand subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) and 4) in terms of 3
0
) and 4
o
). That 
may also reflect ordinary folks’ immediate response to subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) 
and 4). But our ordinary notion of truth is a mixed bag, and this many-sidedness of the notion of 
truth is accentuated when it is conjoined with modality.  
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Depending upon a speaker’s intention in a specific context, subjunctive truth-statements 
such as 3) and 4) can also be understood in terms of 3
pd
) and 4
pd
), not only in terms of 3
o
) and 4
o
):  
 
3
pd
)    Snow might have been green.  
4
pd
)    Snow might not have been white. 
 
We sometimes mean 3
pd
) and 4
pd
) when utter subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) and 4). 
Let’s suppose the Pope said ‘The earth is flat’ to Galileo when Galileo was excommunicated 
several hundred years ago. Suppose Galileo responded to the Pope by saying ‘What you say 
might have been true in another world’. Here, Galileo doesn’t use the truth predicate in the way 
that David understands it. In this context, Galileo isn’t interested in the usage of a word. What 
Galileo intends to say in this context isn’t that if we had used the word ‘earth’ differently, the 
Pope’s utterance e might have been true. What he intends to say is rather that the Pope’s 
utterance (‘The earth is flat) might have been true if and only if the earth would have been flat 
itself. So, in a context in which a speaker isn’t interested in the semantic/use properties of a 
sentence, a subjunctive truth-state of the form ‘‘p’ might have been true’ should be understood in 
terms of ‘It might have been that p’, rather than ‘In some possible world, we might have used the 
sentence ‘p’ in such a way that ‘p’ is true in that world.’  
 It is a misconception about the modal properties of truth to think that subjunctive truth-
statements such as 3) and 4) should always be understood in terms of meta-linguistic subjunctive 
statements such as 3
o
) and 4
o
). We sometimes intend to make a meta-linguistic statement such as 
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3
o
) or 4
o
) in uttering a subjunctive truth-statement such as 3) or 4). But this doesn’t exhaust the 
entire purpose of a subjunctive truth-statement. In other contexts, in uttering a subjunctive truth-
statement, we simply want to talk about the modal properties of the world. In such a context, we 
don’t want the semantic properties of words to vary from one possible world to another possible 
world; namely, when we want to talk about the modal properties of the world rather than words, 
we need to keep the truth condition of a sentence constant from world to world. If the truth 
condition of a sentence changes from world to world, we cannot talk about the modal properties 
of the world. We cannot, because we would not talk about the same world when the semantic 
properties of words change. When we talk about the modal properties of the world, however, we 
talk about different ways the same world might have been. So, when we want to talk about the 
modal properties of the world, we need to keep the semantic properties constant from world to 
world. Therefore, in such a context, the modal statement 2)— (‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow 
is white)—is what we need.  
 Viewed this way, it is unfair to say that Field’s pure disquotationalism is entirely wrong 
about the modal properties of truth. To the contrary, a certain aspect of the modal properties of 
‘true’ requires Field’s purely disquotational understanding of the modal properties of truth. 
Unfortunately, David misses this point. In the passage quoted above, David says 
 If a)—If ‘Snow is green’ were true, then snow would be green—were correct, we could 
make snow green quite easily, namely simply by choosing to use ‘green’ from now on as we 
used ‘white’ until now.109 
 
Of course, no disquotationalist would claim that we can make snow have the color green just by 
choosing to use the word ‘green’ in the way we use ‘white’ now. That is a crazy idea. David 
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credits this crazy idea to the disquotationalist, because he understands the subjunctive truth-
statement ‘‘Snow is green’ were true’ in terms of a subjunctive meta-linguistic statement. David 
understands  
 
5) if ‘Snow is green’ were true  
 
in terms of 5*) in the following:  
 
     5
o
)  if we used the word ‘green’ in the way we use the word ‘white’ in the actual world.  
 
If 5)  is understood in terms of 5*), then to say that a) is true implies that we can easily make 
snow green by choosing to use a word differently. So, David credits this crazy idea because he 
thinks that 5) can be understood only in terms of 5*).  
 The subjunctive truth-statement 5), however, can be understood in terms of 5
pd
) in the 
following:  
 
    5
pd
)   if snow were green,  
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if one’s intention in uttering 5) is to talk about the modal properties of the world. In such context, 
a)— If ‘Snow is green’ were true, then snow would be green—is true. This is the reason why the 
purely disquotational conception of truth has a point. When we make a subjunctive truth-
statement such as ‘What the scientist said might be true’, we don’t make a modal statement about 
the use of a sentence. After all, if it makes sense to say that our purpose of stating that ‘Snow is 
white’ is true is simply to state that snow is white (at least in some contexts), then the 
disquotationalist view of the modal properties of truth should make sense as well. In making a 
truth-statement of the form ‘‘p’ is true’, are we always interested in the semantic properties of ‘p’? 
If the answer is no, then a subjunctive truth-statement of the form ‘‘p’ might have been true’ can 
be understood in terms of an object-level subjunctive statement ‘It might have been that p’. 
David’s mistake is not to see this aspect of the truth predicate.  
 That said, Field’s pure disquotationalism still owes us an explanation of how a 
subjunctive truth-statement can be about modal properties of the semantic, use-dependent 
features of words. Although David and other critics of pure disquotationalism got one aspect of 
the modal properties of ‘true’ wrong, they are right about the other aspect. In uttering a 
subjunctive truth-statement of the form ‘‘p’ might have been true’, we sometimes intend to make 
a modal statement about the semantic, use properties of the words. How can this non-
disquotational—or, as Field puts, “inflationary”—reading of a subjunctive truth-statement be 
accommodated by Field’s pure disquotationalism? Ever since Field proposed the theory, he has 
attempted several solutions to respond to this question. In the following, I will examine the most-
often discussed solution among them—the quasi-disquotational solution.  
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2.2.2 The Quasi-Disquotational Solution 
The term ‘quasi-disquotational’ is from the quasi-disquotational notion of truth that Field 
introduces in order to accommodate the non-disquotational reading of a subjunctive truth-
statement.
110
 Before explaining Field’s account of the quasi-disquotational notion of truth, 
however, it may be helpful to have knowledge about Field’s general strategy in dealing with 
problems of this sort—the problems caused by the discrepancy between the ordinary notion of 
truth and the purely disquotational notion of truth.  From the beginning, Field was fully aware of 
that the ordinary notion of truth often diverges from the purely disquotational notion of truth. As 
was stated previously, Field characterizes purely disquotational truth as a use-independent notion. 
The ordinary notion of truth, however, is not a use-independent notion. Put more accurately, the 
ordinary notion of truth has both aspects—the use-dependent aspect and the use-independent 
aspect. At times, we employ the truth predicate without having any intention of giving semantic 
information about the sentence to which it is ascribed. At other times, we employ the truth 
predicate with an intention to give semantic information about the sentence to which it is 
ascribed. Parallel with this duality, the ordinary truth predicate is sometimes ascribed to a purely 
orthographic sentence-type, and at other times it is ascribed to a sentence-type that has its 
semantic properties built into it.  
                                                          
110
 See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact. Field also 
invokes the extended and the modified disquotational notions of truth in order to deal with the modal objection (see 
his “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Value. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 55-117 and “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content”). I won’t discuss Field’s 
extended and modified disquotational approaches to the modal problem, because he considers the quasi-
disquotational approach as more promising than the other two. Even the quasi-disquotational approach, however, is 
eventually given up for another approach—the schematic approach. See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning 
and Content” and “Postscript: Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.  
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To say that purely disquotational truth is a use-independent notion is to say that the 
purely disquotational truth predicate isn’t ascribed to a purely orthographic type but to a 
sentence-type that has semantic properties built into it. Most of all, if the truth predicate is 
ascribed to a purely orthographic type, it doesn’t make sense to say that the truth-claim ‘‘Snow is 
white’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less claim ‘Snow is white’. Only when ‘Snow 
is white’ at the left-hand side of ‘iff’ in the biconditional  
‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white 
is understood as meaning the same as ‘Snow is white’ at the right-hand side, it makes sense to 
say that the truth-statement at the left-side is as a whole cognitively equivalent to the truth-less 
statement at the right side. Since the cognitive equivalence thesis is the core idea characterizing 
the purely disquotational notion of truth, the purely disquotational truth predicate is meaningful 
only when it is ascribed to a sentence-type that has semantic properties built into it. In this sense, 
Field says that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the left-hand side of the disquotational schema (DS) 
should be construed as a computational type—a sentence-type individuated in terms of its 
computational properties.
111
 In Field’s account, the meaning of an expression is explained in 
terms of its computational properties; namely, the inferential/conceptual roles and the indication 
relations of the expression.
112
 Moreover, since Field is skeptical of interpersonal synonymy, it 
doesn’t make sense to talk about the interpersonal sameness of a computational property. So, in 
Field’s theory, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ at the left side and the right side of ‘iff’ in the 
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 H. Field, “Disquotational truth and Factually Defective Discourse,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
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 See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” and “Attributions of Meaning and Content” in his 
Truth and the Absence of Fact. Field’s deflationist account of meaning will be discussed in detail in Ch. 4.  
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biconditional above is to be understood in terms of a computational sentence- type understood by 
individual speaker X.  
 Viewed this way, it is inevitable that the purely disquotational notion of truth conflicts 
with the modal properties of the ordinary notion of truth. An aspect of the ordinary notion of 
truth is that a subjunctive truth-statement of the form i) in the following can be understood in 
terms of a meta-linguistic subjunctive statement of the form ii):  
 
i) ‘p’ might have been true.  
 
ii) In some possible world, ‘p’ might have had semantic properties that make ‘p’ in that 
world true.  
 
If we understand the sentence replacing ‘p’ in i) as a computational type—or a sentence-type that 
has its semantic properties built into it—we cannot derive ii) from i). It simply doesn’t make 
sense to say that sentence ‘p’ as I understand it now might have had different semantic properties. 
We can derive ii) from i) only when we construe the sentence replacing ‘p’ as a purely 
orthographic type. Only then, does it make sense to say that the sentence replacing ‘p’ might 
have had different semantic properties than it has now. In order to derive ii) from i), we should 
detach the semantic (use) properties from the syntactic/orthographic properties of a sentence.  
 Whenever the purely disquotational notion of truth diverges from the ordinary notion of 
truth in this way, Field tries to explain the latter in terms of the purely disquotational notion of 
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truth, using fairly limited additional resources.
113
 This is Field’s general strategy in dealing with 
problems of this sort.
114
 The motivation behind Field’s invoking the quasi-disquotational notion 
of truth should be understood from this perspective as well—the quasi-disquotational notion of 
truth is at bottom purely disquotational, but some additional resources are invoked in its 
characterization. As with almost everything else, Field offers more than one characterization of 
the quasi-disquotational notion of truth.
115
 I chose to present here the original version, and it 
defines the quasi-disquotational notion of truth as follows:  
                                                          
113
 H. Field, “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p. 223.  
 
114
 Despite many changes Field has brought into his theory of deflationism, it seems that he still holds onto this 
general strategy. But he weakened his view on how this general strategy has to be operated. At first, he thought that 
any non-disquotational notion of truth (the ordinary notion of truth) has to be defined by the purely disquotational 
notion. This view, however, changed to a weaker view that explains the connection between the quasi-disquotational 
and the purely disquotational notions of truth in terms of a schema. See sec. 2.3.2 of this chapter.  
115
 The original version is in H. Field, “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” and the other two versions are 
in “Postscript to “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” both in H. Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact, 
Oxford University Press, 2001. One of later versions, however, is very wrong:  
 
       (*)   S is trueqd (at possible world v) iff S is to be translated by a sentence of mind (in the actual world) that is 
purely disquotationally true (at v).  
 
(See “Postscript to “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content.”)  
This version is wrong because ‘S’ is here a purely orthographic type, therefore, it doesn’t make sense to “translate” 
‘S’ into a sentence of mine. We cannot translate a purely orthographic type. The other one (**) has a problem as 
well:  
 
        (**)   SX,u is trueqd (at possible world v) iff SX,u is to be translated by a sentence of mine (in the actual world) 
that is purely disquotationally true (at v).  
 
About this version, Field says that it avoids using two distinct truth predicates—the purely disquotational one and 
the quasi-disquotational one—because the truth predicate is ascribed to a computational type ‘SX,u’. So, he says that 
we can use the single truth predicate by taking ‘S’ in (*) as a computational type, rather than a purely orthographic 
type. But does (**) use the single truth predicate? It still uses two distinct predicates: the quasi-disquotational and 
purely disquotational truth predicates. So, I am not sure why Field says that he now can use the single truth predicate 
with  version (**). That doesn’t mean that it is wrong to consider the truth predicate ascribed to ‘SX,u’ quasi-
disquotational. It should be considered quasi-disquotational in Field’s theory, because Field characterizes the purely 
disquotational truth predicate as being ascribed to a sentence “as-I-understand-it”. Although ‘SX,u’ is a 
computational type, it is a computational type understood by speaker X at the possible world v. The sentence 
replacing ‘SX,u’ doesn’t occur as a  sentence-as-I-understand-it. So, it is outside the extension of the purely 
disquotational truth predicate as characterized by Field. But then, the truth predicate ascribed to ‘SX,u’ is quasi-
disquotational by “Field’s own standards.”  Field offers another approach (***), and that approach will be discussed 
in the next section. 
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(QD)    (S is trueqd iff Ʃp[Ǝm(m is the meaning of S and m is the meaning of ‘p’ in the actual 
world) & ‘p’ is truepd]),  
and analogously,  
                [S has the quasi-disquotational truth condition that p iff Ǝm(m is the meaning of S and 
m is the meaning of ‘p’ in the actual world)].116 
 
In order to see how the quasi-disquotational notion of truth helps addressing the modal objection, 
let’s consider a subjunctive truth-statement 1) in the following:  
 
1) ‘Snow is green’ might have been trueqd,  
 
where 1) is understood along the lines of 1*) in the following:  
 
1*)   In some possible world, the sentence ‘Snow is green’ might have had semantic 
properties that make ‘Snow is green’ true in that possible world.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The reason why there is such confusion is that Field restricted the extension of the purely disquotational truth 
predicate to a sentence-as-I-understand-it. Once we get rid of this restriction, we can consider the truth predicate 
ascribed to ‘SX,u’ in (**) as purely disquotational. Interestingly (and curiously), Field goes against his own 
restriction in the approach (***) that will be discussed later. The problem is that he doesn’t say explicitly that he 
dropped the restriction.  
 
116
 ‘trueqd’ abbreviates ‘true in the quasi-disquotational sense’ and ‘truepd’ abbreviates ‘true in the purely 
disquotational sense’. See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” (1994), in his Truth and the 
Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 131. 
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Given that 1) is understood in terms of 1*), the truth predicate in 1) cannot be construed as being 
ascribed to a computational type. So, ‘Snow is green’ in 1) should be construed as a purely 
orthographic type. That means the truth predicate employed in 1) isn’t purely disquotational.  
To accommodate the truth predicate employed in 1), Field correlates the purely 
orthographic sentence-type ‘Snow is green’ with a true sentence ‘p’ in one’s own language, 
where ‘p’ is construed as a computational type. The purpose of correlating the purely 
orthographic type ‘Snow is green’ with a computational type ‘p’ in one’s language is to extend 
the purely disquotational truth predicate to the purely orthographic type ‘Snow is green’ by 
invoking the meaning m that connects the purely orthographic type with the computational 
type.
117
 So, strictly speaking, the truth predicate is ascribed to a sentence ‘p’ in one’s own 
language, where the truth condition of this sentence is exhaustively explained in terms of the 
purely disquotational schema (DS). Using the equivalence of meaning as a bridge, however, the 
purely disquotational truth predicate can be indirectly ascribed to the purely orthographic type 
‘Snow is green’. In this sense, the truth predicate employed in 1) is quasi-disquotational; 
although it isn’t itself disquotational, it is defined in terms of the purely disquotational truth 
predicate using the notion of a meaning-entity m as an additional resource. 
By invoking the notion of meaning-entity m, says Field, the quasi-disquotational notion 
of truth tries to “mimic” a non-purely disquotational notion of truth. Notice that one of the 
essential features of the purely disquotational notion of truth is that it cannot be ascribed to a 
purely orthographic type. In this sense, the ordinary notion of truth isn’t purely disquotational, 
since it can also be meaningfully ascribed to a purely orthographic type, thereby yielding modal 
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 Does it make sense to say that a purely orthographic type ‘Snow is green’ has the same meaning that a sentence 
‘p’ in my language does? It does—the idea is to think that the semantic property of a sentence is detachable from the 
sentence as a purely orthographic type.  
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properties that are opposite to the modal properties of the purely disquotational notion of truth. 
By introducing the quasi-disquotational notion of truth, Field tries to bridge the gap between the 
ordinary notion of truth and the purely disquotational notion of truth. To see why let’s consider 
how the quasi-disquotational definition of truth (QD) analyzes the substantive truth-statement 1): 
‘Snow is green’ might have been true. According to (QD), 1) is to be analyzed in terms of 1qd) in 
the following:  
 
1
qd
)   ‘Snow is green’ might have had the same meaning m that a sentence ‘p’ in my language 
has in the actual world, and ‘p’ is truepd. 
 
Analogously, to say that ‘Snow is green’ might have the truth condition that p’ is to say that 
there is a meaning m such that ‘Snow is green’ has m at some possible world, and m is the 
meaning of ‘p’ in the actual world. Intuitively, this is very similar to how we understand the 
ordinary notion of truth as it is ascribed to a purely orthographic type. An aspect of the ordinary 
notion of truth is such that a sentence x has the truth condition that p because x means that p. 
(QD) captures this basic intuition, but it does so by invoking a computational type ‘p’ in one’s 
own language. Once we invoke a sentence in our own language, we can define the ordinary 
notion that diverges from the purely disquotational one using an additional resource as a bridge.  
How plausible is this solution? To answer this question, let’s consider some concerns that 
can be raised about it. One is that (QD) invokes both interpersonal synonymy and the notion of a 
meaning-entity. To do so, however, doesn’t cohere with Field’s view of meaning, since Field is 
skeptical about the notions of interpersonal synonymy and a meaning-entity. How serious is this 
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concern? The answer is “Not so much.” First, (QD) can be easily modified into a weaker version 
that doesn’t invoke interpersonal synonymy or a meaning-entity. Instead, the pure 
disquotationalist can invoke the notion of a “similarity of meaning-characteristics”, which means 
the similarity of conceptual/inferential roles and indication relations (or simply, the similarity of 
use-properties). But then, (QD) may be modified into (QD*) as follows:  
 
(QD*)     (S is trueqd  iff Ʃp[Ǝ ( is the meaning-characteristics of ‘p’ in the actual world 
and S has meaning-characteristics similar to ) and ‘p’ is truepd]),  
 
and analogously,  
 [S has the truth condition that p iff Ǝ ( is the meaning-characteristics of ‘p’ in the 
actual world and S has meaning-characteristics similar to )].  
 
As long as (QD) can be understood in terms of (QD*), it doesn’t seem a serious problem that 
(QD) invokes interpersonal synonymy and the notion of a meaning-entity. 
There is, however, a more serious problem with the quasi-disquotational approach: the 
problem that the explanation provided by the quasi-disquotational approach (QD) puts things 
“backwards”. The crux of the modal objection is that it is of no use to say that a biconditional 
such as 2) in the following is a necessary truth if we construe ‘Snow is green’ at the left side as a 
computational type:  
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2) ‘Snow is green’ is true iff snow is green  
 
To say this, a critic might say, is to admit that the truth of a computational type can be 
understood only in terms of the semantic properties of a sentence. Unless we understand the 
meaning of ‘Snow is green’ at the left side in a certain way, we could not consider 2) a necessary 
truth. But then, says the same critic, it is only fair to say that the truth and truth condition of a 
computational type should be understood in terms of the meaning of a purely orthographic type.  
True, the quasi-disquotational definition (QD) almost captures this idea, but it makes an 
incorrigible mistake---it invokes the truth of a computational type ‘p’. The whole point of my 
objection, says the critic, is that it is phony or spurious to say that the truth—in particular, truth 
condition—of a computational type ‘p’ is use-independent. How can it be so if the notion of a 
computational type is to be understood in terms of semantic notions? A sentence of my language, 
for example, ‘Snow is green’, being a computational type, has the truth condition that snow is 
green because of its semantic properties. Hence, it is putting the matter backwards to invoke the 
truth and truth condition of a computational type in defining the truth and truth condition of a 
purely orthographic type. The pure disquotationalist may invoke the truth or truth condition of a 
sentence in one’s own language in order to accommodate the truth and truth condition of a 
sentence in another language (see the next section). But the modal objection is different, because 
the modal objection raises a question of the very ground of the truth and truth condition of a 
sentence in my own language.  
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If there is a critic arguing this way, he seems right—there is something wrong with the 
quasi-disquotational approach. Not surprisingly, Field later abandons it for another solution.
118
 
Before discussing the new solution, however, let’s consider what needs to be done. What needs 
to be done, as Field says, is to “mimic” a non-purely disquotational theory of truth.119  A ‘non-
purely disquotational theory of truth’ means a theory of truth that invokes a semantic notion in 
the characterizations of truth and truth conditions. Field’s purely disquotational theory of truth 
doesn’t do this, since the purely disquotational truth predicate is ascribed to a computational type, 
not a purely orthographic type. Thus, the meaning of the purely disquotational truth predicate is 
exhausted by the instances of the disquotational schema (DS): ‘p’ is true iff p.  
This aspect of the purely disquotational theory—that it doesn’t invoke a semantic notion 
in the characterization of truth and truth conditions—is the very reason for the modal objection. 
To address the modal objection, therefore, the purely disquotational theory has to invoke a 
semantic notion in the characterization of truth and truth conditions. The question is whether and 
how this can be done in a way that doesn’t cause a conflict with the purely disquotational 
conception of truth. Recall that Field characterizes purely disquotational truth as a use-
independent notion. In order to avoid an inconsistency, Field tried to invoke a semantic notion in 
such a way that the notion of truth is still purely disquotational at the bottom level, while the 
semantic notion bridges the purely disquotational notion with the non-purely disquotational 
notion of truth. This is the idea behind the quasi-disquotational solution, but it doesn’t seem to 
work.  
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 He abandons in the postscript to “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,”; see “Postscript: Deflationist 
Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.  
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 H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 132.  
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So, the pure disquotationalist has to find an alternative way in which he can invoke a 
semantic notion in the characterizations of truth and truth conditions without causing an 
inconsistency within the theory. In a sense, it seems that the pure disquotationalist has arrived at 
an impasse. Field’s initial idea was that the notion of truth ascribed to sentences of almost any 
kind—including purely orthographic types—can be explained in terms of the purely 
disquotational notion of truth ascribed to sentences in one’s own language. The modal objection 
raises a serious doubt about the plausibility of this view. There is, however, another—even more 
serious—problem that challenges the idea. That has to do with extending the purely 
disquotational truth predicate to a sentence in another language. So, before discussing how Field 
modifies his initial views, I will examine another problem challenging them. 
 
2. 3. Attributions of Truth to Sentences in Another Language 
In this section, I will discuss Field’s account of attributions of truth to sentences in 
another language. This is by no means a simple matter, because he has kept changing his views. 
So, unless great care is taken, a presentation of his view will be either misleading or inconsistent. 
Field’s initial position was that the purely disquotational truth predicate cannot be ascribed to a 
sentence in a language that one (the truth-attributor) doesn’t understand. So, his discussion on the 
attribution of truth to a sentence in another language was exclusively focused on how to extend 
the purely disquotational truth predicate to a sentence in a language that one understands. Even 
here, Field offered several different accounts.
120
 A major change, however, was brought about 
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 Field offers two accounts—the extended disquotational and the modified disquotational theories of truth. Both of 
them belong to the translational approach that will be discussed in the next section. Both of them rely on the 
translation of a sentence in another language to a sentence in one’s own language while the purely disquotational 
notion of truth ascribed to one’s own language serves as the rock-bottom of attributions of truth. The difference 
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when Shapiro mounted a powerful argument against Field’s theory.121 Field finally changed his 
position—he now grants that the purely disquotational truth predicate can be ascribed to a 
sentence that one doesn’t understand.122 In doing so, however, he ends up inducing a major 
change in his theory. As will be discussed shortly, the change is big enough to wonder whether 
Field still holds onto the purely disquotational conception of truth.
123
  
The discussion of this section will proceed as follows; first, I will explain Field’s original 
views before they encountered Shapiro’s objection. Then, I will introduce Shapiro’s objection 
and Field’s response to the objection. Third and last, I will criticize Field’s response to Shapiro’s 
objection and thereby suggest a new solution that is slightly different from Field’s. This new 
solution, if it works, will provide a way to hold onto the purely disquotational conception of truth.  
 
2.3.1 Attributing Truth to a Sentence in a Language that One Understands 
In this section, I will discuss Field’s original views about extending the purely 
disquotational truth predicate to a sentence in another language. Since he initially denied 
ascribing the truth predicate to a sentence that one doesn’t understand, the extensions of the truth 
predicate in this section will be restricted to sentences that a speaker understands.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
between them is that whereas the extended disquotational approach invokes the notion of 
interlinguistic/interpersonal synonymy, the modified disquotational approach doesn’t. The difference between these 
two approaches, however, isn’t so important in the discussion of the problems with Field’s pure disquotationalism. 
So, I won’t discuss them. See H. Field, “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright 
(eds.), Fact, Science and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 55-117, and “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” in 
in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
121
 S. Shapiro, “The Guru, The Logician, and The Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence,” Nous, 37 (1), 
2003: 113-132. 
122
 See H. Field, “Postscript: Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.  
123
 Field doesn’t say explicitly that he changed his views, although it is clear that he did so. See H. Field, ibid.  
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Broadly, Field offers two different kinds of accounts for an ascription of truth to a 
sentence in another language: the first is the translational approach and the other is the non-
translational approach.
124
 According to the translational approach, the truth of a sentence in 
another language that one understands is defined in the manner of (Tr) as follows:  
 
(Tr)    S in another language L is trueqd iff Ʃp (S is translated into ‘p’ in my language, and ‘p’ 
is truepd).  
 
According to the non-translational approach, the truth of a sentence in another language that one 
understands is defined in the manner of (N-Tr) as follows:  
 
(N-Tr)   S in another language L (that one understands) is true iff S.  
 
Of these two accounts, I will explain the non-translational approach before I explain the 
translational approach. 
 The non-translational approach (N-Tr) is the result of applying the purely disquotational 
schema (DS)  
 
(DS)  ‘p’ is true iff p  
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 See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” (1994), in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford 
University Press, 2001.  
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directly to a sentence in another language. Field says that it is a misconception of his theory that 
the purely disquotational schema is applicable only to a sentence in one’s own language—the 
schema can directly be applied to a sentence in any language as long as one understands the 
language.
125
 Suppose I understand ‘La neige est blanch’ in French. But then, in the purely 
disquotational conception of truth, to say ‘‘La neige est blanche’ is true’ is to say ‘La neige est 
blanche.’ So, with this approach, the notion of truth ascribed to the French sentence ‘La neige est 
blanche’ is exhausted by the biconditional 1) in the following: 
 
1) ‘La neige est blanche’ is true iff la neige est blanche.  
 
The biconditional 1) looks strange because it is a mixture of expressions belonging to two 
different languages. Except for that, this approach seems perfect in grappling with the purely 
disquotational conception of truth. The most important idea of the disquotational conception of 
truth is that truth is a purely logical notion—the truth predicate is a sort of substitutional device 
whose sole function is to express generalizations over sentences. The non-translational approach 
(N-Tr) is faithful to this core idea of the purely disquotational conception of truth. In case one 
doesn’t have a special need to express one’s understanding of a sentence in another language 
using a sentence in one’s own language, 1) is all that is needed. According to Field, however, 
this approach can be employed only for a sentence in a language that one understands—it cannot 
be meaningfully applied to a sentence in a language that one doesn’t understand. But is this 
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restriction necessary? Especially after Field recanted his initial position in response to Shapiro’s 
objection, it is not clear whether this restriction is needed. I will argue later that Field’s theory 
doesn’t need this restriction, and that will be my contribution to Field’s theory of truth.  
 Despite the fact that Field is quite content with the non-translational approach, he spends 
a lot of time explaining the translational approach to an attribution of truth to a sentence in 
another language. The reason, however, isn’t so much that we must understand a truth-statement 
such as ‘‘La neige est blanche’ is true’ in terms of 2) in the following:  
 
2) ‘La neige est blanche’ is true iff snow is white.  
 
Rather, the reason is that a translational biconditional such as 2) should be explained within the 
framework of the purely disquotational theory of truth. This is another misconception of Field’s 
theory of truth—to construe Field as claiming we must understand an attribution of truth to a 
sentence in another language in terms of a translational biconditional such as 2) above. Given 
that Field grants the non-translational approach, that isn’t the reason why Field spends so much 
time with the translational approach. His reason is rather that we sometimes express an 
attribution of truth to a sentence in another language in terms of a translational biconditional 
such as 2). A translational biconditional such as 2), however, challenges the purely 
disquotational conception of truth, since the truth predicate involved in 2) cannot be considered 
the purely disquotational truth predicate. According to 2), ‘La neige est blanche’ has the truth 
condition that snow is white, but the nature of this truth-conditional relation cannot be explained 
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independently of a semantic notion. In this sense, the notion of truth involved in 2) isn’t use-
independent, and so it is at odds with the purely disquotational concept of truth.  
To accommodate the notion of truth employed in a translational biconditional such as 2), 
Field defines the notion of truth ascribed to ‘La neige est blanche’ in terms of the purely 
disquotational notion of truth using the notion of translation as an additional resource. So, the 
methodology is basically the same as the one used in addressing the modal objection; that is, the 
truth predicate involved in 2) is the quasi-disquotational truth predicate (‘trueqd’), and it is to be 
defined in terms of the purely disquotational truth predicate (‘truepd’), using the notion of 
translation as a ‘limited additional resource’. This is the idea formulated by (Tr) above. The only 
difference between (Tr) and (QD) is that whereas (QD) appeals to a prior notion of meaning as 
an additional resource, (Tr) appeals to the notion of translation.
126
 So, like (QD), the plausibility 
of (Tr) largely depends on whether the additional resource—the notion of translation—can be 
explained in a suitably deflationary way. More precisely, the question is the following: can the 
notion of translation be explained in a way that it doesn’t inflate the notion of truth beyond what 
is allowed by the deflationary conception of truth?  
In order to answer this question, it has to be made clear what it is to explain the notion of 
translation in a way that doesn’t inflate the notion of truth beyond what is allowed by the 
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 The idea underlying (QD) (the quasi-disquotational approach) and (Tr) (the translational approach) is the same—
truth is at bottom purely disquotational, and any notion of truth that isn’t purely disquotational should be explained 
in terms of purely disquotational truth plus some additional resources. But then, why does Field invoke a prior 
notion of meaning in addressing the modal objection? The main reason seems to be that he wants (as he says) to 
mimic an inflationary notion of truth as much as possible. The intuition behind the modal objection is that the 
sentences in our language might have had different meaning, and thereby they might have had different truth 
conditions. When we make a modal statement like this, we construe sentences as purely orthographic types—
otherwise, it doesn’t make sense to say that the sentences in our language might have had different meanings and 
truth conditions. So, it is indeed impossible to appeal to the notion of translation in dealing with the modal 
objection—we can translate a sentence only if it is construed as an entity that has a certain meaning. That is to say, 
we cannot translate a sentence construed as a purely orthographic type. On the other hand, when we ascribe truth to 
a sentence in a foreign language, the sentence isn’t construed as a purely orthographic type. See H. Field, 
“Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 131.  
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deflationary conception of truth. The deflationary conception of truth has it that truth is a purely 
logical concept that doesn’t have an explanatory function. So, what is essential is that the notion 
of translation be explained in a way that the notion of truth doesn’t play an explanatory role in an 
account of meaning and content. There is, however, a dilemma here—that is, the notions of 
meaning and truth are essentially connected to each other. Consider the meaning-to-truth schema 
(M-to-T) as follows:  
 
(M-to-T)  If x means that p, then x is true iff p,  
 
An instance of (M-to-T) is true a priori. It is a conceptual truth that if a sentence x means that p, 
then x has the truth condition that p. From this it follows that the truth condition of a sentence is 
a necessary condition for x’s meaning that p—to have the truth condition that p is essential to 
mean that p. Speaking at the level of understanding language, (M-to-T) implies that we must 
understand the truth condition of a sentence in order to understand its meaning.  So, there is an 
inseparable connection between the notion of meaning and the notion of truth or a truth condition. 
The question is how to make sense of this connection without assigning an explanatory role to 
the notion of truth or a truth condition.  
 It seems that the best way to make sense of this connection in a deflationary way is to 
explain the nature of the connection in the way Horwich does.
127
 According to Horwich, a 
                                                          
127
 Horwich offers a neat and simple explanation of the connection between the notion of meaning and the notion of 
a truth condition. According to Horwich, the meaning of an expression x reduces the use-property of the expression, 
U(x). The use-property U(x), however, doesn’t strongly determine its extension; namely its reference or truth 
condition. So, we cannot infer the truth condition of a sentence x directly from the use-property U(x). For example, 
suppose a sentence in another language x has a certain use property U(x). We cannot infer its truth condition directly 
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deflationist can take the following two steps: first, a deflationist has to explain the notion of 
meaning without employing a truth-conditional notion; and second, a deflationist has to explain 
the connection between the notions of meaning and truth as a matter of a purely conceptual 
(analytic) relation.
128
  Field agrees with this idea, although he doesn’t put the point as clearly as 
Horwich does.
129
 Both Horwich and Field agree that the notion of meaning should be explicated 
without employing a truth-conditional notion. In Horwich’s account, it is explicated in terms of 
the notion of a use-property, and in Field’s account, it is explicated in terms of the notion of a 
computation role; i.e., inferential/conceptual roles and indication roles of an expression. Given 
that the notion of a use-property includes the notion of a computation role, there is no substantive 
difference between their views in this regard. Field agrees with the second step as well—
according to Field, as long as a deflationist doesn’t explain the meaning-to-truth connection 
without making a natural connection between them, he will be fine. What he means by ‘not 
making a natural connection’ is that the nature of their connection is understood in a purely 
conceptual way.
130
  
 But what is it exactly to explain the connection between the notions of meaning and truth 
in a “purely conceptual” way? Put differently, what is it exactly to explain their connection 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from this use-property unless we correlate the use-property U(x) with a sentence in our own language. Since the use-
property—which is the meaning-property in Horwich’s account—cannot of itself determine the extension of an 
expression, truth-theoretic notions cannot be reduced to a use-property. So, there is no inconsistency between 
reducing meaning to a use-property and the irreducibility of truth-theoretic notions. Once we explain a meaning-
attribution of the form ‘x means that p’ in terms of the notions of a use-property and translation, we “trivially” derive 
the truth condition of x by appealing to the Meaning-to-Truth principle. There will be more discussion on Horwich’s 
theory of meaning in Ch. 4 of this thesis. See P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.  
128
 P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 2 & 3.  
129
 The difference between Horwich and Field is that Horwich explains the connection between meaning and truth as 
a matter of an instance of the schema (M-to-T), whereas Field doesn’t—he tries to define a non-purely 
disquotational truth condition in terms of a purely disquotational condition plus some limited resources. He later (in 
the postscript to “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact) says that he 
was wrong in trying to do so. So, it seems that Field eventually accepted Horwich’s approach (which may be called 
‘the schematic approach’).  
130
 See H. Field, “Deflationary View of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p. p. 132.  
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without making a “natural” connection between them? If deflationism about truth requires that 
the connection between meaning and truth be explained in a “suitably deflationary” way, and if 
this in turn requires that the nature of their connection be explained in a purely conceptual way, it 
is important to be clear about what that implies. Field himself considers several different ways in 
which we can explain the nature of the connection between meaning and truth in a purely 
conceptual way; i.e., without making a natural connection between them. Broadly, there two 
options available to the deflationist:  
 
(I)   There is a fact of the matter by virtue of which a sentence ‘s’ in another language L  
means that p; or  
(II)  There is no fact of the matter by virtue of which a sentence ‘s’ in another language L  
means that p.  
 
If we accept (I), we can also accept interlinguistic synonymy. In addition, if we accept (I), we 
can be equipped with a theoretical basis for accepting a meaning-entity. On the other hand, if we 
accept (II), then we cannot accept interlinguistic synonymy. In addition, if we accept (II), we 
cannot accept the notion of a meaning-entity. Field favors (II), but he doesn’t think that option (I) 
is incompatible with the deflationary conception of truth as long as the notion of 
interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy is explained without invoking a truth-conditional notion.  
 Following Field, I will argue that both (I) and (II) are compatible with the deflationary 
conception of truth. Suppose we explicate—as Horwich does—the notion of 
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interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy in terms of the notion of a use-property (or a 
computational role). In such a case, a fact of the matter by virtue of which ‘s’ in another 
language L has the truth condition that p  is that ‘s’ in L and ‘p’ in my language have the same 
use-property U(x). This doesn’t, however, result in a naturalistic reduction of the notion of a truth 
condition; namely, (I) doesn’t lead us to an inflationary account of truth of the form (IP) as 
follows:  
 
(IP)  ‘s’ in L is true iff p ↔ ‘s’ has the naturalistic property F.  
 
First of all, a use-property is a potpourri of many distinct features of an expression; for example, 
assertability conditions, inferential/conceptual roles, indication relations, etc. So, from the 
statement that ‘s’ has the use-property U(x), we cannot infer that ‘s’ has a certain naturalistic 
property F. Second, unless the use-property of ‘s’ in L is correlated with the use-property ‘p’ in 
our own language, we cannot derive the truth condition of ‘s’ directly from its use-property.  It is 
one thing to say that ‘s’ has a certain use-property U(x), and another to say that ‘s’ means that p. 
To say the latter, we should be able to correlate the use-property U(x) with a sentence ‘p’ in our 
language. In this sense, both truth conditions and meaning are immanent notions when the notion 
of meaning is explicated in terms of a use-property; we cannot talk about the meaning or truth 
condition of a sentence that we don’t understand.131 If the use-property of ‘s’ in L  has no match 
                                                          
131
 The point here isn’t we don’t know the meaning or truth condition of a sentence that we don’t understand (which 
is a tautology). The point is rather that neither the meaning nor the truth condition of a sentence is determined by its 
intrinsic properties alone. I am sure that this is the case with Field’s disquotationalist theory of truth, but I am less 
sure about whether it is with Horwich’s. One possible objection is that whether or not we can translate a sentence, it 
must have a certain use-property, and this use-property determines the meaning and truth condition of a sentence. 
The problem with this objection, however, is that Horwich denies that a use-property alone determines its truth-
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with a sentence in our own language, we wouldn’t be able to assign meaning or a truth condition 
to ‘s’. But then, even if the notion of meaning reduces to the notion of a use-property (as it is 
done in Horwich’s account), we cannot read off the meaning or truth condition of a sentence 
from the use-property of a sentence alone. The fact that ‘s’ in L has a certain use-property cannot 
of itself determine its meaning or truth condition—we should be able to correlate ‘s’ with ‘p’ in 
our own language.  
 As a consequence, even if a deflationist accepts (I)—interpersonal/interlinguistic 
synonymy—he doesn’t risk inflating the concept of truth. Given that the notion of meaning is 
explicated in terms of many distinct features of an expression, and, in particular, meaning is a 
more or less immanent notion in deflationism, there is no way to make a “natural” connection 
between ‘x means that p’ and ‘x is true iff p’. The fact that a sentence in another language has a 
naturalistic property F cannot of itself determine either its meaning or truth condition. But then, 
the simplest way to explain the connection between meaning and a truth condition is to explain it 
as a matter of the trivial, conceptual connection expressed by the schema (M-to-T).  
Field, however, chooses an even safer option—option (II). It is beyond the scope of this 
section to provide a full examination of Field’s account of meaning and content (see Ch. 4 for 
more details). To give a brief account, though, there seem to be two reasons why Field is 
skeptical about interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy. First, Field explicates the notion of 
meaning in terms of the meaning-characteristics of an expression, where this notion is further 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conditional property (see Ch. 4 for a more detailed discussion. See also P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 2, 3, and 10). He 
says that we can read off neither the meaning nor the extension of a predicate from its use-property alone. This can 
only be understood as saying that unless we can match the use-property of an expression in another language with 
the use-property of an expression in our own language, we can neither ascribe a meaning nor an extension to a 
predicate. Therefore, neither Horwich nor Field seems to consider the meaning or truth condition of a sentence as 
being determined by its intrinsic properties alone. But then, both meaning and truth conditions should be immanent 
notions in their theories. The problem I try to solve, however, is how to recognize this feature of deflationism 
without making the notion of truth per se an immanent notion.  
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explicated in terms of the computational role of an expression; i.e., inferential/conceptual roles 
and indication relation.. A computational role, however, is a very fine-grained notion; in 
particular, the inferential/conceptual roles of an expression can vary from person to person even 
within a language. For example, the computational role of ‘noodle’ in Sally’s idiolect may be 
different from the computational role of ‘noodle’ in Tom’s idiolect even if both of them are 
English speakers. Between speakers of different languages, the gap may well be even bigger. For 
example, the Chinese word ‘麵’ is normally translated into ‘noodle’ in English. But the 
computational role of ‘麵’ in a Chinese speaker’s idiolect is quite different from the 
computational role of ‘noodle’ in an English speaker’s idiolect.132 But then, in Field’s theory, 
what we mean by a meaning-attribution such as  
 
3) ‘麵’ in Chinese means <noodle>,  
 
is 4) in the following:  
 
4) The meaning-characteristics of ‘麵’ in Chinese are most similar to the meaning-
characteristics of ‘noodle’ in English.  
                                                          
132
 First of all, Chinese people (in the past and maybe even now in rural places) use noodles as glue. So, the 
inferential/conceptual roles of ‘麵’ are different from those of ‘noodles’ in English. Second, their noodles look very 
different—if we say that noodles can have the shape of shell, many Chinese people will laugh at us. There are 
numerous examples of this kind. The point is not merely that cultures are relative—physical circumstances are 
sometimes very different alos. That means what is indicated by a word x in another language that is translated to, for 
example, ‘tree’ in English can indicate things that are quite different from what is indicated by ‘tree’ in English. But 
we still have to translate the word into ‘tree’, since there is no alternative. Translation is a way of trying to 
understand another language by finding commonalities. Finding commonalities, however, is a matter of matching 
and tailoring that can be done only from a translator’s point of view. There is a saying that translation is treason, of 
which the point is just to emphasize how difficult it is to translate one language to another.  
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So, by denying interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy, Field defends the idea that a meaning-
attribution should be understood in terms of the “similarity”, not sameness, of meaning-
characteristics.  
There is, however, another reason why Field is skeptical about 
interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy--he views meaning as not fully factual but partly 
evaluative notion.
133
 Field defends a kind of projectivist theory of meaning and content that is 
found in the theories of Quine, the simulation theory of mind, and others.
134
 According to this 
theory, when we attribute meaning and content to another person’s utterances and mental states, 
we project our own mental states—we understand another person’s utterances and mental states 
by “empathizing” with the person’s mental states. To a certain extent, the idea seems like a 
commonsense. It is inevitable that we project our own mental states in translation and 
interpretation, because we use sentences from our own language when we translate sentences in 
another language. A language, however, isn’t just a collection of words that contain information 
about the world; it embodies a culture, ways the speakers of the language look at the world, 
logical principles they accept, and so forth. Similarly, in interpreting other people’s mental states, 
we often use ourselves as a model. We infer that a person is in mental state M by observing 
behavior B because we are ourselves in the mental state M when we exhibit that behavior.  
                                                          
133
 H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” and “Attributions of Meaning and Content” in his Truth 
and the Absence of Fact. There will a more detailed discussion on this distinction in Ch. 4.  
134
 Field says in “Postscript: Mental Representation” (in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 68) that he now takes 
the Quinean projectivist view more seriously. Field discusses Quine’s  projectivist view of psychological 
explanations in his “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science 
and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 55-117.  Field also mentions R. Gordon’s “Folk Psychology as Simulation,” 
Mind and Language 1, pp. 158-171. Putnam also emphasizes the role played by “empathy” (Verstehen) in semantics 
and social sciences in his Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1978. See also W. V O. 
Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960.  
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If it is inevitable, at least to a certain extent, that we project ourselves in translation and 
interpretation, in order to claim that there is a fact of the matter in meaning, it is essential to 
show that there is interlinguistic/interpersonal synonymy. Consider ‘La neige est blanche’ in 
French. We translate it into ‘Snow is white’, and thus say that it means that snow is white. But 
the same sentence in French is translated into many different sentences in many different 
languages. In order to say that there is a fact of the matter, we have to show that all the different 
sentences translating ‘La neige est blanche’ mean the same thing. Unless this is shown, we have 
to conclude that it is one thing that we translate it into ‘Snow is white’, and thereby claim that 
‘La neige est blanche’ means that snow is white; it is another that Germans translate it into 
‘Schnee ist weiss’, and thereby claim that it means that Schnee ist Weiss; it is yet another that 
Koreans translate it into ‘눈은 하얗다’, and thereby claim that it means that눈은 하얗다; and 
so on.
135
 Each of these translations is considered “correct”, but if we cannot show that all these 
sentences mean the same, we have to accept a relativistic conclusion of some sort. In other words, 
although all of those translations and meaning-attributions are correct, they are not about exactly 
one and the same fact; there isn’t “the” meaning-fact that all of these meaning-attributions are 
about.  
It is important, however, not to exaggerate this relativistic aspect of Field’s notion of 
meaning. Although Field denies that there isn’t “the” correct translation, he still grants that there 
are standards for translation—some translations are better than others.136 Most of all, before we 
                                                          
135
 Strictly speaking, the phrases such as ‘means that Schnee ist Weiss’ and ‘means that 눈은 하얗다’ should be 
written in German and Korean respectively.  
136
 To say that some translations are better than others is to say that a translation that is more similar in respect of 
meaning-characteristics is better than a translation that is less similar in respect of meaning-characteristics. So, there 
is an objective standard. However, the standards for translation and interpretation are not exhausted by an objective 
standard; they also have a non-objective standard such as an interpreter’s background beliefs and values. In this 
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project our background beliefs, we have to examine the meaning-characteristics of the foreign 
expression. It is a more-or-less objective matter to examine the meaning-characteristics of an 
expression, since it consists in examining the inferential/conceptual roles and indication relations 
of an expression.
137
 Second, there should be a sufficient degree of the similarity of meaning-
characteristics. For example, we cannot translate ‘pomme’ in French into ‘banana’ in English 
because there is a word in English—‘apple’—that is more similar in meaning-characteristics. So, 
even if there is relativism in Field’s view of meaning, it isn’t too rampant. The kind of semantic 
relativism defended by Field is that a meaning-attribution has a third parameter—the background 
beliefs and values that are implicitly accepted by a translator or an interpreter.   
 Unfortunately, the relativistic side of Field’s theory of meaning is often exaggerated by 
some of his critics. For example, Kunne states that Field’s “idiolectic disquotationalism” (as 
Kunne calls the theory) cannot explain how there can be a contradiction in beliefs in the 
following case.
138
 Suppose someone uttered ‘La neige est blanche’. Suppose further that Sally 
responds to it by saying ‘That’s true’, whereas Tom responds to it by saying ‘No, that’s not true’. 
Listening to their conversation, we think that Sally and Tom contradict each other. Kunne’s 
objection to Field’s idiolectic disquotationalism is that Field’s theory cannot explain how Sally 
and Tom contradict each other. Because Field denies interpersonal synonymy, there is no 
guarantee that Sally’s understanding of ‘La neige est blanche’ is the same as Tom’s 
understanding of this sentence. More precisely, even if both Sally and Tom translate ‘La neige 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sense, there isn’t “the” correct translation or interpretation.  See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and 
Content,” (1994), in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001.  
 
137
 In other words, it consists in examining the inferential patterns of an expression and the causal connections 
between an expression and the world. To examine these features of an expression is a more or less objective matter.  
138 W. Kunne, “Disquotationalist Conceptions of Truth,” in What is Truth? Ed., R. Schantz, Berlin; New York; de 
Gruyter, 2002.  
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est blanche’ into ‘Snow is white’, there is no guarantee that ‘Snow is white’ in Sally’s idiolect 
means the same as ‘Snow is white’ in Tom’s idiolect. So, in Field’s theory, when Sally said 
‘That’s true’, she said that ‘Snow is whitesally’ is true, and when Tom said ‘That’s not true’, he 
said that ‘Snow is whitetom’ is not true. Without assuming interpersonal synonymy, we cannot be 
sure that ‘Snow is whitesally’ means the same as ‘Snow is whitetom’. Therefore, Field’s theory 
cannot explain how Sally and Tom contradict each other.  
The problem with Kunne’s argument is that he misses a crucial point about Field’s 
skepticism about meaning—the reason why Field is skeptical about synonymy is that meaning 
and synonymy are “evaluative” notions. The details of Field’s view on this point will be 
explained in Ch. 4. A core idea of this view, however, is that a meaning-attribution or synonymy-
claim should be understood as it is relativized to a meaning-attributor’s personal goal or interest. 
Surely, this is a controversial idea, but this isn’t the place to discuss the controversies concerning 
the view. Apart from the controversies, however, Field can explain the contradiction between 
Sally’s and Tom’s claims by relativizing them to a listener.  First, by listening to the 
conversation between Sally and Tom, we infer 5):  
 
5) Sally said that ‘Snow is white’ is true, and Tom said that ‘Snow is white’ is not true.  
 
Second, unlike Kunne, we take ‘Snow is white’ to abbreviate ‘Snow is whiteme’. So on this 
account, 5) has to be analyzed into 6):  
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6) Sally said that ‘Snow is whiteme’ is true, and Tom said that ‘Snow is whiteme’ is not true.  
 
But then, we don’t need to assume interpersonal synonymy in order to make sense of the 
contradiction between Sally’s and Tom’s claims. As Kunne says, in Field’s disquotationalism,  
we have to construe Sally’s truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ in terms of ‘‘Snow is whitesally’ 
is true’; similarly, Tom’s truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is not true’ in terms of ‘‘Snow is whitetom’ 
is not true’. When we hear them talking, however, we interpret ‘Snow is white’ in terms of a 
sentence in our own idiolect—‘Snow is whiteme’, and ascribe the truth predicate to this sentence. 
So, even if the meaning of ‘Snow is whitesally’ ≠ the meaning of ‘Snow is whitetom’, we can make 
sense of the contradiction between Sally’s and Tom’s claims.  
 That said, it is still perfectly possible that the meaning-characteristics of ‘Snow is whiteme’ 
in each person’s idiolect are “very similar.” My understanding of ‘Snow is white’ isn’t exactly 
the same as your understanding of ‘Snow is white’, but they must have similar meaning-
characteristics. That is inevitable, because if they didn’t, we would not be able to get what we 
want—for example, I say ‘I want an apple’, but you would give me a banana; I tell you that it 
will rain tomorrow, and you would prepare a picnic in a park; and so forth. In other words, 
unless the inferential patterns and indication relations of personalized/computational types (‘ptom’, 
‘pmary’, etc.) are sufficiently similar, linguistic communications would fall into pieces. So, even if 
there is no objective fact in the sense that an expression has “the” meaning, there is still some 
objective basis for a meaning-attribution that Field should recognize. He does, but he should 
have emphasized it more clearly. In order for us to have linguistic communications, our 
understanding of a language should have some common basis. We can grant this common basis 
110 
 
even if we don’t accept interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy. But then, the difference between 
those who accept interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy and those who don’t isn’t so great.  
 
2. 3. 2 Attributions of Truth to Sentences in a Language That One Doesn’t Understand 
 
As was discussed in the previous section, Field’s account of attributions of truth to 
sentences in another language doesn’t have a serious problem as long as we ascribe the truth 
predicate to sentences in a language that we understand. An attribution of truth to a sentence in 
another language can be accommodated by Field’s theory in terms of either (N-Tr)—by applying 
the disquotational schema directly to a sentence in another language—or (Tr)—by invoking the 
notion of translation. Field’s account, however, runs into a serious problem in accommodating an 
attribution of truth to a sentence in a language that one doesn’t understand.  As was mentioned 
earlier, Field wasn’t much concerned about this problem—he declared that the purely 
disquotational truth predicate cannot be extended to a sentence in a language that one doesn’t 
understand.
139
 He simply didn’t see a reason for which we extend the purely disquotational truth 
predicate to a sentence that we don’t understand. If the whole purpose of employing the truth 
predicate is to express generalizations over sentences, we have no reason to extend the purely 
disquotational truth predicate to sentences that we don’t understand. This idea, however, was 
challenged by Shapiro’s thought-experiment. Shapiro’s thought-experiment goes as follows.140  
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 H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.  
140 S. Shapiro, “The Guru, The Logician, and The Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence,” Nous, 37 (1), 
2003: 113-132. Indeed, Shapior not only criticizes Field’s disquotationalism but also Horwich’s minimalism with 
regard to the issue of ascribing the truth predicate to a sentence that a truth-attributor doesn’t understand. Shapiro 
says that Horwich’s theory is no better than Field’s in addressing this problem.  
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Suppose there is a guru who makes pronouncements about set theory; suppose further 
that there is a disciple who thinks that everything the guru says is true, but who doesn’t 
understand set theory; last, suppose that there is a logician who distrusts the guru’s set-
theoretical pronouncements, but likes to draw their number-theoretic consequences, which the 
disciple understands. If the disciple trusts the logician’s acumen about logic, and if ‘p’ is a 
number-theoretic sentence that the logician proves to be entailed by the guru’s set theory, then 
the disciple will infer that ‘p’ is true, so p. Since the disciple believes everything that the guru 
says to be true, and consequence preserves truth, the disciple infers that ‘p’ is true. According to 
Field, the problem posed by Shapiro’s example is that “though the disciple understands this 
conclusion, the reasoning is blocked if we can’t meaningfully apply ‘true’ to the guru’s 
utterances.”141 To put the problem more clearly, the explanandum here is how the disciple infers 
that p. Its explanans proceeds as follows:  
 
i) The logician says ‘p’ is entailed by the guru’s utterance ‘s’ about set theory.  
ii) The disciple trusts the logician’s acumen about logic.  
iii) Therefore, the disciple infers that ‘p’ is entailed by ‘s’. (from i) and ii)) 
iv) The disciple believes that consequence preserves truth.  
v) Therefore, the disciple believes that if what the guru says about set theory is true—if 
‘s’ is true—then ‘p’ is true. (from iii) and iv)) 
vi) The disciple believes everything that the guru says. (assumption) 
vii) Therefore, the disciple believes that what the guru says about set theory—‘s’—is true. 
(from vi)) 
viii) The disciple infers that ‘p’ is true. (from v) and vii)) 
ix) Therefore, the disciple infers that p. (from viii) plus the disciple’s knowledge of the  
disquotational schema) 
 
 
The question here is how vii) can be accommodated by the pure disquotationalist theory. 
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 H. Field, “Postscript: Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” in Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 147. 
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 To respond to Shapiro’s objection, Field attempts several solutions. 142The first is to 
construe ‘s’ as a sentence in a “potential” extension of a truth-attributor’s language. That is to 
say, ‘s’ is a sentence that might exist in a truth-attributor’s future language if his understanding 
were to improve.
143
 The problem with this solution, however, is that one’s language will never 
improve to the point that he can understand all the true sentences in the world. For example, 
what about a sentence that has not yet been uttered by anyone but can be potentially uttered by 
someone in the future? Our ordinary understanding of the notion of truth allows us to ascribe the 
truth predicate even to such a sentence. That is to say, we grant that even if we don’t understand 
a sentence, it is either true or not true. Field seems to think that Shapiro’s objection is concerned 
only with making sense of logical derivations, because at least here he recognizes the need to 
ascribe to a sentence that one doesn’t understand. But Shapiro makes it clear that the problem 
with Field’s disquotationalism (or deflationism in general) is that it “does not exhaust the 
legitimate uses of the notion of truth.”144 Shapiro is right about this, since even if I don’t 
understand quantum mechanics, I sometimes need to acknowledge that a sentence belonging to 
quantum mechanics is true simply because most experts in the field hold that it is true. When we 
accept experts’ opinions, we don’t necessarily understand what they say; we believe what they 
say is true, because they are experts and we have no reason to undermine their credibility. 
Knowledge by testimony provides another example. Imagine that I am in a Russian law court 
where a witness is testifying in Russian. If I have no reason to doubt the witness’s reliability, I 
would say that the witness’s testimony is true (even if I understand no word in Russian). Field’s 
solution doesn’t work in these cases, since when we say that these sentence are true, we are not 
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 H. Field, ibid.  
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 H. Field, ibid.  
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 S. Shapiro, “The Guru, The Logician, and The Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence,” Nous, 37 (1), 2003: 
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saying that these sentences will be true in the future when our understanding improves. Field 
here changes the subject—the question is not what we will mean by a truth-attribution of the 
form ‘‘s’ is true’ when our understanding improves. The question is what we mean by a truth-
ascription now when we don’t understand a sentence.  
 Recognizing the problem with the solution appealing to a “potential expansion” of 
understanding, Field offers a new solution.
145
 His new solution is formulated in (***) as follows:  
 
(***)   If SX,u is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u is true iff p) 
          [And if SX,u  is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u has the truth condition that p).],  
 
  
 
where ‘SX,u’ abbreviates ‘a sentence S as it is understood by an individual X in a possible world 
u’, and ‘□‘ means ‘necessarily’. This new solution differs from Field’s previous solutions in two 
respects. First, (***) is a schema, like the purely disquotational schema (DS) (‘p’ is true iff p). 
So, according to this new proposal, we should treat a conditional statement such as 1)  
  
1) If ‘La neige est blanche’ is translatable as ‘Snow is white’, then □ (‘La neige est blanche’ 
is true iff snow is white).  
 
as an axiom.
146
 By treating a truth-statement such as 1) as an axiom, Field gives up the idea that 
he held for a long time—that a non-purely disquotational truth predicate should be defined in 
terms of the purely disquotational truth predicate (using fairly limited resources). Thus he says, 
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I must have thought that the motivation for demanding a substantive theory of truth and truth 
conditions and reference, like that advocated in Chapters 1 and 2, could only be undercut if 
these notions are explicitly defined in terms of more-or-less logical notions plus translation. 
But this seems a mistake: the argument for a substantive theory of truth conditions and 
reference depends on taking truth conditions and reference as having a certain kind of 
‘causal-explanatory’ role, as noted in the postscript to Chapter 1 ; and introducing a notion of 
truth conditions by means of the schema (***) does nothing to make the notion ‘causal 
explanatory’147 
 
This is quite a change, since if we accept this schematic solution, we don’t need two 
disquotational truth predicates—the purely disquotational and quasi-disquotational. That means 
all the previous solutions invoking the quasi-disquotational truth predicate are no longer needed. 
More precisely, if we accept this schematic solution, we don’t need the quasi-disquotational 
solution (QD) to the modal objection (section 2.2.2) or the translational approach (Tr) that Field 
offered to explain a truth-ascription to a sentence in another language that one understands. All 
of these approaches attempt to define the ordinary truth predicate in terms of the purely 
disquotational truth predicate using some additional resources. According to Field now, however, 
all these approaches were based on a wrong idea—the idea that the notion of a substantive theory 
of a truth condition would be needed unless a non-purely disquotational truth predicate is defined 
in terms of the purely disquotational predicate using some additional resources. This idea is 
mistaken because what really matters for the deflationary theory of truth is that the notions of a 
truth condition and reference don’t have a certain kind of causal-explanatory role. 
 So, by proposing the schematic solution appealing to (***), Field induces a big change in 
his purely disquotational theory of truth. Originally, Field characterized purely disquotational 
truth as a use-independent notion; it is a notion that should be understood in a total separation 
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from the semantic properties of a word. It was indeed this idea that resulted in the quasi-
disquotational approach (QD) and the translational approach (Tr). Field’s original ides was the 
following. First, the notion of truth ascribed to a sentence in one’s own language can be 
understood independently of a semantic notion, and in this sense, the notion of truth ascribed to a 
sentence in one’s own language is purely disquotational. Second, the ordinary notion of truth 
isn’t purely disquotational, since the notion of truth ascribed to a purely orthographic type or a 
sentence in another language is not use-independent; it cannot be understood in a total separation 
from a semantic notion. But this isn’t a problem as long as the ordinary notion of truth can be 
defined in terms of the purely disquotational notion of truth using fairly limited resources. The 
underlying idea here is to separate a truth-part from a meaning-part involved in a truth-claim; the 
truth-part is exhaustively explained by the purely disquotational notion of truth ascribed to a 
sentence in one’s own language, and the meaning-part is explained by invoking additional 
limited resources. As was discussed throughout this chapter, however, this idea turned out to 
have too many problems. It falls into infinite regress or circular reasoning when it is applied to 
the modal objection, and it cannot accommodate a truth-ascription to a sentence in a language 
that one doesn’t understand.148  So, at last, Field gives up the whole idea—the idea of 
defining the ordinary notion of truth in terms of the purely disquotational notion of truth using 
limited resources. But what does it mean to give up this idea? It means that Field gives up the 
use-independent feature of the purely disquotational notion of truth. If he hadn’t characterized 
disquotational truth as a use-independent notion—a notion that is entirely separated from a 
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semantic notion—he wouldn’t have taken such a tortuous road. Although he doesn’t’ say it 
explicitly, he makes it quite clear that he now gives up the use-independent feature of 
disquotational truth.  He says “I now prefer to do things in the more natural way.”149 The more 
natural way is just to acknowledge that the notion of a truth condition cannot be understood 
independently of a semantic notion. This new idea is exhibited by the schema (***).  
 Given that the purely disquotational notion of truth was originally characterized as a use-
independent notion, does this have to be taken as giving up the purely disquotational theory as a 
whole? In a sense, ‘yes’—Field now has no reason to keep the “purely” disquotational notion of 
truth. From the broader perspective, however, this isn’t a disaster at all. It just means that a 
version of deflationism—Field’s pure disquotationalism—has to be rejected. As Field says 
himself above, even if the deflationary theory of truth will be sustained as long as the notions of 
a truth condition and reference don’t have a certain kind of causal-explanatory role. So, even if a 
deflationist has to acknowledge the inseparable connection between the notion of a truth-
condition and the notion of meaning, the deflationary conception of truth can still be sustained.  
 But what if the schematic solution appealing to (***) is not the best solution that can be 
offered by the pure disquotationalist? Although it is by no means clear whether there is a better 
solution than (***), it is quite clear that the solution appealing to (***) has a problem. The 
problem is that it still cannot accommodate an ascription of truth to a sentence in a language that 
one doesn’t understand. According to Field, the schematic solution (***) better handles the 
problem of ascribing the truth predicate to a sentence that one doesn’t understand, because it is 
noncommittal when ‘SX,u’ is untranslatable. According to (***), if ‘SX,u’ is translated to ‘p’ 
which one understands, then it is necessary that ‘SX,u’ is true iff p. But if ‘SX,u’ is untranslatable, 
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its truth condition is indeterminate—we cannot fill out the right-hand side of ‘iff’ in ‘□(SX,u is 
true iff ___’.  
It seems reasonable to consider the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence 
indeterminate, since even an inflationist cannot do much better than that. An inflationist—for 
example, a correspondence theorist or coherent theorist—may insist that the truth condition of a 
sentence is determined by its intrinsic properties; for example, the causal properties of a sentence 
or a sentence’s relations to other sentences. The problem with this claim is that the inflationist 
has to prove that the truth condition of a sentence is determined by the intrinsic properties of a 
sentence. In order to do better than the deflationist about the truth condition of an untranslatable 
sentence, the inflationist should be able to show that the notions of truth and truth conditions are 
reducible to the intrinsic properties of a sentence. As was discussed in Ch. 1, however, it is 
extremely difficult to show that the notions of truth and truth conditions are reducible to the 
intrinsic properties of a sentence. If such a reductive theory had been available, we wouldn’t now 
be discussing the prospect of the deflationary theory. So, even an inflationist cannot help but 
admitting that the truth of an untranslatable sentence is indeterminate.  
 When it comes to a deflationist, she has no other option but to accept the indeterminacy 
of the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence. A deflationist cannot explain the truth 
condition of a sentence by defining its truth condition of a sentence in terms of its intrinsic 
properties. A deflationist cannot accept an explanation of the form as follows:  
 
 (IT)  x is true iff p ↔ x has the property F.  
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To accept an explanation of this form is inconsistent with the core ideas of a deflationary theory 
of truth. Neither does it seem a reasonable idea to separate the notion of a truth condition from 
the notion of meaning as Field did before he turned to the schematic solution (***). As was 
discussed, the modal objection is raised because Field characterized the notion of truth ascribed 
to a sentence in one’s own language as a use-independent notion. Besides, it would be 
inconsistent to say that the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence is indeterminate if the 
notion of a truth condition were not essentially connected to one’s understanding of the meaning 
of a sentence. Last and the most important, even a deflationist has to offer some account of the 
truth condition of a sentence. The only option available to a deflationist is to derive the truth 
condition of a sentence from its meaning, while he explains the relationship between them in 
terms of a purely conceptual connection. The idea is to accept an instance of the meaning-to-
truth schema (M-to-T) 
 
     (M-to-T)  If x means that p, then x is true iff p,  
 
as a conceptual truth. Both the meaning-to-truth schema and the schema (***) exhibit the idea 
that the truth condition of a sentence is derived from its meaning as a matter of a simple 
conceptual truth. In this way, the deflationist can avoid inflating a theory of truth while he 
explains the minimal, conceptual connection between the notions of meaning and a truth 
condition.  
 But if a deflationist has no other way of explaining the truth condition of a sentence 
except by making use of the conceptual connection between the notion of meaning and the 
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notion of a truth condition, then when the meaning of a sentence is indeterminate, he cannot but 
say that its truth condition is indeterminate as well. One may here object that it is wrong to say 
that the truth condition of a sentence is indeterminate just because the truth-attributor doesn’t it. 
A deflationist about truth, however, has no other option. To say that meaning or a meaning-
ascription is not immanent to one’s understanding of an expression is to say that the meaning of 
an expression is determined by some intrinsic properties of an expression alone. To say this, 
however, is highly dangerous to the core ideas of deflationism. Suppose the meaning of a 
sentence x is determined by its intrinsic property F in the manner of (IM):  
 
(IM)   x means that p ↔ x is F.  
 
Let’s add to (IM) the meaning-to-truth principle: x means that p → x is true iff p. The result 
would a justification of the inflationary principle of truth (IT) mentioned above: x is true ↔ x is 
F.  Although a deflationist recognizes meaning-constituting properties (e.g. computational roles, 
indication relations, and use-properties), she doesn’t say that we can read off the meaning of an 
expression from these meaning-constituting properties alone.
150
 That is to say, even if an 
expression x in another language has its use-properties intrinsically, if we cannot translate it into 
an expression in our own language, we wouldn’t be able to attribute a meaning to it.  
  So, it seems that the notion of meaning is essentially immanent in a deflationary theory 
of truth and meaning. This implies the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence is essentially 
indeterminate in a deflationary theory as well. So, if the notion of meaning is essentially 
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immanent, so is the notion of a truth condition. Therefore, if we accept the deflationary notion of 
truth, we should treat the truth condition of a sentence that we don’t understand as indeterminate.  
According to Field’s schema (***), however, not only the truth condition but also the 
truth of an untranslatable sentence is indeterminate—according to this schema, we cannot say 
anything about the truth of an untranslatable sentence. But then, the schema (***) cannot address 
Shapiro’s counterexample; we cannot still make sense of the disciple’s derivation of the truth of 
a number-theoretic sentence, which depends on the disciple’s believing the truth of a set-
theoretic sentence which he cannot understand.  Besides, Field’s solution doesn’t square with the 
ordinary intuition of truth; we’re inclined to think that a sentence can be true or not true even if 
we don’t understand it. For these reasons, I will propose a solution that is different from Field’s.  
 
2.3.3 A Different Approach 
 
What I will argue for in this section is that the purely disquotational notion of truth is not 
an immanent notion. The disquotational notion of truth is usually construed as an immanent 
notion—the notion of truth that can be meaningfully ascribed only to a sentence that one 
understands. That is also how Shapiro understands the disquotational notion of truth, and that’s 
the whole motivation for his thought-experiment—to show that there is a serious problem with 
this feature of disquotational truth.
151
  In this section, however, I will argue that it isn’t essential 
that disquotational truth be understood as an immanent notion.  
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Assuming that there is no way to solve Shapiro’s problem while we keep the schema 
(***), I propose a different schema—a schema that allows us to apply the disquotational schema 
to a sentence that we don’t understand. The schema is (****) in the following:  
 
(****)   □(‘SX,u’ is true iff SX,u).  
  
The major difference between this schema and Field’s schema (***)  
(***)   If SX,u is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u is true iff p) 
          [And if SX,u  is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u has the truth condition that p).] 
is that it doesn’t invoke the notion of translation in characterizing the truth of a sentence. So, if 
we accept the schema (****), then we can make sense of the truth of a sentence in another 
language or another person’s idiolect without invoking a sentence in one’s own language. This 
difference is important in addressing Shapior’s objection. Shapiro’s objection is that the 
disquotationalist cannot make sense of the disciple’s ascription of the truth predicate to the 
guru’s set-theoretic sentence that the disciple doesn’t understand. Now, the disquotationalist can 
explain it as following. First, notice that the truth predicate in (****) is ascribed a sentence 
understood by a speaker X at a possible world u. Surely, this is also the case in Field’s schema 
(***), which is an important improvement from Field’s initial position. Initially, Field took the 
disquotational schema (DS)  
   (DS)  ‘p’ is true iff p   
 to be the basis of the disquotational notion of truth. This idea led him to define a non-purely 
disquotational notion of truth in terms of the purely disquotational notion of truth plus limited 
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resources. By proposing the schema (***), however, Field gave up the idea—what is at the 
bottom of the disquotational notion of truth is no longer the disquotational schema (DS) but the 
schema (***). A big difference between (DS) and (***) is that the truth predicate in (***) is 
ascribed to a sentence understood by speaker X at a possible world u—the truth predicate isn’t 
ascribed to a sentence understood by me at the actual world. So, (DS) is a special case of (***)—
it is a case in which a speaker and an attributor are the same person.  
 The schema (****) respects this feature of (***)—that the truth predicate ascribed to a 
sentence understood by a speaker is logically prior to the truth predicate ascribed to a sentence 
understood by a truth-attributor.  Applying this idea to Shapiro’s guru-example, we first ascribe 
the truth predicate to a set-theoretic sentence understood by the guru as follows:  
 
1)  (‘Sguru’ is true iff Sguru).  
 
Second, if ‘S’ is a sentence in a foreign language, and ‘Sguru’ is translatable into ‘p’ in my 
language, we can derive 2) from 1):  
 
2)  (‘Sguru’ is true iff p ).  
 
But step 2) isn’t necessary to make sense of the truth of the guru’s set-theoretic sentence; it can 
be fully made sense of by 1). Suppose we don’t understand ‘Sguru’. We can still make sense of the 
truth of the guru’s sentence, since the truth predicate in 1) is ascribed to a sentence understood by 
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the guru, and not by me. Initially, Field ascribed the disquotational truth predicate primarily to a 
sentence understood by me, and this generated Shapiro’s objection. As a response, Field 
proposes the schema (***) in which the disquotational truth predicate is primarily ascribed to a 
sentence understood by a speaker. So, Field’s schema (***) is close enough to solve Shapiro’s 
objection except that it still invokes the notion of translation. By invoking the notion of 
translation, Field in effect nullifies the effect of ascribing the disquotational truth predicate to a 
sentence understood by a speaker. It is mysterious why Field still invokes the notion of 
translation after he liberates disquotational truth from the narrow confinement of sentences 
understood by a truth-attributor. It seems that Field is still in the grip of his initial idea that the 
disquotational truth predicate is primarily ascribed to a sentence understood by me.  
 The schema (****) corrects this problem with the schema (***). As a consequence, it can 
finally address Shapiro’s objection. A drawback with the schema (****), however, is that it 
cannot characterize the truth condition of a sentence. As was stated earlier, a truth condition is an 
essentially immanent notion when we construe it in the deflationary sense. In his “The 
Deflationary Conception of Truth,” Field says,  
 
Note that as I understand a theory of truth, it could equally be called a theory of truth-
conditions; the question that forms the subject of a theory of truth is substantially equivalent 
to the question of what it is for an utterance or state of thinking to have a given set of truth-
conditions.
152
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Ironically, Field’s disquotational theory of truth denies the need of a theory of truth conditions 
that explains what it is for an utterance or state of thinking to have a given set of truth condition. 
No theory is needed—once we understand the meaning of a sentence, we derive its truth 
condition trivially by applying the meaning-to-truth schema (M-to-T): if x means that p, then x is 
true iff p. In Field’s theory of meaning, however, the notion of meaning—or the property ‘x 
means that p’—is itself an immanent notion. The meaning of a sentence isn’t determined by its 
intrinsic properties alone—we should be able to interpret (or translate) it into a sentence in our 
own language. But then, we cannot talk about the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence; 
for example, we cannot make sense of the truth condition of the guru’s set-theoretic sentence. In 
order to explain the disciple’s logical derivation, however, we don’t need to make sense of the 
truth condition of the guru’s sentence; we only need to make sense of its truth. This can be done 
by appealing to the schema (****). Field’s schema (***) is derived from (****) when we can 
understand ‘SX,u’. If we cannot, we cannot derive (***), and the truth condition of the sentence 
should be considered indeterminate. So, by making the distinction between an ascription of truth 
and an ascription of a truth condition, the disquotationalist can address Shapiro’s objection.  
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Chapter 3. Deflationism and the Success Argument
153
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A core idea of deflationism is that truth is a purely logical notion or property. One 
important implication of this idea is that truth shouldn’t be assimilated into naturalistic properties 
such as being a certain valence number, being turquoise, and being sodium chloride.
154
 Unlike 
these naturalistic notions, a purely logical notion cannot play a causal-explanatory role. The so-
called ‘success-argument’ against the deflationary theory of truth is purported to challenge this 
very idea of the deflationary theory of truth—the idea that truth is a purely logical notion that 
doesn’t play a causal-explanatory role.155 The gist of this argument proceeds as follows. First, the 
notion of truth plays an important role in an account of the success of behavior. For example, if I 
desire to drink water, and my belief that there is a fountain across the street is true, then I will 
succeed in drinking water by crossing the street.  Second, according to the deflationary theory of 
truth, truth is a purely logical notion; the utility of the notion of truth is exhausted by its role as a 
device of expressing generalizations. Therefore, third, the explanatory role played by the notion 
of truth in an account of the success of behavior cannot be accommodated by the deflationary 
theory of truth.  So, according to the success-argument, the explanatory role played by truth in an 
account of the success of behavior doesn’t square well with the deflationary conception of truth.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether and how the deflationist can 
accommodate the role of truth in an account of the success of behavior.  For this purpose, two 
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quite different criticisms drawing on the success-argument will be discussed: Nic Damnjanovic’s  
and Kitcher’s criticisms of the deflationist response to the success-argument.156 Although they 
both find the deflationist response to the success-argument unsatisfactory, they base their 
criticisms on very different reasons.  Damnjanovic’s reason is that the deflationist’s response is 
inconsistent—the deflationist’s response to the success-argument shows that truth is a causal-
explanatory property. To support this view, Damnjanovic brings in Jackson and Pettit’s program 
explanation; when the standard deflationist response to the success-argument is conjoined with 
Jackson and Petitt’s theory, it shows that the notion of truth plays a causal-explanatory role in an 
account of the success of behavior.  
Philip Kitcher has an entirely different agenda when he criticizes the deflationist response 
to the success-argument. As an ardent advocate of scientific realism, Kitcher’s main interest is to 
decide whether the deflationary theory of truth is compatible with the doctrine of scientific 
realism.  On Kitcher’s view, they are not compatible—more precisely, scientific realism needs a 
non-deflationary notion of truth; in particular, the correspondence notion of truth. To support this 
view, Kitcher focuses on the role of truth in the so-called ‘success-to-truth rule’. Two features of 
the success-to-truth rule make relevant to the discussion of deflationism and realism. First, 
viewed broadly, the success-to-truth rule is also an account of the success of behavior. Second, it 
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embodies one of the most important arguments for scientific realism—the idea defended by the 
no-miracle argument and the abductive argument for scientific realism.  The main thesis of 
Kitcher’s argument is that the deflationist cannot accommodate the role of truth in this success-
to-truth rule. From this, Kitcher aims to infer the conclusion that scientific realism needs a non-
deflationary notion of truth.  
In the following, I will criticize Damnjanovic’s and Kitcher’s arguments in turn. Unlike 
what Damnjanovic contends, the deflationist’s response to the success-argument doesn’t show 
that truth is a causal-explanatory property. There is simply no room for applying Jackson and 
Pettit’s theory to the deflationary theory of truth. To think differently indicates that one has 
misunderstood either the deflationary theory or Jackson and Pettit’s theory (or both). Kitcher’s 
criticism of deflationism also fails because he is confused about the goal of the success-to-truth 
rule. Kitcher argues that if we construe the notion of truth in the deflationary sense, we cannot 
explain systematic successes. To explain systematic successes, however, is not what the success-
to-truth rule is supposed to do—it is supposed to defend the doctrine of scientific realism. Once 
we put aside Kitcher’s demand of explaining systematic successes, we will find that the role of 
truth in the success-to-truth rule can be accommodated by the deflationary theory of truth. Indeed, 
the deflationary notion of truth—contrary to what Kitcher contends—is ideally suited for the 
purpose for which the success-to-truth rule is put forward.  
 
3.2 Damnjanovic’s Criticism of Deflationism 
3.2.1 The Standard Deflationist Response to the Success Argument 
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Nic Damnjanovic, in his “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” tries to show that 
deflationists are wrong in denying that truth is a causal-explanatory property.
157
 Damnjanovic 
claims that the standard deflationist response to the success argument is inconsistent because 
Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation shows that even logical properties can be causally 
explanatory.
158
 The first half of this chapter will be devoted to examine the plausibility of this 
view. As a first step of this task, I will in this section explain the standard deflationist response to 
the success argument that Damnjanovic accuses of being inconsistent. Before embarking on this 
task, I will clarify a small terminological issue. Damnjanovic uses the expression ‘causal-
explanatory’ in discussing the deflationist response to the success argument. He doesn’t explain, 
however, what is exactly meant by “causal” here; neither does anyone who uses this expression 
in the discussion of the success argument against deflationism.
159
 The concept of causation, 
however, is extremely complicated, and I am disinclined to getting entangled into the discussion 
of this difficult concept. So, in using the notion of a causal-explanatory role in the following, I 
will assume only one thing: a concept has a causal-explanatory role if and only if its role isn’t 
purely logical. In other words, a causal-explanatory property isn’t a purely logical property; a 
causal-explanatory property is a non-logical/natural property such as being turquoise or being 
made of tin.
160
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.  According to Damnjanovic, the success argument argues from the role of truth in an 
account of an agent’s success of behavior to the conclusion that truth is a causal-explanatory 
property. Deflationists have typically responded to this argument in two stages as follows: first, 
they try to show that the truth predicate appears only as a device of generalization in an account 
of the success of behavior; and therefore, second, the notion of truth plays a purely logical—not 
causal-explanatory—role in a success-explanation. Damnjanovic finds this standard deflationist 
response inconsistent. To make his points more effectively, Damnjanovic recasts the success 
argument against deflationism in terms of five steps as follows:  
 
i) If A has true beliefs about how to get what A wants, A is more likely to get what A 
wants [platitude]. 
 
ii) Therefore if A has beliefs about how to get what A wants which have the property of 
being true, A is more likely to get what A wants [(i) and pleonastic transformation].  
 
iii) Therefore, the property of being true is appealed to in a causal-explanatory 
generalization [(ii) and the definition of causal-explanatory generalization]. 
 
iv) Therefore truth is a causal-explanatory property [(iii)]. 
 
v) Therefore deflationism is false [(iv) and the definition of deflationism].  
 
 
It is hardly imaginable that someone should raise an objection to the inference from (i) to (iii). 
After all, we do appeal to the property of truth in order to explain the success of an agent’s 
behavior, and neither does any deflationist as far as I know deny the intuition underlying the 
inference from (i) to (iii).
161
 So, the potentially questionable step is the inference from (iii) to (iv). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
defined in terms of some sort of a physicalistic notion, we would still be left in dark about the nature of the alleged 
causal connection. What does it mean to say that the correspondence/causal connection between a belief state and 
the external world causes the success of behavior?  
161
 Some deflationists such as prosententialists hold that truth is not a property. For them, ‘is true’ is not even an 
ordinary predicate: it is a prosentence-forming operator. Horwich, however, doesn’t deny that truth is a property, 
since ‘true’ should be formalized in logic as a predicate. To Horwich whether truth is a property or not is a less 
interesting question than the question of what sort of property truth is. What should be emphasized, thus, is that truth 
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The standard deflationist response blocks the inference from (iii) to (iv); it accepts (iii), but 
doesn’t accept (iv). According to this response, the property of truth is appealed to as a device of 
generalization, so to accept (iii) doesn’t lead to accepting (iv). Damnjanovic disagrees; he claims 
that the deflationist can accept the inference from (iii) to (iv). Surprisingly, Damnjanovic doesn’t 
think the claim (iv)—that truth is a causal-explanatory property—to be incompatible with the 
deflationary theory of truth. This is a very peculiar idea, since most leading deflationists think 
that truth is a purely logical notion, and they also think that if truth is a purely logical notion, 
truth cannot be a causal-explanatory property. Peculiar or not, Damnjanovic’s very purpose is to 
show this seemingly impossible combination is possible. To be more precise, Damnjanovic 
wants to show that there is no inconsistency between the following two claims a) and b):  
 
a) The deflationary theory of truth is correct.  
b) Truth is a causal-explanatory property.  
 
I am too conservative to agree with Damnjanovic—I don’t think a) and b) both can be sustained. 
There are, however, things to be done before I mount criticisms of Damnjanovic’s view; first, 
there should be a more detailed explanation of the standard deflationist response to the success 
argument; and second, there should be a scrutiny of Damnjanovic’s arguments.  
As was mentioned, the standard deflationist response that Damnjanovic has in mind is 
Horwich’s response to the success argument. The upshot of Horwich’s response to the success 
argument is that although the property of truth is appealed to in a causal-explanation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is not a complex or a naturalistic property, unlike properties such as being a tree, being a dog, having a certain 
valence, and etc.  
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success of behavior, all the work done by the property of truth can be exhaustively explained by 
assuming no more than what is implied by an instance of the equivalence schema (E) below:  
 
(E) The proposition that P is true iff P.  
 
Suppose that we endorse a statement which goes as follows
162
:  
 
1) If Bill desires to have a beer, and he believes that merely by nodding he will get one, 
then if his belief is true, he will get what he wants.  
 
According to Horwich, the following derivation suffices as an account of the role of truth in the 
success-explanation 1):  
 
a) Bill wants <Bill has a beer>163. 
b) Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer>. 
c) [Bill wants <Bill has a beer> & Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer] → Bill nods. 
d) Bill nods. 
e) Bill’s belief is true. 
f) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true. 
g) Bill nods → Bill has a beer. 
h) Bill has a beer. 
i) <Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill has a beer 
j) <Bill has a beer> is true. 
 
 
a), b), and c) are assumptions. Given these assumptions, d) is derived. e) is another assumption; 
in addition to these assumptions, let’s further assume that Bill’s belief b) is true. Assuming that 
Bill’s belief b) is true and the instances of the equivalence schema (E) are true, we can derive g). 
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 P. Horwich, Truth, 2
nd
 ed. pp. 22-23 
163
 The brackets are used to express ‘the proposition that …’.  
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From g) and d), we can derive h). From a) and i) + j), we can derive the conclusion that Bill 
achieves his desire. This exhausts Horwich’s explanation of the success of Bill’s behavior.  
 What makes this explanation deflationary is that this explanation appeals to no other 
theory of truth than the deflationary theory in deriving the success of the agent’s behavior. The 
explanation from (a) to (j) appeals to the truth of the agent’s belief in explaining the success of 
his behavior (that is the step (e) above). As we can see in the steps (f) and (g), its role is 
exhaustively explained in terms of what is implied by an instance of the equivalence schema (E) 
in the following:  
 
      (E)  <P> is true iff P.  
 
Hence, Horwich concludes that the success argument doesn’t pose a real threat to the 
deflationary theory of truth. 
 But in what sense does the deflationist hold that the truth predicate appears as a purely 
logical device in an explanation of the success of behavior? The deflationist response explains 
why we don’t need to assume a theory of truth other than the deflationary one in order to explain 
the role of truth in a success-explanation. It doesn’t explain, however, why the deflationist 
objects to the inference from (iii) to (iv) of the success argument against deflationism. The 
reason has to do with role of truth in a generalized success-explanation such as 2) in the 
following  
 
2) An agent’s behavior is more likely to succeed in satisfying the agent’s goal when the 
agent has a true belief.  
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When the truth predicate is ascribed to a single belief that is articulated as it is in the explanation 
1) above, the deflationist says that the truth predicate is eliminable. We can see this in the 
derivation (e) to (g) above. But when the truth predicate appears in a generalized success-
explanation such as 2), the truth predicate is not eliminable. According to the deflationist, the 
sole utility of the notion of truth lies in enabling us to express a generalization such as 2) above. 
The deflationist explains the role of truth in a generalization such as 2) in terms of the following 
steps. First, 2) abbreviates an infinite conjunction such as 3) in the following
164
:  
 
 
3) If one believes <one nods →one gets a beer> and one nods → one gets a beer, then one is 
more likely to succeed in achieving one’s goal by nodding; if one believes <one exercises 
                                                          
164
 Gupta objects to this very idea that the notion of truth enables us to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions 
(see his “A Critique of Deflationism” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 21, 1993). Gupta’s criticism, however, seems to be 
based on a misunderstanding of deflationism. According to Gupta, in order for the deflationist to make this claim, 
she needs to say that a generalization such as 2) means the same as an infinite conjunction such as 3). The 
deflationist, however, doesn’t have to make such a strong claim. All she needs to say is that the generalization 4) 
abbreviates the infinite conjunction 5) in the same way that the generalization i) abbreviates the infinite conjunction 
ii) in the following:  
 
   i)   (x) (x is human →x is mortal) 
 
   ii)  If Madonna is human → Madonna is moral; if Lady Gaga is human → Lady Gaga is mortal; and so on.  
 
In order to say that i) abbreviates ii), we don’t have to say that i) means the same as ii); all we need to say is that i) is 
materially equivalent to ii). Nobody would say that i) means the same as ii), but everybody accepts that i) is a 
generalization of ii). But then, why does Gupta says so? Gupta seems to be confused between the two slightly 
different but related aspects of deflationism.  The first is the deflationist’s claim that the truth predicate is eliminable 
when it is ascribed to a single sentence (or proposition) that is explicitly given. For example, the truth predicate in iii) 
in the following is eliminable: 
 
  iii)  ‘Snow is white’ is true.  
 
But then, iii), as Field says,  iii) is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less statement iv) as follows:  
 
   iv)  Snow is white. 
 
The second aspect of deflationism is that the truth predicate isn’t eliminable when it appears in a generalization such 
as 2). But if the truth predicate is not eliminable in a generalization such as 2), then 2) cannot be considered 
cognitively equivalent to the infinite conjunction 3). So, it seems that Gupta wrongly assimilates the second aspect 
of deflationism into its first aspect. These two aspects are related because both of them are grounded on the 
equivalence schema (E). But they should be distinguished from each other for a proper understanding of the 
deflationary theory of truth.  
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→ one becomes healthier> and one exercises → one becomes healthier, then one is more 
likely to succeed in achieving one’s goal by exercising; and so on.  
 
 
As Quine says, second, we cannot generalize 3) using ordinary objectual quantification because 
of some technical difficulties.
165
 We may appeal to non-objectual quantification—i.e., 
substitutional quantification—in the way below:  
 
4) (Πp) (If one believes that p and p, then one is more likely to succeed in achieving one’s 
goal). 
 
Even if we accept 4) as a formal generalization of 3), we still need an informal generalization 
that is couched in ordinary language. The truth predicate serves this purpose; indeed, the truth 
predicate may have been created exactly for such a purpose. Viewed this way, it is clear why we 
need to assume nothing more or less than what is implied by an instance of the equivalence 
schema (E). Here, I will quote one of the most often-quoted passages in the literature of 
deflationism:  
 
It is not surprising that we should have use for a predicate P with the property that " ‘____’ is 
P" and "____" are always interdeducible. For we frequently find ourselves in a position to 
assert each sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g., when all the members of z share a 
common form); lacking the means to formulate infinite conjunctions, we find it convenient to 
have a single sentence which is warranted precisely when each member of z is warranted. A 
predicate P with the property described allows us to construct such a sentence: (x)(x ϵ z  
P(x)). Truth is thus a notion that we might reasonably want to have on hand, for expressing 
semantic ascent and descent, infinite conjunction and disjunction.
166
 
                                                          
165
 There are two well-known technical difficulties; first, the second occurrence of ‘one nods → one gets a beer’ or 
‘one exercises → one becomes healthier’ is a sentence, but a sentence is not a name. So, it cannot be replaced by an 
objectual variable. Second, the same sentence-type occurs both inside and outside a ‘that’-clause in 3). See W. O. 
Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Eaglewood Cliff; Prentice-Hall, 1970.  
166 S. Leeds, "Theories of Reference and Truth," Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 111-29, p. 121.  
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What Leeds says above offers a clear and intuitive account of why we consider the instances of 
the equivalence schema (E) epistemologically fundamental. Given the genetic explanation 
offered by Leeds, we cannot but consider the instances of the schema (E) conceptually 
fundamental.  
 As was stated in the footnote above, the second aspect of the deflationary conception of 
truth is that the notion of truth is ineliminable when it is invoked in a generalization such as 2). 
According to the deflationist, the truth predicate exists solely for this purpose. So, although the 
truth predicate appears in a generalized success-explanation such as 2), its role is purely 
logical—it appears merely as a device of generalization. This is the reason why the deflationist 
doesn’t accept the inference from iii) to iv). The deflationist explains why the truth predicate is 
appealed to in a causal-explanatory generalization while she construes truth as a purely logical 
property. So, she doesn’t accept iv).  
 
3.2.2 Damnjanovic’s Criticism of the Standard Deflationist Response 
 
A. The Distinction Between Causal Efficacy and Causal Relevancy 
The main inspiration of Damnjanovic’s argument comes from Jackson and Pettit’s 
distinction between causally efficacious properties and causally relevant properties.
167 
I have no 
intention to go into the details of their account except for noting that the distinction between 
casually efficacious properties and causally relevant properties was drawn as a means of 
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 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, “Causation in the Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Fall, 1990 
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vindicating the causal relevance of “functionally defined higher-order properties” (of which the 
particular emphasis being laid upon commonsense psychological properties).
168
 According to 
Jackson and Pettit, higher-order functional properties are not themselves causally efficacious 
properties but they are causally relevant properties in the sense that they supervene on some 
lower-level basic properties which are themselves causally efficacious. The examples presented 
by Damnjanovic are properties such as being a sleeping-pill and having a pain. Let’s suppose, for 
example, Ann ingested a sleeping-pill and is now face down in her bowl of soup. By pleonastic 
transformation, we can also say that she is face down in her soup-bowl because she ingested 
something having the property of being a sleeping-pill. However, there arises a question whether 
we can say that the property of being a sleeping-pill is a causal-explanatory property, in other 
words, whether it played a role in causing Ann to be face down in her soup-bowl now.  
 Damnjanovic’s answer, as may be expected, is that even though the property of being a 
sleeping-pill is not itself a causally efficacious property, it is a causally relevant property. 
Damnjanovic says that we cannot suppose that the property of being a sleeping-pill—in addition 
to the lower-level property the property of being a sleeping pill supervenes on—is causally 
efficacious because to do so would result in the problem of causal over-determination. The 
problem of causal over-determination occurs when we suppose that there are two distinct 
properties both of which are causally efficacious in bringing about an event or a phenomenon 
simultaneously, where each property alone is sufficient in bringing about the event or 
phenomenon at the time. Assuming that this is a legitimate problem, we cannot say that both the 
property of being a sleeping pill and its supervenient basis are causally efficacious, because a 
property is causally efficacious if it doesn’t need another property in order to cause an event or 
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 J. Kim offers a good criticism of Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation. See J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World, 
London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. 
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phenomenon.
169
 A causally efficacious property is one that can alone cause an event or a 
phenomenon. Hence, to say that both the property of being a sleeping pill and its supervenient 
basis are causally efficacious is to say that there are two distinct properties both of which are 
sufficient in causing Ann’s facing down in her soup-bowl. Therefore, to avoid the problem of 
causal over-determination, we should say that only one of them is a causally efficacious property. 
In this case, we should say that the supervenient basis of the higher-order property—the property 
of being a sleeping pill—is the causally efficacious property.  
Nonetheless, the property of being a sleeping-pill, according to Jackson and Pettit’s 
account, can still be said to be causally explanatory because the higher-order property of being a 
sleeping pill “ensures” that there is a lower-level, chemical, property that instantiates the higher-
order property. In Jackson and Pettit’s account, the fact that a higher-order property isn’t reduced 
to a lower-level property confers an explanatory power on the higher-order property. Their 
argument is that if a higher-order property can be instantiated by distinct lower-level properties, 
we cannot explain the explanatory power of the higher-order property in terms of the explanatory 
powers of lower-level properties that instantiate the higher-order property. In particular, they 
argue that an explanation that invokes a higher-order property provides the kind of modal 
information that an explanation invoking only a lower-level property cannot supply.
170
 It is 
possible that the same higher-order property be instantiated by a lower-level property that is 
different from what underlies it now. Hence, the information provided by an explanation such as 
1) below is different from the information provided by an explanation such as 2):  
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 See F. Jackson and P. Pettit, “Program Explanation: A General Perspective,” Analysis, Vol. 50. No. 2, 1990: 107-
117.  
170
 A higher-order property can be instantiated by different lower-level properties at different possible worlds. So, an 
explanation that invokes a higher-order property conveys information that the same phenomenon can be caused by 
different lower-level properties at different possible worlds. See F. Jackson and P. Pettit, , “Causation in the 
Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Fall, 1990. 
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1) Ann is face down in her soup-bowl because she ingested something that has the property 
of being a sleeping-pill.  
 
2)  Ann is face down in her soup-bowl because she ingested something that has the chemical 
property C.  
 
 
The information provided by 1) cannot be reduced to what is provided by 2), because the higher-
property of being a sleeping pill may be instantiated by a lower-level property that is distinct 
from the chemical property C. The presence of the higher-order property of being a sleeping pill, 
however, ensures the presence of a lower-level property (whatever it might be). In this sense, the 
higher-order property of being a sleeping pill is causally “relevant” to the effect although it is not 
causally efficacious.
171
 
 Now, the upshot of Damnjanovic’s argument is that the deflationary concept of truth can 
be understood in terms of Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation. More precisely, his idea is 
that, first, we can understand the deflationary concept of truth in terms of a supervenience 
relation, and second, we can justify the causal relevance of deflationary truth by applying 
Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation to the property of truth. So, Damnjanovic’s goal is to 
prove that deflationary truth is a causally relevant property by applying Jackson and Pettit’s 
program explanation to the deflationary concept of truth. But then, the plausibility of 
Damnjanovic’s idea depends on, first, whether the deflationary concept of truth can be defined in 
terms of a supervenience relation, and second, whether Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation 
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 The ultimate goal of Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation is to justify the causal-explanatory role of a 
higher-order, mental, property in an account of behavior by utilizing the non-reductive/supervenience theory of a 
mental property.  
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is correct. The logical order of these two questions is clear—only after we answer the first 
question, we need to be worried about the second. 
The crux of my criticism of Damnjanovic’s argument will be centered on the first 
question—whether the deflationary concept of truth can be understood in terms of the notion of 
supervenience. The notion of supervenience is a jack of all trades—as McLaughlin and Bennett 
say, it has been invoked in almost every corner of analytic philosophy.
172
 The supervenience 
relation that Jackson and Pettit’s theory draws upon, however, is a supervenience relation of a 
special kind--it is a supervenience relation that obtains between a higher-order property and 
lower-level properties, where the lower-level properties are physical properties.
173
 So, in order to 
apply Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation to the deflationary concept of truth, the 
deflationary concept of truth should be defined in terms of the supervenience relation of this 
specific kind. The most serious problem with Damnjanovic’s argument, however, is that he 
totally misses this point—he wrongly thinks that a supervenience relation of any kind can do the 
trick.
174
  
 
B. Deflationary Truth is a Supervenient Property 
According to Damnjanovic, the deflationary concept of truth can be understood in terms 
of the notion of supervenience because what is implied by the instances of the equivalence 
schema can be re-construed in terms of the notion of supervenience. According to Horwich’s 
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 B. McLaughlin and K. Bennett,  “Supervenience,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010.  
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 Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation is a kind of physicalistic theory of a mental property (this is made clear 
by Jackson and Pettit themselves). So, Jackson and Pettit claim that the lower-level properties that higher-order, 
mental, properties supervene on are physical properties. See Jackson and Pettit, ibid.  
174 A supervenience relation in its generic sense is defined as follows: a property A supervenes on a property B if and 
only if there cannot be a difference in the property A without there being a difference in the property B. As 
McLaughlin and Bennett say, this simple slogan can be cashed out in many different ways, which results in 
supervenience relations of different kinds.  
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deflationary theory of truth, the concept of truth is implicitly defined by the instances of the 
equivalence schema (E):  
 
     (E)   <P> is true iff P.  
 
So, on this theory, to say that  
 
      <P> is a true proposition. .  
 
is to say that  
 
     <P> is true = <Snow is white> & snow is white; or <P>= <Grass is green> & grass is green; 
or . . . 
 
In other words, to accept the deflationary theory of truth is to accept 1) in the following:  
1)  <P> is a true proposition iff <P> = <Snow is white> & snow is white; or <P>= <Grass is 
green> & grass is green; or . . . 
 
Unlike other critics of deflationism, Damnjanovic agrees with all the core ideas of the 
theory; for example, he agrees with the idea that the concept of truth is implicitly but 
exhaustively defined by 1) above. So, he agrees with deflationists that we need to assume no 
theory of truth other than the deflationary one. In particular, Damnjanovic accepts the 
deflationist idea that whatever role played by the notion of truth can exhaustively be explained 
by the instances of the equivalence schema (E). So, he doesn’t find Horwich’s response to the 
141 
 
success argument to be inadequate per se; he thinks that a Horwich-style success-explanation is 
all we need for an account of the success of behavior. Damnjanovic doesn’t take this, however, 
as showing that truth isn’t a causal-explanatory property. To the contrary, he thinks that a 
Horwich-stype success-explanation shows that truth is a causal-explanatory property. How on 
earth does a Horwich-style success-explanation show that truth is a causal-explanatory property? 
Damnjanovic’s super-economic, low-cost strategy is to insert the concept of supervenience into 
Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth.   
Damnjanovic’s idea is simple—maybe too simple. First, he claims that the deflationary 
definition of truth 1) above entails 2) in the following:  
 
2) The truth of <P> supervenes on <P> = <Snow is white> & snow is white; or <P> = 
<Grass is green> & grass is green; or . . .  
 
Second, from 2), Damnjanovic derives 3) in the following: 
 
3) The subvenient properties of the property of truth are disjuncts such as ‘<P> = <Snow is 
white> & snow is white’ or ‘<P> = <Grass is green> & grass is green’; or . . .175 
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 Damnjanovic says:  
 
But in just the same way, the property of truth requires a combination of truth-bearer and state of the world. If 
truth is instantiated in an agent's set of beliefs, for example, then either he believes that p, and p; or he believes 
that q, and q; or .... In fact, the standard deflationist method for explaining the generalization linking truth and 
practical success relies heavily on this point. What is more, truth's subvenient disjuncts (like believing that p 
when p) are, at least relatively, efficacious. (N. Damnjanovic, “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, pp. 53-67. Emphasis is done by me.)  
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Third, Damnjanovic applies Jackson and Pettit’s theory to 3), the result of which, according to 
Damnjanovic, is as follows:  
In particular, the property of being in pain requires a certain combination of agent and neural 
event. If pain is instantiated, then either John has his C-fibres firing or Dave has his D-fibres 
firing, or … But in the same way, the property of truth requires a combination of truth bearer 
and state of the world. If truth is instantiated in an agent’s set of beliefs, for example, then 
either he believes that p, and p; or he believes that q, and q; or … In fact, the standard 
deflationist method for explaining the generalization linking truth and practical success relies 
heavily on this point. What is more, truth’s subvenient disjuncts (like believing that p when 
p ) are, at least relatively, efficacious.
176
 
 
According to Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation, the causal relevance of a higher-order 
property such as being a sleeping pill or being in pain is explained in terms of the causal efficacy 
of its lower-level properties on which the higher-order property supervenes. Damnnajovic’s 
grand proposal is that the causal relevance of the property of truth can be explained in the same 
way—in terms of the causal efficacy of its subvenient properties. Although the property of truth 
doesn’t directly enter into the explanation of the success of behavior, it is indirectly relevant to 
bringing about the success of behavior. What makes this possible, says Damnjanovic, is that 
deflationary truth is a sort of supervenient property.  
 
3.2.3 The Problems with Damnjanovic’s Argument 
 
I have always wondered whether anyone attempted a supervenience theory of truth; if a 
reductive theory of truth is unlikely to be forthcoming, what about a supervenience theory of 
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143 
 
truth? A correspondence theorist may benefit himself by developing a supervenience theory of 
truth that explicates the nature of the correspondence relation in terms of its subvenient 
properties. I couldn’t find anyone, however, who has made a serious attempt of this kind.177 The 
reason may be that it is extremely difficult to develop a supervenience theory of truth. Let’s 
suppose, as suggested by Damnjanovic, that we model a supervenience theory of truth on a 
supervenience theory of a mental property. A difference between the reductive theory and the 
supervenience theory of a mental property is that the latter allows that one and the same mental 
property can be realized by different lower-level physical properties in different domains. For 
example, the supervenience theory of a mental property may characterize the property of being 
in pain in the manner of 1) as follows:  
 
1) x is in pain iff  x is a human & x’s C-fibres are firing; or x is a Martian & x’s D-fibres are 
firing; or . . .  
 
Hence, if there is a supervenience theory of truth and it is to be modeled upon the supervenience 
theory of a mental property, it should proceed in the manner of 2) as follows:  
 
2) x is a true proposition iff  x is a proposition belonging to the domain D1 & x has the 
physical property F
1
; or x is a proposition belonging to the domain D
2
 & x has the 
physical property F
2
; or . . .  
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 David Armstrong seems to defend a supervenience theory of truth of a very simple kind in connection with his 
theory of truth and truthmakers. Indeed, Damnjanovic’s way of using the notion of supervenience is very similar to 
Armstrong’s—both of them simply replace ‘iff’ with ‘supervenes on’. See D. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2004.  
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It is not clear what those domains D
1
, . . , D
n
 should be, and even less clear what those physical 
properties F1, . . , F
n
 should be. Most of all, in order to have a supervenience theory of truth in 
the form of 2), it is essential that we should be able to give a functionalist (of functional) 
definition of the concept of truth. Notice that the supervenience theory of mental properties such 
as 1) wouldn’t even get off the ground unless we can give a functionalist definition of the 
concept of being in pain.
178
 Only after we show that the concept of being in pain can be defined 
in terms of a functionalistic property ϕ, we can give a supervenience theory of the property of 
being in pain by showing that the functionalistic property ϕ can be multiply realized by distinct 
lower-level physical properties. Indeed, the very motivation of Jackson and Pettit’s program 
explanation is the worry that the functionalist theory of mental concepts may not explain the 
causal relevance of mental properties if an agent’s behavior can exhaustively be explained by the 
agent’s internal physiological properties.179 The program explanation is the solution offered by 
Jackson and Pettit—the causal relevance of mental/functionalistic properties can be justified via 
the causal efficacy of the lower-level physical (neural) properties. Now, Damnjanovic’s goal is 
to defend the causal relevance of the property of truth in the way Jackson and Pettit defends the 
causal relevance of mental properties. But then, he should show, first, how to define the concept 
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 The functionalist definition of pain is to define the concept of pain in terms of its causal-functional role; for 
example, an organism is in pain iff it exhibits a set of behavior b* when it receives a sensory stimulation s*, and 
then move to another mental state m*. See N. Block, “Functionalism,” in N. Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy 
of Psychology, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980’ N. Block, “What is Functionalism?” The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy Supplement, 1996.  
179
 Jackson and Pettit says:  
 
Our problem is that if the popular functionalist approach to mental properties is correct, the very same style of 
argument appears to be available to cast doubt on the causal relevance of mental properties. The shadow of 
physiology seems to raise a problem for functionalists as well as for dualists despite the fact that functionalism 
is compatible with a purely materialistic view of the mind.  (F. Jackson and P. Pettit, “Causation in the 
Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, 1990, pp. 195-214, p. 1998) 
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of truth in terms of a certain functionalist property Ψ; second, how the functionalistic property Ψ 
can be multiply realized by distinct lower-level physical properties in distinct domains.  
 The supervenience theory of truth advocated by Damnjanovic is basically as follows:  
3) x is a true belief (or proposition) iff  x =<Snow is white> & snow is white; or x = <Grass 
is green> & grass is green; or . . .  
 
Now, let’s compare 3) with 2)—what similarities do they bear? They only bear a superficial 
similarity—both of them are defined in terms of multiple disjunctions. Other than that, they are 
very different, where their difference may be summed up in terms of the following two 
statements:  
i) First, unlike 2), 3) doesn’t define the concept of truth in terms of lower-level physical 
concepts; therefore 
ii) Second, unlike 2), 3) is not a metaphysical or ontological analysis of the concept of 
truth.  
 
As a result, Damnjanovic’s supervenience theory of truth cannot be combined with Jackson and 
Pettit’s theory—it is not the kind of supervenience theory that is needed by Jackson and Pettit’s 
theory.  
 As McLaughlin and Bennett say, the notion of supervenience has been used almost every 
corner of analytic philosophy.
180
 So, it may not be incorrect to construe the deflationary theory of 
truth in terms of a concept of supervenience. A supervenience relation, however, comes in many 
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different kinds, and so it is important to invoke a supervenience relation that fits the purpose at 
hand. Damnjanovic’s argument fails in this respect—he thinks that to invoke supervenience 
relation of any kind will give him what he needs. What Damnjanovic needs, however, is a 
supervenience relation of a specific kind—the one that is connected to ontological dependence. 
Consider 1); i.e., the supervenience theory of the property of being in pain. 1) states that the 
property of being in pain supervenes on lower-level physical properties (e.g. the property of C-
fibres’ firing) in the sense that the higher-order mental property depends for its existence on the 
lower-level physical properties.
181
 
 The question, however, is whether 3) fits this type of supervenience theory of truth. We 
can construe 3), as Damnjanovic insists, by invoking the notion of supervenience—that the truth 
of a belief supervenes on the belief is <Snow is white> & snow is white; or the belief is <Grass 
is green> & grass is green; or . . . This doesn’t give, however, Damnjanovic what needs—the 
kind of supervenience invoked here is not concerned with ontological dependence. What he 
needs is the supervenience theory that connects the property of truth—being a higher-order 
property—with lower-level physical properties that the property of truth depends on for its 
existence. 3) can never be turned into a supervenience theory of truth of this kind, because it is 
the (Horwich-style) deflationary definition of the concept of truth. According to Horwich, the 
notion of truth is implicitly defined by the instances of the equivalence schema (E), and 3) 
embodies this very idea. Recall, however, how Horwich characterizes the notion of truth—he 
characterizes it as a non-natural/purely logical property which cannot be assimilated into 
properties such as being turquoise, being a tree, or being made of tin. So, 3) is characteristically 
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 The nature of the ontological dependence of mental properties on physical properties should further be explained. 
J. Kim says that it can be explained by invoking modal operators or possible worlds. See J. Kim, Mind in a Physical 
World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, MIT Press, 2000, Ch. 1.  
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different from 1)—whereas 1) is aimed to reveal the ontological bases of the concept of being in 
pain, 3) isn’t. What is then the aim of 3)? The statement 3) is aimed at revealing the functional 
property of the concept of truth—it is a functional characterization of the property of truth. It 
tells us when we can use the truth predicate ‘true’—we can use the truth predicate when a belief 
(or proposition) is <Snow is white> & snow is white; or when a belief (or proposition) is <Grass 
is green> & grass is green; or . . . So, according to 3), we can derive a statement of the form 
‘<P> is true’ from a statement of the form ‘P’, and vice versa. According to Horwich’s 
deflationary theory, however, this exhausts whatever role played by the notion of truth. But then, 
there is no point of trying to uncover the ontological bases of this concept—its role is in its 
nature purely logical in the sense that the role of a logical constant such as ‘ʌ’ is purely logical.  
So, Damnjanovic’s comparison between the property of being in pain and the property of 
truth is incorrect—we shouldn’t understand 3) on the par with the supervenience theory of the 
property of being in pain; i.e., the statement 1). If Damnjanovic is to vindicate the causal 
relevance of the property of truth in the way Jackson and Pettit vindicates the causal relevance of 
the property of being in pain, he should have given a supervenience theory of truth of the form 2) 
above. Namely, he should have attempted to connect the property of truth with lower-level 
physical properties with respect to different domains. I have no objection to construing the 
deflationary definition of truth—the statement 3)—in terms of the concept of supervenience. To 
do so, however, doesn’t give what Damnjanovic needs. Only when he offers a supervenience 
theory of truth of the type 2) can he appeal to Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation in order 
to vindicate the causal relevance of the property of truth. The real problem with Damnjanovic’s 
overall proposal is that this can never be done if he accepts the core ideas of deflationism. 
Damnjanovic’s overall proposal is to show that a deflationist can recognize the causal-
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explanatory role of truth without stepping outside the deflationary theory of truth. This is the 
reason why Damnjanovic turns the deflationary definition of truth into a supervenience theory of 
truth leaving the core ideas of deflationism intact. Supervenience is an elastic notion, so the 
deflationary definition of truth may be turned into a supervenience theory of truth of some kind. 
But the kind of a supervenience theory of truth that Damnjanovic needs is the supervenience 
theory of truth of the type 2). Only in such a case can he plug Jackson and Pettit’s theory into the 
property of truth. A supervenience theory of truth of the type 2), however, is inconsistent with 
the Horwich-stype deflationary theory of truth. Someone can pursue a supervenience theory of 
truth of the type 2) only if he assumes that truth is a natural or physicalistic notion. Horwich 
denies this, which is implied by his contention that truth is a purely logical property.  
In conclusion, Damnjanovic makes a typical mistake in dealing with the deflationary 
conception of truth—he fails to understand what it means to say that truth is a purely logical 
property. He is right in saying that a logical property can also have a causal-explanatory role. 
The deflationist’s view of truth, however, isn’t simply that truth is a logical property but that 
truth is nothing but a logical property, implying that it isn’t a causally explanatory property. In 
order to see the point let’s compare 3) with 4) in the following: 
 
4) x is in pain iff x produces the output O1 under the input I1 & goes to another mental state 
M
1
; or x produces the output O
2
 under the input I
2
 & goes to another mental state M
2
; 
or . . .  
 
Like 3), 4) is a functional characterization of the property of being in pain. Indeed, if 
Damnjanovic is to make an analogy between the concept of truth and the concept of being in 
149 
 
pain, he should have begun by comparing 3) with 4), not with 1). Although 3) and 4) are both 
functional characterizations, their epistemological statuses are different—whereas 4) is an 
empirical truth, 3) is a purely conceptual truth. This is the reason why the role of truth 
characterized by 3) is purely logical, whereas the role of being pain characterized by 4) isn’t.182 
Moreover, 4) leads to 1)—namely, we need 1) as an explanation of why the mental property of 
being in pain has the functional role that is characterized by 4). On the other hand, we don’t need 
such an explanation for 3)—it is a purely conceptual truth that the property of truth has the 
functional role that is characterized by 3). Consequently, as long as we accept the deflationary 
definition of truth 3), we don’t need a supervenience theory of truth of the type 2). However, this 
is exactly what Damnjanovic needs in order to justify the causal explanatory role of truth by 
appealing to Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation. Hence, Damnjanovic’s proposal collapses 
due to an internal conflict—either he has to deny the deflationary theory or he should give up the 
causal-explanatory role of truth. He cannot have both.  
 
3.3 Kitcher’s Realist Attack against Deflationism: A Case For the Causal-Explanatory Role Of 
Correspondence Truth In the Success-To-Truth Rule 
 
 
3.3.1 Introduction
183
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 In other words, we don’t need any explanation why we can derive a statement of the form ‘P’ from a statement of 
the form ‘<P> is true’, and vice versa. This is guaranteed by the meaning of ‘true’ alone. In order to derive the 
functional role characterized by 4) from the property of being in pain, however, we need empirical observation.  To 
take another example, we need empirical observation to associate the mental property of being schizophrenic with 
its alleged functional role. Once we have the functional characterization of the property of being schizophrenic, we 
then next we why the property of being schizophrenic has that functional role—why people who are schizophrenic 
produce certain behavior under certain circumstances, and then develop another mental illness (or return to a normal 
state if they are cured). This explanation is provided by the reductive or supervenience theory of the property of 
being schizophrenic—it is explained as the operation of some neurological properties. The deflationist’s point is that 
neither the reductive nor supervenience theory of truth is needed because truth is a purely logical property.  
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 Kitcher’s articles referred to in this section include P. Kitcher, “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence 
Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64(2), 2002, pp:346-364; P. Kitcher, “Real Realism: The 
Galilean Strategy,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 2. 2001, pp:151-197; and P. Kitcher, “Explanatory 
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Is there any rational relationship between the problem of truth and the problem of realism? 
According to Horwich, there is no interesting connection between a theory of truth and the 
debate between realism and anti-realism. A commitment to realism or anti-realism, says Horwich, 
doesn’t make one embrace a particular theory of truth. Or to speak conversely, to embrace the 
deflationary theory of truth doesn’t constitute a basis to take up or avoid any particular position 
in the realism debate. In other words, a theory of truth is neutral in the debate between realism 
and anti-realism.
184
  
In his “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth”, Kitcher aims to show 
otherwise; he aims to show that realism—more precisely, scientific realism—requires the 
correspondence theory of truth.
185
 Scientific realism comes in many varieties (and so does 
scientific anti-realism). The purpose of my discussion of Kitcher isn’t to determine the 
plausibility of scientific realism per se but to determine whether scientific realism, as Kitcher 
claims, requires a non-deflationary theory of truth; i.e., the correspondence theory of truth. That 
said, it is inevitable to say a few words about scientific realism. I will here briefly define 
scientific realism in terms of two doctrines respectively called ‘SR’ and ‘SSR’ by Michael Devitt:  
 
(SR)    Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories 
exist mind-independently.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Unification,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48 (4), 1981, pp:507-531.  
184
 See P. Horwich, “Realism and Truth” in his From a Deflationary Point of View, Oxford University Press, 2004.  
185
 P. Kitcher (2002), “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 64(2), 346-364. The deflationary notion of truth that Kitcher challenges in this work is mainly the 
one advocated by Horwich.  This is the reason why Kitcher’s main argument is concerned with criticizing 
Horwich’s response to the success argument.  Kitcher’s criticism of Horwich’s response to the success argument 
will be discussed in the next section.  
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(SSR)   Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories 
exist mind-independently, and mostly have the properties attributed to them by 
science.
186
  
 
Kitcher is committed to both (SR) and (SSR) and so he states that a scientific statement that has 
passed appropriate scrutiny of its epistemic credentials—including the one that involves an 
expression for an unobservable entity—should be considered true or approximately true.187  
 Kitcher also characterizes scientific realism he defends as a “homely doctrine, vested in 
commonsense appraisals rather than weighty metaphysics.”188 To explain what Kitcher means by 
this, it has to be pointed out that Kitcher builds the correspondence notion of truth into his 
characterization of scientific realism. According to Kitcher, a scientific statement that has passed 
scrutiny of its epistemic credentials isn’t merely true but true in the correspondence sense. So, on 
Kitcher’s view, scientific realism presupposes the correspondence theory of truth. What Kitcher 
means by ‘the correspondence theory of truth’, however, is a theory that accepts only i) and ii), 
but not iii) in the following:  
 
i) Reference relations are causal relations between mind-independent entities and linguistic 
tokens.  
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 M. Devitt, “Scientific Realism,” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy, eds. By F. Jackson and M. Smith, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, p. 769.  
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 Richard Boyd characterizes scientific realism using the expression ‘approximate truth.’ An opposing view is Van 
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. According to his constructive empiricism, a scientific statement involving an 
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ii) It's possible to give a naturalistic account of these relations; that is, semantics can be 
conducted as a natural science. 
iii) There's a physicalist reduction of semantics.189 
 
So, the reason why Kitcher calls his realism a ‘homely’ or ‘modest’ doctrine is that the 
correspondence theory of truth that he considers an essential aspect of scientific realism doesn’t 
require the notions of reference and truth to be reduced to physicalistic terms. Kitcher says  
 
Here I should note explicitly that the type of correspondence theory I envisage is one like that 
originally sketched by Hartry Field in "Tarski's Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 69 
(1972): 347-75. One important difference, however, is that I don't see a naturalistic account 
of reference as necessarily involving a reduction to a physicalist vocabulary. Naturalists who 
are antireductionists with respect to some sciences (for example, parts of biology) should 
allow that the basis for a reduction of the notion of reference may out-strip the resources of 
physics.
190
 
 
But why does Kitcher consider the correspondence theory of truth an essential aspect of 
scientific realism. ? Namely, what is Kitcher’s reason for holding that scientific realism requires 
a non-deflationary theory of truth? Kitcher’s reason in a nutshell is that the correspondence 
notion of truth plays an essential role in the so-called ‘success-to-truth’ rule that can be 
formulated as follows:  
 
(Success-to-Truth Rule) 
S plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and intervention. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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     S is approximately true.
191
 
 
Two things should be noted about the success-to-truth rule: first, this rule embodies a success-
explanation of a certain type—a success-explanation that accounts for the success or 
effectiveness of a scientific theory. A success-explanation of a scientific theory, however, can be 
construed as a success-explanation of behavior of a specific type; i.e., behavior caused by a 
scientific belief. That is to say, a success-explanation of a scientific theory is supposed to explain 
how scientists who follow a certain scientific theory are so successful in achieving their goals; 
for example, how bio-engineers who accept the main claims of molecular genetics are so 
successful in manufacturing new organisms.
192
 So, the success-to-truth rule doesn’t have to be 
construed as a success-explanation of an entirely new kind. Kitcher also treats it as continuous 
with a success-explanation of behavior. Second, the success-to-truth rule embodies an important 
argument for scientific realism; namely, the argument called ‘the no-miracle argument’ or ‘the 
abductive argument’ for scientific realism.193 According to the no-miracle argument, the 
empirical success of a scientific theory would not be explained unless it is true or approximately 
true. The abductive argument defends the same idea; from the empirical success of a theory, we 
can derive the conclusion that the theory is true as a hypothesis that best explains the success of 
the theory. Thus, Kitcher's argument proceeds as follows: first, scientific realism relies on the 
success-to-truth rule, and second, the success-to-truth rule relies on the correspondence notion of 
truth. So, according to Kitcher, the correspondence notion of truth plays an essential role in the 
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success-to-truth rule, and in that sense scientific realism requires the correspondence theory of 
truth.  
 In the remaining of this chapter, I will try to discern whether Kitcher is right about this—
whether the success-to-truth rule requires the correspondence notion of truth. By maintaining 
that the success-to-truth rule and thereby scientific realism requires the correspondence theory of 
truth, Kitcher aims to criticize the deflationary theory of truth from a realist point of view. On 
Kitcher’s view, deflationism about truth is not compatible with scientific realism—as a real 
realist, Kitcher says he cannot embrace the deflationary theory of truth. For a while I was 
somewhat sympathetic to Kitcher’s view, mainly because many scientific realists presuppose the 
correspondence notion of truth when they invoke the notion of truth to characterize scientific 
realism. According to Horwich, however, it is a commonly made mistake to think that scientific 
realism has anything to do with a theory of truth of a certain kind. I now think that Horwich is 
right about the neutrality of a theory of truth in the realism debate. At least, the correspondence 
notion of truth doesn’t seem to play a role in the success-to-truth rule. Some other arguments for 
scientific realism might need the correspondence theory of truth, but the success-to-truth rule 
doesn’t. This is what I will argue for in the remaining of this chapter.  
 
3.3. 2.Horwich’s View on Truth and the Realism Debate 
 
 Among all the deflationists, Horwich seems to be Kitcher’s major opponent. Horwich’s 
views are in direct opposition to Kitcher’s views in two respects. First, whereas Kitcher holds 
that deflationism is not compatible with realism, Horwich holds that deflationism is absolutely 
neutral between realism and anti-realism. Second, whereas Kitcher thinks that the explanatory 
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role played by truth in the success-to-truth rule cannot be accommodated by the deflationary 
theory of truth, Horwich thinks it can. As we have seen 3.2.1, this is the gist of Horwich’s 
response to the success argument. Here, in order not to mislead readers with similar terms, I shall 
make the following distinction:  
 
 Success-Explanation: an explanation that accounts for the success of behavior or the 
effectiveness of a scientific theory.  
 Success-Argument: an argument criticizing the deflationary theory of truth on the 
grounds that the explanatory role of truth in a success-explanation cannot be 
accommodated by the deflationary theory of truth.  
 
Kitcher’s argument begins with his criticism of Horwich’s response to the success-argument. 
Before examining Kitcher’s argument, however, I shall first explain briefly why Horwich claims 
that deflationism is neutral between realism and anti-realism.  
Let’s first consider what Horwich says:  
 
The important thing, rather, is to see that it is not settled one way or the other by deflationism 
about truth . . .  Not only is deflationism neutral with respect to the disputes between realism 
and antirealism, but so are the other well-known theories of truth . . .  [N]ot only is the right 
account of truth (namely, deflationism) absolutely neutral regarding realism, but even if one 
adopted what I have suggested are wrong points of view on truth (either the correspondence 
or the coherence accounts) it would be a further mistake to think that any of the 
epistemological or metaphysical issues that constitute the realism debate would be settled.
194
 
 
What Horwich says here is that not only can deflationists be either realists or anti-realists but 
also that endorsing a non-deflationary theory doesn’t help solve problems facing the realism 
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issue. Consider one of the most challenging problems facing realism: that we cannot have 
epistemological access to phenomena involving unobservable entities. One may try to solve this 
problem by endorsing the verificationist theory of truth—that is, by “promoting the accessibility 
of facts at the expense of their autonomy.”195 The problem with the verifiability theory of truth, 
according to Horwich, is that it assumes the equivalence schema: <P> is true iff P. Horwich says,  
 
[O]ne might reason that, since it is relatively easy to tell regarding, for example, the 
proposition that there are infinitely many stars, whether or not it is verifiable, then—given 
the identification of truth with verifiability—it would be equally easy to tell if that 
proposition is true, hence easy to tell if there are infinitely many stars. And, moreover, since 
the verifiability of the proposition is a fact about our methodology, then so would be the truth 
of the proposition, i.e. the fact that there are infinitely many stars. 
 
To elaborate Horwich’s point (which wasn’t easy at all), the verificationist would first identify 
the truth of <There are infinitely many stars> with its verifiability (e.g. its verification condition), 
and then, second, infer that there are infinitely many stars (or that there aren’t infinitely many 
stars) from the fact about the verifiability of <There are infinitely many stars>.  
 The problem with this approach, however, is that it stealthily appeals to the equivalence 
schema (E): <P> is true iff P.
196
 The verificationist can infer that there are infinitely many stars 
(or there aren’t infinitely many stars) from the fact about the verifiability of <There are infinitely 
many stars> because he assumes the truth of an instance of the equivalence schema; i.e., <There 
are infinitely many stars> is true iff there are infinitely many stars. Can the verificationist assume 
the equivalence schema? The answer is no, because that’s exactly what needs to be justified by 
the verificationist theory of truth. So, the attempt to defend realism by identifying truth with 
verifiability doesn’t work—it faces the problem of circularity. A similar problem confronts a 
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correspondence theorist who attempts to defend realism by defining truth with a correspondence 
relation. Horwich says,   
 
[T]he correspondence theory of truth provides no quick path to sceptical anti-realism or to 
metaphysical realism. For again, those conclusions can be obtained only given the 
equivalence schema which, as in the previous case, will be no easier to establish than the 
realist or anti-realist theses it is being used to support.
197
 
 
Consider again the proposition that there are infinitely many stars. The correspondence theorist 
claims that <There are infinitely many stars> is true iff it corresponds to the fact that there are 
infinitely many stars. From the correspondence theorist point of view, however, the truth of this 
claim should be justified by the correspondence theory. If the correspondence theorist is to 
simply assume that <P> is true iff <P> corresponds to the fact that P, there is no point of 
invoking the correspondence theory of truth in arguing for realism or anti-realism. The whole 
point of invoking a non-deflationary theory of truth is that to invoke a non-deflationary theory of 
truth—for example, the correspondence theory of truth—is essential to argue for realism or anti-
realism. But if so, it is unlikely that anyone would be able to argue for realism or anti-realism—
to establish a non-deflationary theory of truth is as difficult as establishing realism or anti-
realism. 
 But then, what explains the prevalence of the idea that the realism debate is about the 
notion of truth? Horwich’s explanation is that those who think that the realism debate is about 
the notion of truth are misled by the role played by the notion of truth appearing in the theses of 
realism and anti-realism. The notion of truth is often employed in articulating the theses of 
realism and anti-realism. For example:  
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All truths are verifiable.  
Theoretical hypotheses are truth-value-less.  
Science aims at truth.  
No contingent statement about the future can be true.  
 
Horwich’s point is that the notion of truth appears as a purely logical device in all of these claims; 
it appears as a device of generalization. To see why, let’s consider the third claim in the list 
above; the claim that science aims at truth. This statement is a generalization of particular 
statements such as 1) in the following:  
 
1) Scientists want it to be that they believe that there are infinitely many stars only if there 
are infinitely many stars; or scientists want it to be that they believe that electrons ARE 
almost perfectly round only if electrons are almost perfectly round; or . . . 
 
By appealing to the equivalence schema (E), we can derive from 1) the following: 1*).   
 
1*)   Scientists want it to be that they believe that there are infinitely many stars only if it is 
true that there are infinitely many stars.  
 
Now, we can generalize 1*) into 1**) in the following:  
 
1**)   Scientists want it to be that they believe x only if it is true that x.  
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The claim above—that science aims at truth—is a colloquial way of expressing 1**).198 So, the 
role of truth in this claim is purely logical—we appeal to the notion of truth in order to generalize 
an infinite disjunction such as 1) above. Similar accounts can easily be given for other claims 
listed above.  
 On the basis of these considerations, Horwich concludes that truth is irrelevant to the 
realism debate. Horwich isn’t alone thinking this way; for example, Devitt also contends that 
realism is compatible with a totally deflationary theory of reference and truth. A deflationist, 
says Devitt, can be a realist or an anti-realist.
199
 Like Horwich, Devitt says that the notion of 
truth appears as a device of generalization in the realism debate.  Of course, Kitcher disagrees, 
and his arguments will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.3.3 Kitcher’s Arguments 
 
A. Kitcher’s Criticism of Horwich’s Explanation 
 As was mentioned earlier, Kitcher’s main argument is that the correspondence notion of 
truth plays an essential role in the success-to-truth rule. In order to establish this point, Kitcher 
examines Horwich’s response to the success-argument. The gist of Horwich’s response to the 
success-argument is that the explanatory role played by truth in an account of the success of 
behavior or a scientific theory can exhaustively be accommodated by the deflationary theory of 
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truth.  An example of Horwich’s explanation was already introduced in the previous section 
(3.2.1), but since Kitcher’s criticism is also concerned with the same example, it should be 
repeated here:  
 
1) Bill wants <Bill has a beer>.  [Premise] 
2) Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer>. [Premise] 
3) [Bill wants <Bill has a beer> & Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer>] → Bill nods. 
[Premise] 
4) Bill nods. [from 1), 2), and 3)] 
5) Bill’s belief is true. [Premise] 
6) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true. [From 2) and 5)].  
7) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [An instance of the 
equivalence schema] 
8) Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [From 6) and 7)] 
9) Bill has a beer. [From 4) and 8)] 
10) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [An instance of the 
equivalence schema] 
11) Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [From 6) and 7)] 
12) Bill has a beer. [From 4) and 8)] 
13) <Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill has a beer. [From the equivalence schema] 
14) <Bill has a beer> is true. [From 9) and 10)] 
15) Bill gets what he wants. [From 1) and 11)]200 
 
As was stated in the previous section (3.2.1), the derivation from 1) to 15) is Horwich’s 
deflationary explanation of the success of behavior—by explaining the success of behavior this 
way, Horwich responds to the success argument against deflationism. According to Kitcher, 
however, Horwich’s deflationary explanation “stops rather at a shallow level,” implying that 
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there is more to be explained about the success of behavior.
201
 If we stop with Horwich’s 
explanation, we wouldn’t need the correspondence notion of truth. But Horwich’s explanation, 
says Kitcher, doesn’t tell us the whole story of what underlies the success of behavior. The 
following is what Kitcher says about Horwich’s explanation of the success of behavior:  
 
This appears to be a very powerful debunking of the realist’s insistence that correspondence 
truth was required to explain success, for we seem to be able to give an explanation without 
looking at any notion of correspondence. All that’s needed is the minimal theory of truth. But 
we should ask exactly what has been explained. The answer, surely, is that if an agent has a 
true belief about means-ends relations, then that agent is likely to be successful. That isn’t 
quite the explanandum that realists have taken to be crucial in their defenses of 
correspondence truth. Correspondence truth has been supposed to be necessary because of 
the way in which true beliefs about means-ends relations, or behavior that is as if the agent 
has true beliefs about means-ends relations, result from true beliefs about the objects that 
figure in the desired goal-state. The problem with Horwich’s explanation is that it stops at a 
rather shallow level. Indeed, it’s akin to the classic paradigms of “explanation” that 
subsumed facts about bird plumage under putative ornithological laws. The major instances 
of scientific explanation go much deeper, and I think we can emulate them in this case. 
Specifically, we can deepen our understanding of what is going on in successful actions by 
considering, among other things, the causal relations that connect items in the world with the 
tokens that figure in the agent's psychological states.
202
 
 
Kitcher’s criticism may be summarized as follows:  
i) Horwich’s deflationary explanation gets the explanandum wrong;  
ii) Horwich’s deflationary explanation is shallow because it doesn’t invoke causal relations 
that connect the constituents of psychological states with the entities in the mind-
independent world.  
I shall elaborate these points as follows. First, according to Kitcher, Horwich gets the 
explanandum wrong because what needs to be explained isn’t merely how successful behavior 
results from an agent’s true beliefs about means-ends relations. From the realist’s perspective, 
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what needs to be explained is how the agent obtains his true beliefs about means-ends 
relations—it is the source of an agent’s true beliefs about means-ends relations that should be 
explained.  An example of an agent’s true beliefs about means-ends relations is Bill’s belief that 
if he nods, then he will get a beer (i.e., Bill’s believing <Bill nods → Bill gets a beer>). Horwich 
doesn’t explain where Bill got this belief, and this, according to Kitcher, makes Horwich’s 
explanation remain at a “shallow” level. 
 Kitcher’s quest for the source of a belief about means-ends relations, however, is 
connected to his quest for the principles that can explain “systematic successes”. The notion of 
systematic successes looms large in Kitcher’s criticism of deflationism. To understand what he 
means by that notion, let’s consider the following:  
Bill’s performance is extremely local. We hear one success on an occasion in which Bill had 
a commonplace belief about means-ends relations. But I've insisted, from the beginning, that 
the realist's argument concerned systematic successes. What exactly does that mean? I 
answer that the cases of concern are those in which our agent has a device, or set of devices, 
from which beliefs about means-ends relations (or behavior that is as if the agent had beliefs 
about means-ends relations) flow.
203
 
 
Kitcher is one of those who regard “systematic unification” as a criterion of a good scientific 
explanation.
204
 A good explanation is the one that has the capacity to unify a wide variety of 
phenomena under one or a small number of ultimate principles. Kitcher’s emphasis on 
systematic successes should be understood from this perspective as well—the concept of 
systematic successes assumes that a wide variety of successful behavior can be explained in 
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terms of one or a small number of underlying principles. To take a related example, we don’t use 
the term ‘systematic failure’ when one or two schools in the nation are doing badly; we use the 
term when a large number of schools in the nation are doing badly for a long period of time. 
Some may object that there isn’t necessarily a systematic failure just because a large number of 
schools are failing. Kitcher disagrees; if a large number of schools are failing, there should be a 
common cause in terms of which those massive failures can be explained. Similarly, a success-
explanation should offer an account of systematic successes.  A Horwich-style deflationary 
explanation, however, cannot account for systematic successes; it can explain only individual 
successes.   
 But why can’t a Horwich-style deflationary explanation offer an account of systematic 
successes? The reason, says Kitcher, is that a Horwich-style deflationary explanation fails to 
relate all the true beliefs about means-ends relation to their ultimate sources. In order to explain 
systematic successes, we should be able to explain a wide variety of successful behavior in terms 
one or a small number of ultimate principles. To do so in turn requires tracing all the true beliefs 
about means-ends relations back to their ultimate source, and the explanatory role of 
correspondence truth emerges in the search of the ultimate source of true belief. In order to argue 
for these points, Kitcher brings in the example of a map.  
 
B. The Map-Example 
Suppose Ophelia uses a map to go to various places she wants to; she obtains various true 
beliefs about means-end relations from the map, and she adjusts her behavior in accordance with 
these beliefs. By doing so, she succeeds in arriving various places that she wants to go. One day, 
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Ophelia wants to go to the brook in her vicinity. So, she refers to the map, and she obtains the 
belief that if she follows the path past the willows, she will get to the brook. She follows the path 
past the willows, and she succeeds in arriving at the brook.  
The standard deflationary explanation of the success of Ophelia’s behavior proceeds in 
the same way that its explanation of the success of Bill’s behavior does. It begins with Ophelia’s 
having the desire <Ophelia wants to get to the brook>, and Ophelia’s believing <Ophelia follows 
the path past the willows → Ophelia gets to the brook>. The rest of the explanation will be 
omitted here, since it proceeds in the exactly same way that the explanation of Bill’s success 
does. As was stated above, Kitcher finds this explanation stops at a shallow level, because it 
doesn’t trace Ophelia’s belief about means-ends relation back to its source. The source of her 
belief is the map. So, Kitcher expands the Horwich-style explanation of Ophelia’s success by 
adding the following explanation:  
1) Ophelia believes <the map is accurate>.  
2) Ophelia is competent to read the map.  
3)  Ophelia desires q [possible instances: <Ophelia gets to the brook>, <Ophelia gets to the 
cliff>, <Ophelia gets to the graveyard>].  
4)  [Ophelia believes <the map is accurate> & Ophelia is competent to read the map & 
Ophelia desires q] → Ophelia does A(q).  
5) The map is accurate.  
6)  [The map is accurate & Ophelia does A(q)] → q.  
7) q. 
 
Here, ‘q’ is to be replaced by Ophelia’s desires; ‘A(q)’ is to be replaced by the action that 
Ophelia performs to achieve her desire q. What Kitcher is concerned with in this derivation is the 
contrast between step 4) and step 6). According to Kitcher, step 4) tells us that the action A(q) is 
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psychologically pertinent to achieve Ophelia’s desire q. An action A(q) is psychologically 
pertinent to an agent’s goal as long as the agent thinks that the action will lead to the satisfaction 
of her goal. The derivation from 1) to 4) explains why Ophelia thinks that doing the action A(q) 
is pertinent to her goal. The psychological pertinence of an action, however, should be 
distinguished from the objective pertinence of an action. An action A(q) is objectively pertinent 
to the agent’s goal q only if the agent succeeds in achieving her goal by doing A(q). Step 6) tells 
us that Ophelia’s action A(q) is objectively pertinent to her goal q.  
Now, the question that Kitcher is most interested in is what explains an action A(q) that is 
both psychologically and objectively pertinent to an agent’s goal. Kitcher says, “The explanatory 
mystery is precisely why there should be any action that meets these two constraints.”205 And 
here comes Kitcher’s main criticism of the deflationary explanation of the success of behavior. 
He says, “To read 5) in the deflationist’s sense leaves at least one of 4), 6) unexplained.”206 That 
is to say, the deflationist can explain either the psychological pertinence or the objective 
pertinence of A(q) to q, but not both. On Kitcher’s view, the deflationist can easily explain the 
psychological pertinence of an action to a goal. The deflationist, however, cannot explain how a 
psychologically pertinent action can also be objectively pertinent. Kitcher’s reason, in short, is 
that the deflationist cannot explain systematic success; that is to say, on Kitcher’s view, if the 
deflationist cannot explain systematic success, she cannot explain the objective pertinence of an 
action A(q) to a goal q, either. I will argue in the next section, however, that this view is wrong.   
 
3.3.4. The Criticisms of Kitcher’s Argument 
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What I will argue for in this section is as follows; first, although the deflationist cannot 
explain systematic successes, he can explain the objective pertinence of an action to a goal; and 
second, for Kitcher’s ultimate purpose—the defense of realism—the objective pertinence of an 
action is all that needs to be explained. In particular, I will argue that the success-to-truth rule 
can be sustained as long as the objective pertinence of an action is explained. Kitcher’s 
requirement for an account of systematic successes seems orthogonal to the defense of the 
success-to-truth rule.  
 First, let’s examine whether the deflationist can explain how there can be an action A(q) 
that is both psychologically and objectively pertinent to an agent’s goal q. To do so, let’s return 
to Kitcher’s expansion of a Horwich-style explanation of the success of Ophelia’s action. I will 
reproduce it here for the sake of convenience:  
1) Ophelia believes <the map is accurate>.  
2) Ophelia is competent to read the map.  
3) Ophelia desires q [possible instances: <Ophelia gets to the brook>, <Ophelia gets to the 
cliff>, <Ophelia gets to the graveyard>].  
4)  [Ophelia believes <the map is accurate> & Ophelia is competent to read the map & 
Ophelia desires q] → Ophelia does A(q).  
5) The map is accurate.  
6)  [The map is accurate & Ophelia does A(q)] → q.  
7) q. 
 
According to Kitcher, when we understand 5) in the deflationary sense, we cannot explain how 
there can be an action A(q) that is both psychologically and objectively pertinent to Ophelia’s 
goal q. But the deflationist has no problem explaining it. First, the psychological pertinence of 
A(q) is fully explained by the step from1) to 4) above. To say that an action A(q) is 
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psychologically pertinent to an agent’s goal q is to say that the agent believes that doing an the 
action A(q) will satisfy his goal. The step from 1) to 4) shows that Ophelia believes that doing 
the action A(q) will satisfy her goal q. Given that each step from 1) to 4) is satisfied, Ophelia will 
do the action A(q). But then, in order to explain the psychological pertinence of Ophelia’s action, 
it isn’t even necessary to invoke 5). Namely, the psychological pertinence of an action can be 
explained independently of the truth of a belief or the accuracy of the map. So, at this stage, it 
doesn’t matter how we understand the notion of accuracy or truth; we don’t even have to invoke 
5).  
At the second stage, however, we need to invoke the accuracy of the map; an account of 
the objective pertinence of an action requires the step 5). To say that an action A(q) is objectively 
pertinent to a goal q is to say that if an agent does A(q), he will succeed in satisfying the goal q; 
namely, it is to say that  OS) in the following is true:  
  
OS)  Ophelia does A(q) → q.  
 
But then, to say that OS) is true amounts to saying that the action is successful; it means that if 
an agent does A(q), he will succeed in achieving his goal q. Therefore, to explain the objective 
pertinence of an action is to explain the success of behavior; they amount to the same thing. But 
then, it is weird for Kitcher to say all of sudden that the deflationist cannot explain the objective 
pertinence of an action. We all agreed from the beginning that the success of an action should be 
explained, among other things, by the truth of a belief. But then, the objective pertinence of an 
action should be explained by the truth of a belief. In the map-example, the truth of Ophelia’s 
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beliefs about means-ends relations originates from the accuracy of the map. Kitcher questions 
whether the deflationist can make sense of the role played by the accuracy of map in an account 
of the objective pertinence of Ophelia’s action. Contrary to Kitcher’s skepticism, the deflationist 
can easily explain it by offering the derivation in the following: 
 
5)  The map is accurate.  
5
1
)  The map says <One does A(q) → q>.  
5
2
)   <One does A(q) → q> is true. (from 5) and 51)) 
5
3
)   One does A(q) → q. (from 52) and the equivalence schema (E)) 
OS)  Ophelia does A(q) → q. (an instantiation of 53)) 
 
The derivation from 5) to OS) shows how the objective pertinence of Ophelia’s action A(q) is 
derived from the accuracy of the map. This explanation assumes no principle of truth other than 
the equivalence schema. So, unlike what Kitcher says, the deflationist has no problem explaining 
both the psychological and objective pertinence of an action.  
 But then, what is the nature of Kitcher’s complaint of the deflationary account of the 
success of behavior? The nature of Kitcher’s complaint is that the deflationary account cannot 
explain systematic successes. As was noted above, to explain systematic successes is to explain a 
wide variety of successful behaviors in terms of a small number of ultimate principle(s). In order 
to do so, we have to find a common feature shared by all successful behaviors. In the map-
example, the common feature is that they all flow from 5)—the accuracy of the map. More 
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precisely, any successful behavior in the map-example is caused by a true belief about means-
ends relations, and a true belief about means-ends relations originates from the accuracy of the 
map. So, it appears, at a first glance, that the deflationist should have no problem explaining 
systematic successes—the underlying principle of all successful behaviors is the accuracy of the 
map. At a second glance, however, we find something wrong with this explanation—when we 
understand the notion of truth in the deflationary sense, it is trivial to say that the underlying 
principle of successful behaviors is the accuracy (truth) of the map. When we understand the 
accuracy of the map in the deflationary sense, 5) is equivalent to 5
D
) in the following:  
5
D
)   The map says <One walks past the willows → one gets to the brook> & (One walks 
past the willows → one gets to the brook; or the map says <One crosses the river → 
one gets to the castle> & (One crosses the river → one gets to the castle); or . . .  
 
To say that 5
D
) is the underlying principle of all successful behaviors trivializes the very idea of 
systematic successes—the idea that a wide variety of successful behavior can be explained in 
terms of a small number of principles. 5
D
) consists of infinite disjunctions, and this already 
betrays the idea that 5
D
) can be an underlying principle of a wide variety of successful behaviors. 
Given that 5) is equivalent to 5
D
), to say that an action A(q) is successful because the map is 
accurate amounts to saying 5
D*
): 
 
5
D*
)    <Ophelia follows the path past the willows → Ophelia gets to the brook> because the 
map says <One follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook> & (One 
follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook); or <Ophelia crosses the 
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river → Ophelia gets to the castle> because the map says <One crosses the river → 
one gets to the castle> & (One crosses the river → one gets to the castle); or . . .207 
 
To be sure, 5
D*
) isn’t what Kitcher means by an account of systematic successes; there is nothing 
systematic about 5
D*
). But this is all we can afford if we understand 5) in the deflationary sense. 
Since the deflationist denies that phenomena about truth can be reduced to a small number of 
more basic facts, to invoke the accuracy of the map in an account of the success of behavior 
means nothing more or nothing less than 5
D*
). The utility of a truth-expression—for example, 
‘true’ or ‘accurate’—is that it enables us to generalize 5D*) into G) in the following:  
 
      G)  An action A(q) is successful because its ultimate source—the map—is accurate.  
 
The explanatory role of truth or accuracy is exhausted by such a logical, generalizational, 
function. But to say that the nature of the explanatory role of truth is purely logical is to say that 
the notion of truth doesn’t have any other explanatory function. To make the point vivid, let’s 
compare the explanatory role played by notion of truth with the explanatory role played by the 
notion of oxygen in Lavoisier’s theory of combustion. Roughly speaking, Lavoisier’s theory of 
combustion is that oxygen is the underlying principle in terms of which various phenomena of 
combustion can be explained. In this theory, the notion of oxygen doesn’t play a merely logical, 
generalizational, function; the notion of oxygen determines well-defined physical properties, and 
these properties cause combustion by interacting with other physical properties. By contrast, the 
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deflationary notion of truth doesn’t determine well-defined properties, let alone physical 
properties. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to say that the property of truth explains a wide 
variety of successful behaviors; truth isn’t even the kind of property that can have such an 
explanatory power.   
Michael Levin—whose view Kitcher mentions in his discussion—claims that the notion 
of truth has nothing to do with the success of behavior (including successful predictions and 
interventions made by scientists).
208
 Levin says,  
Why do airplanes stay up? Surely the reason airplanes stay up is not                                               
(1) “The pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure on its 
overside” is true,                                                                                                            
but rather  
(2) The pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure on its 
overside.
209
  
 
Levin isn’t here advocating the redundancy theory of truth; he only tries to identify what really 
does the causal-explanatory work; the causal-explanatory work is done by the properties invoked 
in 2). The notion of truth invoked (1) is a purely disquotational device doing no causal-
explanatory work. Similarly, the notion of truth invoked in G) above doesn’t do a causal-
explanatory work—it is a device of generalization. The causal-explanatory work is done by 
Ophelia’s believing <One follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook> & (One 
follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook); Ophelia’s believing <One crosses the 
river → one gets to the castle> & (One crosses the river → one gets to the castle); and so forth. 
                                                          
208 M. Levin, “What Kind of Explanation is Truth?”, in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984, pp:124-39.  
209
 M. Levin, ibid., p. 126.  
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The notion of truth is appealed to only as a device of generalization such an infinite conjunction 
(or a disjunction).  
 So, Kitcher is right when he claims that if we construe the notion of truth in the 
deflationary sense, we cannot expect truth to explain systematic successes. Let’s recall, however, 
what Kitcher aims to prove eventually—he aims to prove that scientific realism requires a non-
deflationary notion of truth; in particular, correspondence truth. To prove this point, Kitcher 
brings in the success-to-truth rule:  
      (Success-to-Truth Rule) 
S plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and intervention. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
      S is approximately true.  
 
This rule embodies one of the most important arguments for scientific realism—it embodies 
ideas underlying the “no-miracle” argument and the abductive argument for scientific realism. 
So, according to this rule, we would not be able to explain how a theory yields successful 
predictions and interventions unless we take the theory to be true; put differently, from the 
premise that a theory yields successful predictions and interventions, we are allowed to infer that 
the theory is true. Kitcher maintains that the deflationist cannot make sense of this argument for 
scientific realism on the grounds that the deflationist cannot accommodate the role of truth in this 
argument; i.e., the success-to-truth rule.  
 The deflationist has no problem, however, accommodating the role of truth in the 
success-to-truth rule—he can explain it in the same way he explains the role of truth in an 
account of the success of Ophelia’s behavior. The nature of the role played by truth in the 
173 
 
success-to-truth rule, says the deflationist, is purely logical, because the success-to-truth rule 
generalizes an infinite disjunction 8) in the following:  
 
8) If Newton’s theory is composed of propositions <P1>,  <P2>, . . , <Pn>, and Newton’s 
theory plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and 
intervention, then P1, P2, . . , Pn; or if Einstein’s theory is composed of propositions <R1>, 
<R2>, . . , <Rn>, and Einstein’s theory plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-
grained prediction and intervention, then R1, R2, . . , Rn; or . . .  
 
    
Given that the success-to-truth rule is purported as an argument for scientific realism, 8) exhausts 
what is stated by the success-to-truth rule. The reason the success-to-truth rule supports scientific 
realism is that if this rule is accepted, the two main theses of scientific realism will be accepted 
as well: (SR) and (SSR) (see 3.3.1 and the footnote below).
210
 That is to say, if we accept the 
success-to-truth rule, we will accept the existence of the entities—including unobservable 
entities—that feature in well-established scientific theories; we will also believe that those 
entities have the properties attributed to them by science. The same effect will be obtained if we 
accept 8). For example, suppose we infer the conclusion that masses warp space and time from 
the premise that Einstein’s theory states <Masses warp space and time> and Einstein’s theory 
plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of prediction and intervention. This is enough to 
show that we accept (SR) and (SSR); it shows that we believe that masses, space, and time exist 
mind-independently, and these entities have the properties attributed by Einstein’s theory. 
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Therefore, as long as the success-to-truth rule is construed as a generalization of the infinite 
disjunction 8), the success-to-truth rule can support scientific realism. In order to explain how the 
success-to-truth rule generalizes the infinite disjunction 8), we need to assume no theory of truth 
other than the instances of the equivalence schema (E): <P> is true iff P. Therefore, the 
deflationist has no problem accommodating the role of truth in the success-to-truth rule.   
 Kitcher may respond to this response by pointing out that the deflationist cannot offer an 
account of systematic successes. Kitcher may argue that if the success-to-truth rule is nothing but 
a generalization of 8), then we could not explain systematic successes. What he would mean by 
‘systematic successes’ in this context is that many, diverse, scientific theories—for example, 
Newton’s theory, Einstein’s theory, Boyle and Charles’ theory, and so forth—result in successful 
predictions and interventions, and the success of all these theories should be explained in terms 
of a small number of ultimate principles. If the meaning of the success-to-truth rule is exhausted 
by the infinite disjunction 8), however, we cannot expect that we will find some ultimate 
principles in terms of which we can explain how all those theories result in successful 
predictions and interventions. Therefore, says Kitcher, we cannot give an account of systematic 
successes if we construe the notion of truth invoked in the success-to-truth rule in the 
deflationary sense.  
Two responses can be offered by the deflationist. First, for the purpose of defending 
scientific realism, it isn’t essential that we give an account of systematic successes. As was 
discussed earlier, Kitcher places two very different requirements on a success-explanation—the 
requirement of explaining the objective pertinence of an action and the requirement of explaining 
systematic successes. Of these two requirements, it is only the requirement of explaining the 
objective pertinence of an action that is relevant for the defense of scientific realism. The core 
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theses of scientific realism are (SR) and (SSR), but to defend (SR) and (SSR) doesn’t require us 
to give an account of systematic successes. Whether or not we can derive the success of all those 
theories from a small number of ultimate principles has no bearing upon endorsing (SR) or 
(SSR). To be sure, if a success-explanation—an explanation of the success of behavior—can 
derive all the successful action from a small number of ultimate principles, its explanatory power 
would increase. The success-to-truth rule, however, isn’t any kind of a success-explanation—the 
purpose of the success-explanation is to defend realism. If the success-to-truth rule were any 
kind of success-explanation, then one may insist that the notion of truth should play a role in 
accounting for systematic successes. The purpose of the success-to-truth rule, however, isn’t 
simply to explain the success of an action—it is to show that only the doctrine of scientific 
realism can explain the success of predictions and interventions. The notion of truth is invoked to 
make this point—to state that the extra-mental and extra-linguistic conditions of reality plays an 
essential role in an account of the success of scientific predictions and interventions. Explaining 
systematic successes is totally orthogonal to the role of truth in the success-to-truth rule. 
Therefore, it is wrong for Kitcher to require the deflationist to explain systematic successes.  
Another response that can be offered by the deflationist is that to invoke the 
correspondence notion of truth isn’t helpful in giving an account of systematic successes. Kitcher 
maintains that if we construe the notion of truth in terms of the correspondence notion, we can 
have both—not only can we make sense of the success-to-truth rule but we can also have an 
account of systematic successes. This expectation can be met, however, only if the 
correspondence notion of truth is properly defined.  Unless the correspondence notion of truth is 
defined in a clear and substantive way, we would have no idea how the empirical success of 
many, diverse, scientific theories are derived from the property of correspondence truth. Besides, 
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unless the correspondence notion of truth is properly defined, there would be no difference 
between invoking truth and invoking correspondence truth in an account of the success of 
scientific theories. Kitcher’s characterization of correspondence truth, however, is far from being 
clear and substantive. He rarely explains what the property of correspondence truth is. In 
particular, Kitcher uses the notion of correspondence relations in two different ways without 
differentiating one from the other. He sometimes means by it a congruence-relation between a 
mental/linguistic representation and the states in the world.  At other times, he means by it a 
causal relation between the elements of a mental/linguistic representation and the entities in the 
world. It hardly makes sense, however, to construe the nature of a correspondence relation 
between a linguistic/mental representation and the world in terms of a congruence relation. To 
construe a correspondence relation in terms of a congruence relation makes sense only when we 
deal with a pictorial representation such as a map. A mental/linguistic representation, however, 
isn’t a pictorial representation.  
So, the notion of a correspondence relation, if there is such a relation, should be 
construed in terms of a causal relation, not a congruence relation. As was discussed in Ch. 1, 
however, there are many difficulties in defining a correspondence relation in terms of a causal 
relation. Kitcher’s problem, however, is even more acute—Kitcher has to show that there is a 
causal relation that essentially enters into an explanation of the empirical success of a scientific 
theory. Kitcher’s idea is that we could not explain how scientists succeed in making predictions 
and interventions without invoking the causal relations between the elements of their beliefs and 
the entities in the world. Is there however, any causal relation that should exist in order for 
scientists to make successful predictions and interventions? It seems that as long as scientists 
have true beliefs—in other words, the scientific theories they accept are true—their predictions 
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and interventions would be successful. How the entities in the world are causally related to the 
scientists’ beliefs doesn’t seem to play an essential role in their making successful predictions 
and interventions. It is possible that two scientists have the same belief about science while the 
causal relations between the elements of their beliefs and the entities in the world are not the 
same. For example, a Martian scientist and a scientist on the earth have the same scientific belief, 
although the way the elements of a Martian’s belief are causally connected with the entities in 
the world is different from the way the elements of the earthling’s belief are causally connected 
with the entities in the world. To say this doesn’t deny the role played by a scientific method in 
an account of successful predictions and interventions. The causal relation between the elements 
of a belief and the entities in the world, however, has no bearing upon a scientific method—it 
bears upon the semantics of scientific beliefs. Unfortunately, Kitcher often confuses a 
methodological question with a semantic question. The deflationist doesn’t deny the importance 
of a methodological question in bringing about successful predictions and interventions. He 
denies, however, that a semantic question has anything to do with the empirical success of a 
scientific theory. In order to argue for the correspondence theory of truth, Kitcher has to prove 
that a semantic question has any bearing upon the empirical success of a scientific theory. It is 
doubtful, however, that he can do so; a Martian, a blind person, a deaf person, or even an android 
may have the same success in their predictions and interventions. What matters, thankfully, is the 
truth of their beliefs, not the semantic mechanism involved in their beliefs.  
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Chapter 4. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content 
 
4.1. Introduction 
  
 What should a theory of meaning and content be like when the notion of truth is 
construed in the deflationary sense? This is a big question, and involves vagueness as well. First, 
the term ‘theory of meaning’ can mean a theory that explicates the nature of the meaning of an 
expression, a theory that explains the underlying facts by virtue of which an expression has the 
particular meaning it has, or something else.
211
 Second, there are a variety of deflationary 
theories of truth. So, before discussing what theory of meaning is best suited for a deflationary 
theory of truth, it is essential to be clear about what the kind of deflationary theory of truth is 
being considered.
212
 In this chapter, the term ‘theory of meaning’ will be used both as an account 
of the nature of meaning and as an account of the underlying facts by virtue of which an 
expression has the particular meaning it has.
213
 The kinds of deflationary theory of truth being 
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 David Lewis says:  
 
I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems 
whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and 
sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or 
population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics. (D. Lewis, “General Semantics,” Synthese, Vol. 
22, 1970, pp. 18-67)  
 
Drawing upon Lewis’s distinction, Jeff Speaks (“Theories of Meaning,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010) 
distinguishes a semantic theory from a foundational theory of meaning, where a semantic theory is to assign 
semantic contents to expressions, and a foundational theory of meaning is to explicate the facts by virtue of which 
expressions come to have their semantic contents. There seems to be, however, the third kind of a theory of meaning 
which, like Davidson’s, aims to generate theorems knowledge of which is sufficient to understand what a speaker of 
a language says in uttering a sentence in the language. See D. Davidson, Inquires into Truth and Interpretation, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press,2
nd
 ed., 2001.  
212
 Following Horwich, we may call ‘semantic deflationism’ a combination of a deflationary theory of truth and a 
deflationary theory of meaning. See P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, Ch. 1. 
213
 Horwich uses the term ‘theory of meaning’ as meaning a theory explicating underlying facts (or properties) by 
virtue of which an expression possesses the particular meaning it has. (P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 3, p. 43) Field, on 
the other hand, uses the term ‘theory of meaning’ as meaning both a theory explicating the nature of the meaning of 
an expression and a theory explicating the facts by virtue of which an expression possesses the particular meaning it 
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considered are those developed and advocated by Horwich and Field. In this thesis, I have 
concentrated more on their commonalities than their differences. In discussing their matching, 
deflationist theories of meaning, I will adopt the same approach—I aim to show that there are 
more commonalities than there appears to be.  
In discussing the commonalities between Horwich’s and Field’s theories of meaning, I 
will focus on a specific issue—how their theories of meaning deflate the role of truth-theoretic 
notions in an account of meaning. According to Devitt, one of the most important characteristics 
of a deflationary theory of meaning and truth is that it denies a systematic connection between an 
account of meaning and an account of truth.
214
 Considering what motivates the deflationary 
concept of truth in the first place, what Devitt says makes perfect sense. The most important 
argument for the deflationary concept of truth is that the role played by the notion of truth is 
purely expressive as opposed to being explanatory. The truth term such as ‘is true’ is a device 
that enables us to express things that we could not do easily without it—it enables us to 
abbreviate a long series of conjunctions (or disjunctions); it enables us to express an agreement 
(or a disagreement) with a belief that we cannot articulate; and so forth. In this very sense, 
deflationists construe truth as a purely logical notion not playing an important explanatory role.  
So, a deflationist theory of meaning should be deployed without having the notion of 
truth playing a central role. In this regard, Horwich says, “[W]hen it comes to semantics, truth 
really has got nothing to with it,” implying that his deflationist view of meaning is opposed to 
orthodox, mainstream semantics characterizing facts of meaning in terms of truth-theoretic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
has. Ironically, Field’s deflationist theory of meaning denies there is either a meaning expressed a word or facts by 
virtue of which an expression possesses a particular meaning. (See H. Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 
214
 This is one of the many valuable comments given by Prof. Devitt on this thesis.  
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terms.
215
 Field agrees—he says, “[A]ccepting deflationism requires dethroning truth conditions 
from the central place in the theory of meaning and the theory of intentionality . . .”216 Thus, 
Horwich and Field offer theories in which non-truth-theoretic notions play a central role in an 
account of meaning and content. Horwich’s use theory of meaning and Field’s linguistic view of 
meaning attributions are those theories respectively.  
Both Horwich’s use theory of meaning and Field’s linguistic view of meaning 
attributions deal with a wide range of issues concerning a theory of meaning and content. 
Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all of them. So, the aim of this chapter 
is modest—in the first part of this chapter, I will explain the core ideas of Horwich’s use theory 
of meaning. In discussing some of the core ideas, I will bring in Horwich’s response to Kripke’s 
skeptical argument regarding Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning. A brief excusatory remark is 
needed here—this discussion wasn’t part of my original plan. Working on this topic upon Prof. 
Levin’s request, however, I got interested in the later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning especially 
with regard to its influence on contemporary deflationist views of meaning. This is the reason 
why I will give somewhat lengthy discussion on Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein’s view of 
meaning. In the second part of this chapter, I will compare Horwich’s view of meaning with 
Field’s view of meaning. As was mentioned earlier, I will deal with this topic by concentrating 
more on their commonalities than differences. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss 
Field’s treatment of a version of success arguments against the deflationist theory of truth and 
content. The purpose of this discussion is to see how a deflationist can explain the success of 
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 P. Horwich, “Semantics: What’s Truth Got to Do with It,” in his Truth—Meaning—Reality, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 165.  
216
 H. Field, “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse,” Philosophical Review, 1994, 103, pp.405-52. 
As Field emphasizes in many of his writings, Field regards one’s stance on the role of truth as being decided by 
one’s stance on the role of truth conditions. A more discussion on this point will be given shortly.  
181 
 
behavior while she explains the content of a belief-state without assigning a central role to a 
truth-theoretic notion.   
 
4. 2. Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning and its Response to Kripke’s Skeptical Paradox 
 
 Horwich says that his use theory of meaning is intended to answer the question: in virtue 
of which of its underlying properties does a word come to possess a particular meaning.
217
 To 
understand how Horwich’s use theory answers this question, we should first be clear about what 
he means by the ‘meaning’ of a word. The meaning of a word, in his theory, is a concept 
expressed by the word, where a concept is an abstract entity that constitutes a proposition and 
state of mind (e.g. a belief, desire, etc.).
218
 Horwich uses capitalization convention to name a 
concept expressed by an expression. For example, ‘DOG’ refers to the concept, DOG, and it is 
the meaning of ‘dog’; ‘SNOW IS WHITE’ refers to the concept, SNOW IS WHITE, and it is the 
meaning of ‘snow is white’; and so on. Now, in Horwich’s use theory, ordinary meaning 
attributions of the forms 1) and 2) are construed in terms of 3) and 4) in the following:  
 
1) x means <dog>.219  
2) x means that snow is white.  
 
3) x means DOG.  
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 P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 43. 
218
 Ibid., p. 44.  
219
 Here, I use Field’s formulation of an ordinary meaning-attribution for a sub-sentential expression, which is 
intended to be neutral to the question of what sort of entity if the bracket-term refers to. In Horwich’s use theory of 
meaning, the bracket-term refers to the concept expressed by the word inside the bracket-term. Since I will use this 
formulation in discussing Field’s deflationist theory of meaning, I use this formulation for the sake of consistency. 
See H. Field, “Attributions of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p. 157.  
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4)  x means SNOW IS WHITE.  
 
As will be argued later, however, Horwich’s theory of meaning doesn’t seem to involve the 
claim that ordinary meaning-attributions of the forms 1) and 2) are reducible to meaning-
attributions of the forms 3) and 4). Instead, it involves the claim that meaning-attributions of the 
forms 3) and 4) are reducible to the use-properties of relevant expressions; i.e., ‘dog’ and ‘snow 
is white’ as they are understood in English. In this sense, Horwich says that his use theory of 
meaning involves a series of reductive analyses such as 5):  
 
5) x means DOG = u(x) 
            x means ELECTRON = v(x) 
. . . and so on,  
 
where the underlying use-properties u(x), v(x), . . ., and so on stem from the basic acceptance 
properties possessed by relevant expressions.
220
 The basic acceptance properties of an expression 
are explanatorily fundamental properties that designate circumstances in which certain specified 
sentences containing the term are accepted.
221
 For example, the basic acceptance property 
underlying the use-property of ‘red’ is the disposition to apply ‘red’ to an observed surface when 
and only when it is clearly red. Similarly, the explanatorily fundamental acceptance property 
underlying the use-property of ‘dog’ is our disposition to utter or accept a sentence such as ‘This 
is a dog’ when and only when there is an object having the property of doggyness.222 The 
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 P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 3 (“Meaning as Use”).  
221
 P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 45.  
222
 Here, as Horwich says, the term ‘property’ is to be understood in a sufficiently fine-grained sense; that is to say, 
the property of ‘doggyness’ is distinct from the property of ‘caninity’ (just as the property of ‘water’ is distinct from 
the property of ‘H2O’). According to Horwich, the identity criterion of properties is as follows:  
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primary explanatory function of these basic acceptance properties is to account for the 
acceptance of other sentences containing relevant words; for example, the basic acceptance 
property of ‘dog’ accounts for our acceptance of sentences such as ‘Dogs are friendly animal’ 
and ‘Dogs are humans’ favorite pet’. So, according to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, what 
explains a word x’s having a particular meaning property such as ‘x means DOG’ is that x has a 
certain use-property u(x). For example, if the word ‘chien’ in French means DOG, then it should 
have the use-property u(x) to which the meaning-property ‘x means DOG’ is reduced. Given that 
it is a trivial truth that ‘dog’ means DOG, if ‘chien’ means DOG, then the two words ‘chien’ and 
‘dog’ should have the same basic acceptance property.223 In this sense, Horwich’s use theory of 
meaning involves the claim that two words express the same concept in virtue of having the 
same basic acceptance property.
224
  
 What makes Horwich’s use theory of meaning distinctively deflationary is the way in 
which Horwich appeals to this theory in explaining why many constraints that philosophers have 
traditionally placed in a theory of meaning are “pseudo”-constraints.225 There are several pseudo-
constraints examined throughout his book Meaning—the understanding constraint, the 
relationality constraint, the representation constraint, the aprioricity constraint, the 
compositionality constraint, and the normativity constraint.
226
 By calling them ‘pseudo-
constraint’, Horwich doesn’t intend to weaken the importance of these constraints; he rather 
intends to remove obstacles in the way of developing a theory of meaning satisfying these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
the property f-ness = the property g-ness iff the predicate ‘f’ means the same as the predicate ‘g’.  
 
See P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 21.  
223
 To say that ‘dog’ means DOG is trivially true because ‘DOG’, by definition, names the meaning of the word 
‘dog’. See P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 15.  
224
 P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 3 (“Meaning as Use”), p. 46.  
225
 See P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 1 (“Introduction”).  
226
 P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, Ch. 2 (“Pseudo-Constraint on an Adequate Account of 
Meaning”).  
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constraints.
227
 The main obstacle in satisfying these constraints, says Horwich, is a cluster of 
misguided assumptions. For example, the difficulty with meeting the understanding constraint 
emerges from the misguided assumption that our understanding the meaning of a word should be 
explained by an explicit knowledge.
228
 Horwich explains why this assumption is misguided by 
showing how his use theory of meaning satisfies the understanding constraint while it doesn’t 
presuppose the assumption.
229
 Taking another example, the normativity constraint is the 
requirement that an adequate theory of meaning should explain the normative import of a 
meaning-property. For example, the meaning-property ‘x means DOG’ has the normative import 
that x ought to be applied only to dog. Hence, the property that reduces this meaning-property 
must be capable of having such normative import as well. This constraint has been considered 
extremely difficult to satisfy, because no naturalistic (factual) property is intrinsically 
normative.
230
 According to Horwich, however, this impression emerges from the misconception 
that a meaning-property is intrinsically normative—that the property reducing a meaning-
property should be intrinsically normative. Horwich explains why this is a misconception, and 
then proposes his use theory of meaning as an alternative approach in which the normative 
import of a meaning-property is explained in terms of a factual property; i.e., a use-property.
231
 
 In this way, Horwich argues for the dual aspects of his deflationist view of meaning—
eliminating various misconceptions plaguing a theory of meaning, and providing an alternative 
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 P. Horwich, Meaning, pp. 16-18.  
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 Since the main focus of the discussion will be the relationality constraint and the representation constraint, the 
detailed account of other constraints will be omitted. To be brief, however, Horwich’s point about the understanding 
constraint is that the knowledge constituting our understanding the meaning of a word is implicit. Our knowledge of 
the use-property of a word is implicit in that although we cannot articulate it to ourselves consciously or 
unconsciously, we know how to deploy the word in various circumstances.  
230
 As Horwich says, Kripke’s skeptical argument in his Wittgenstein on Rules and private Language is a good 
example of this kind. See P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 8 (“Norms of Language”) and S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules 
and Private Language,  
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185 
 
theory of meaning that meet all the constraints listed above. It would be nice if I could go over 
each of his solutions to these constraints. Instead, I will in the following focus on Horwich’s 
solutions to two of those constraints—the relationality constraint and the representation 
constraint. Horwich’s solutions to these constraints are particularly relevant to his response to 
Kripke’s skeptical argument against Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning. To be sure, Kripke’s 
argument is concerned with the normativity constraint—that there is no fact in the world that can 
explain the normative import of a meaning-property. Krikpe’s skeptical argument, however, is 
also concerned with the relationality and representation constraint. Especially, Horwich responds 
to Kripke’s skeptical argument by relating it to the relationality and representation constraints. 
Moreover, Horwich’s treatment of these constraints shows how the inflationary conception of 
truth engenders some of the misguided assumptions presupposed by traditional theories of 
meaning. 
 The relationality constraint stems from the surface form of a meaning-attribution: ‘x 
means y’, where x is to be replaced by a phonological and orthographic entity and y is to be 
replaced by its meaning. Given that a meaning-attribution has such a relational form, an adequate 
theory of meaning must explain, first, the nature of meaning-entities, and second, the nature of 
the meaning-relation in which expressions stand to the meaning entities. As was mentioned, in 
Horwich’s use theory of meaning, meaning-entities are concepts expressed by words or 
sentences; for example, DOG or SNOW IS WHITE. But then, to meet the relationality constraint, 
Horwich’s use theory of meaning should explain the nature of the meaning-relation between 
expressions and concepts.  
In explaining the nature of the meaning-relation, Horwich’s use theory of meaning makes 
an important departure from other theories of meaning. Most theories of meaning that have been 
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seriously entertained assume that the meaning-relation should be reduced to a relational 
property.
232
 If we accept this assumption, we would require that the relational property ‘x means 
DOG’ be analyzable into a relational property of the form 6) in the following:  
 
6) T(x, dog).233 
 
Horwich argues, however, that nothing compels us to analyze a meaning-property into 6); to 
think otherwise involves several misconceptions. First, it involves committing the Constitution 
Fallacy—to suppose that what constitutes a relational property has to be itself a relational 
property.
234
 The surface form of a meaning-property is relational, but it doesn’t follow from this 
that the property by virtue of which an expression has a meaning-property should be relational as 
well.
235
 One may object here that if what constitutes a meaning-property isn’t relational, a 
meaning-property isn’t genuinely relational, either. The problem with this objection is the 
obscurity with the notion of being “genuinely relational”; the distinction between a relational and 
non-relational property is obscure in the first place, and so it is by no means clear what a 
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 According to Horwich, the Davidsonian truth-conditional theory, the teleological theories defend by Papineau, 
Dretske, Millikan, and Jacob, and Kripke’s skeptical argument against the naturalistic reduction of meaning-facts 
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meaning-property should be reduced to a relational property, ‘x means DOG’ would first be analyzed into T*(x, 
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Horwich, Meaning, pp. 21-27.  
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 More precisely, the Constitution Fallacy (Horwich uses capital letters) is an error to suppose that reductive 
analysis must preserve logical structure. In other words, it is a fallacy to assume that whenever a fact has a certain 
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(see P. Horwich, Meaning, p 21).  
235 I suppose Horwich is right about this; for example, John may have the relational property ‘x is taller than Tom 
Cruise’ by virtue of having the non-relational property ‘x is 6 feet tall’. Field expresses a disagreement with 
Horwich’s constitution fallacy (in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 71). I won’t discuss it here.  
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“genuinely relational” property consists in.236 That doesn’t mean that there is no distinction at all 
between relational and non-relational properties; for example, there is a difference between 
properties such as ‘x kicks y’ or ‘x loves y’ and properties such as ‘x is sick’ or ‘x is alive’.  
Horwich takes note of such difference by distinguishing a strongly relation property and a 
weakly relational property. A meaning-property would be strongly relational if it were 
constituted by a relational property at a deeper level; and if it were, we would be justified in 
analyzing ‘x means DOG’ into 6) above: T(x, dog). But the surface form of a meaning-property 
doesn’t by itself show that a meaning-property is constituted by a relational property at its 
deepest level. In this sense, Horwich argues that most meaning theories have assumed a 
misconception that a meaning-property is a strongly relational. Horwich calls this misconception 
‘the strongly relational constraint’, and this is another misconception associated with the 
relationality constraint.  
Freed from these misconceptions, Horwich argues that we can explain the nature of the 
meaning relation without invoking a relational property such as ‘T(x, dog)’. Thus, Horwich 
claims that what constitutes a meaning-property such as ‘x means DOG’ is simply the following:  
 
7) The concept, DOG, is present within some mental state of a speaker who utters x.237  
 
We infer 7) from the use-property u(x) which the meaning-property ‘x means DOG’ is reduced to; 
namely, by observing how a speaker uses a certain word, we infer 7). So, Horwich’s use theory 
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 For example, is a property such as ‘x is red’ a relational property or not? We tend to think it to be a non-relational 
property. However, in order for an object to have this property, it should stand in relations to certain conditions; 
indeed, according to Locke, an object must stand in relations to a perceiver. But then, it is hard to say that the 
property ‘x is red’ is “genuinely” relational or non-relational.  
237
 See P. Horwich, Meaning, pp. 20-21.  
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satisfies the relationality constraint easily while it doesn’t presuppose the strong relationality 
constraint.  
 Horwich’s solution to the relationality constraint is closely connected to his solution to 
the representation constraint. Interestingly, the representation constrain is in turn closely related 
to Kripke’s skeptical argument against Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning. More precisely, 
Kripke’s complaint about Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning is that it doesn’t meet the 
representation constraint. The restraint constraint is that an adequate theory of meaning must 
explain how an expression comes to represent a certain part of the world by virtue of possessing 
a certain meaning-property. A rationale for this constraint is that we accept a meaning-to-truth 
conditional such as 8) in the following:  
 
8) x means DOG → x is true of all and only dogs. 
 
For example, we accept that if the word ‘개’means DOG, then ‘개’ should be true of all and only 
dogs. The question is then how to explain the connection between the antecedent and the 
consequent of a meaning-to-truth conditional such as 8).  
 The core idea of Kripke’s argument against Wittgenstein’s dispositional (use) theory of 
meaning is that meaning-properties such as ‘x means DOG’ cannot be reduced to a dispositional, 
use property u(x) because a use-property u(x) doesn’t determine a representational (truth-
theoretic) property such as ‘x is true of all and only dogs’.238  Here, Horwich summarizes 
Kripke’s argument as follows:  
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i) Whatever constitutes the meaning of a predicate must determine its extension.  
ii) The use of a predicate doesn’t determine its extension.  
Therefore,  
iii) The meaning of a predicate isn’t constituted by its use.  
 
To substantiate the premise ii) Kripke brings in the famous “quus”-example; when I answer ‘125’ 
to the problem ‘68+57’, is my answer justified by my disposition to use the plus sign (‘+’ or 
‘plus’) in a certain way? Kripke’s answer is that no fact about my disposition to use the plus sign 
justifies that ‘+’ means PLUS as opposed to QUUS.  Kripke (the self-proclaimed skeptic) says:  
 
The sceptic argues that when I answered '125' to the problem '68+57', my answer was an 
unjustified leap in the dark; my past mental history is equally compatible with the hypothesis 
that I meant quus, and therefore should have said '5'.
239
 
  
Here, an assumption is that I have never performed a computation that involves a number bigger 
than 57.
240
 Another assumption is that there is the quus-function (symbolized ‘ⱷ’ as) that is 
defined as follows: x ⱷ y = x + y if x, y <57, and x ⱷ y = 5 otherwise. But then, we can justify 
‘68 + 57 = 125’ only if we can justify the metalinguistic assertion that my employment of the 
plus sign (‘+’) means PLUS, not QUUS. Kripke’s skeptical conclusion is that nothing justifies 
this metalinguistic assertion; in particular, my disposition to use the plus sign can never justifies 
that it means PLUS as opposed to QUUS. Kripke emphasizes that the point of his skeptical 
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190 
 
argument isn’t epistemological—it isn’t that we don’t have an access to the fact by virtue of 
which the plus sign means PLUS as opposed to QUUS.
241
 The point is rather semantic—that 
there is simply no fact of the matter determining that I meant PLUS by the plus sign.
242
 Once he 
establishes such skeptical conclusion, Kripke deploys his skeptical solution. Before discussing 
Kripke’s skeptical solution, however, I shall first examine Horwich’s response to Kripke’s 
skeptical argument.  
Horwich offers a two-pronged response to Kripke’s skeptical argument. Its first prong is 
that Kripke’s argument is threatened to be invalidated by equivocation—the concept of 
determination can be construed in two different ways, but Kripke’s argument rests on only one of 
them.
243
 Its second prong is that the concept of determination Kripke’s argument rests on 
involves the inflationary conception of truth. I shall both points in the following. First, 
concerning the problem of equivocation, Horwich claims that we should make the distinction 
between the strong and the weak determination of the representational property of an expression 
by its use-property. That is to say, the use property of a predicate either strongly determines 
(DETERMINES) or weakly determines (determines) its extension. The use property of a 
predicate DETERMINES its extension when we can read off the extension of the predicate from 
its use-property.
244
 According to Horwich, it is this notion of determination that Kripke’s 
skeptical argument rests on; namely, the skeptical conclusion iii) above follows from the 
premises i) and ii) only when ‘determines’ is understood as meaning DETERMINES. Construed 
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this way, the crux of Kripke’s objection to Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning is that we 
cannot read off the extension (any other truth-theoretic properties) of an expression from its use 
property.  
What’s wrong, however, with the concept of DETERMINATION? Horwich’s answer is 
that it assumes the inflationary concept of truth. To see why let’s examine what we need in order 
to be able to read off the extensional (truth-theoretic) property such as ‘x is true of all and only 
dogs’ from the use-property, u(x).  What we need, says Horwich, is an inflationary principle of 
the form 9) in the following:  
 
9) u(x) → T(x, dog),  
 
where ‘T’ names a non-semantic, naturalistic relation. It goes without saying that we would be 
able to read off the extension of a predicate from its use property if we had a principle of the 
form 9). But consider what it amounts to accept 9)—it amounts to accepting an inflationary 
definition of being true of such as 10) in the following: 
 
10)   x is true of all and only dogs ↔ T(x, dog).  
 
A definition of the form 10) is inflationary, since it offers a substantive analysis of the truth-
theoretic concept being true of—it analyzes this truth-theoretic property in terms of a naturalistic 
property. From the deflationist perspective, however, it is neither needed nor possible to analyze 
the property of being true of in terms of a naturalistic property. The deflationist construes truth as 
a purely logical or expressive device the nature of which can exhaustively explained by the 
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equivalence schema (E): <P> is true iff P. Similarly, in the deflationary truth, the concept of 
being true of can exhaustively explained by what is implied by the instance of schemas such as  
 
         The concept F is true of y ↔ F(y).245  
 
So, when we construe truth-theoretic concepts such as being true of in the deflationary sense, we 
don’t need inflationary principles such as 9) and 10). But we need these principles if we are to be 
able to read off the extension of a predicate from its use property. Therefore, when Kripke 
criticizes Wittgenstein’s use theory on the grounds that we cannot read off the extension of a 
predicate from its use property, Kripke assumes the inflationary conceptions of truth-theoretic 
notions. Put more precisely, Kripke’s assumes that meaning-constituting properties are strongly 
relational in the sense that meaning-properties strongly determine (DETERMINE) the truth-
theoretic properties of expressions. Horwich’s point is that these are “pseudo-contraints”, which 
are ultimately rooted in the inflationary conceptions of truth-theoretic notions. When we construe 
truth-theoretic notions in the deflationary sense, it is only expected that we cannot read off truth-
theoretic properties from use properties. But then, Kripke’s skeptical argument doesn’t provide a 
legitimate reason to object to Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning.  
 I agree with Horwich’s response to Kripke’s skeptical argument—most of all, the 
concept of meaning presupposed by Kripke’s skeptical argument is not Wittgensteinian.246 Since 
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Just because most of the properties we encounter have one, we shouldn’t assume that all do. Such an 
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the Wittgensteinian concept of meaning seems to be closely related to the deflationist view of 
meaning, I will briefly discuss in the following some problems with Kripke’s criticism of 
Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning.  
Kripke’s skeptical argument involves two distinct arguments neither of which shows that 
dispositional use properties don’t constitute meaning properties. First, it involves the argument 
questioning whether I will have the same disposition to use the plus sign the disposition that I 
have had. Kripke says that it is possible that I proceed to compute—in conflict with my previous 
linguistic intentions—that 68 + 57 = 5.247 On the basis of this consideration, Kripke concludes 
that nothing in my mind determines whether I mean PLUS or QUUS by the plus sign.
248
 This 
argument doesn’t seem valid; even if we agree that my past and present dispositions don’t 
determine my future dispositions, from this we cannot infer that my dispositions to use the plus 
sign don’t determine its meaning-constituting properties. Suppose I proceed to compute 
‘68+57=5.’ If this happens, we would have to say that I have been meaning QUUS by the plus 
sign all along. By Kripke’s own definition, meaning QUUS involves an abrupt change of 
dispositions—to compute ‘x ⱷ y = x + y if x, y <57’ but to compute ‘x ⱷ y = 5 otherwise’. This 
only proves that meaning-properties are constituted by dispositional properties. Kripke may 
respond back that at the present moment we cannot determine whether my plus sign means 
PLUS or QUUS (because my present disposition is compatible with meaning PLUS and meaning 
QUUS). The problem with this response is that the issue, as Kripke says himself, isn’t 
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       The point is the sceptical problem, outlined above, that anything in my head leaves it undetermined what 
function `plus' (as I use it) denotes (plus or quus), what 'green' denotes (green or grue), and so on. 
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epistemological—whether we can determine the meaning of the plus sign is orthogonal to the 
issue. The issue is whether meaning-properties are constituted by dispositional properties. So, 
even if we cannot determine, by observing how I am disposed to use the plus sign, whether my 
plus sign means PLUS or QUUS, it shouldn’t undermine the dispositional theory of meaning. 
The question, therefore is whether Kripke’s counterexample (the quus-example) shows that 
meaning-properties are not constituted by dispositional use-properties. The answer is that it 
doesn’t; to the contrary, it only adds weight to the dispositional theory. Notice how Krikpe 
defines the meaning-property ‘x means QUUS’—he defines it as ‘x ⱷ y = x + y if x, y <57, and x 
ⱷ y = 5 otherwise’. This definition can easily be accommodated by the dispositional theory of 
meaning—what constitutes meaning QUUS is the disposition to compute numbers in the same 
way you compute an addition (x + y) if numbers are smaller than 57, but compute them 5 
otherwise. Similarly, what constitutes ‘x means PLUS’ is the disposition to compute numbers in 
the way we compute addition for all numbers. Surely, my past and present disposition to use an 
expression are compatible with many different semantic hypotheses; that it means PLUS, it 
means QUUS, it means QUUS*, and so forth. So, we cannot determine, just on the basis of 
dispositional use-properties—whether an expression means anything. But by Kripke’s own 
definition, meaning-properties are constituted by dispositional use-properties—what makes a 
sign mean QUUS is how a user of the sign is disposed to compute numbers. Despite that Kripke 
warns us not to confuse an epistemological question with a semantic question, he himself mixes 
up these two questions.  
Kripke’s another argument is that whereas the notion of meaning has an infinitary 
character, the notion of dispositions doesn’t; we are finite beings, so our dispositions are also 
finite. Therefore, meaning-properties cannot be constituted by dispositional, use-properties. It is 
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doubtful, however, whether meaning has an infinitary character; is it really an infinite matter that 
the plus sign (‘+’) means PLUS? Although Wittgenstein says at times as if meaning is an infinite 
matter (a rule is like a rail to infinity), he also says that a rule can be altered.
249
 Wittgenstein says 
that following a rule is like a practice or custom.
250
 We usually follow a practice or custom 
blindly, without asking for a justification, but a practice or custom can change. Therefore, it 
seems wrong to take what Wittgenstein means by ‘infinity’ literally. Instead, we should take it as 
saying that although the first step of following a rule contains its future steps, it does so only 
finitely, not infinitely.
251
 But then, the notion of a disposition best captures Wittgenstein’s notion 
of meaning; a dispositional property has the kind of the regularity that a meaning property has, 
but a dispositional property, like a meaning property, can change over time.  
So, Kripke’s argument begs the question—it involves the dubious assumption that a 
meaning property is fundamentally different from a dispositional use property. Kripke assumes 
that whereas it is an infinite matter that the plus sign (‘+’) means PLUS, it is a finite matter that a 
speaker (or a linguistic community as a whole) has a relevant disposition. It is by no means clear, 
however, that we have to understand the notion of meaning in such an exaggerated way. Neither 
does Wittgenstein construe the notion of meaning in this way.  
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The most serious problem with Kripke’s criticism of the use theory, however, is that his 
own solution to the skeptical problem—the skeptical solution—isn’t really different from the use 
theory of meaning. The core idea of Kripke’s skeptical solution is that we should understand a 
meaning-attribution such as ‘John means PLUS by the plus sign (‘+’)’ in terms of its assertability 
condition, not truth condition.
252
 Kripke says,  
 
All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be 
roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the 
game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition that 
'facts correspond' to those assertions is needed.
253
 
 
So, on this view, we are entitled to assert ‘John means PLUS by the plus sign’ if John’s 
responses to sum-questions seem acceptable from the perspective of the members of his 
linguistic community. This is the reason why Kripke considers Wittgenstein’s argument against 
private language a key to the solution to the skeptical paradox. Just as Hume solves the problem 
of causation by recognizing the impossibility of private causation, so does Wittgenstein solve the 
skeptical paradox by recognizing the impossibility of private language.
254
 When a person is 
considered isolated, the meaningfulness of a meaning attribution such as ‘Jones means PLUS by 
the sign ‘+’’ cannot be made sense of.255 Kripke says:  
 
Wittgenstein finds a useful role in our lives for a 'language game' that licenses, under certain 
conditions, assertions that someone `means such-and-such' and that his present application of 
a word `accords' with what he `meant' in the past. It turns out that this role, and these 
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conditions, involve reference to a community. They are inapplicable to a single person 
considered in isolation. Thus, as we have said, Wittgenstein rejects 'private language'. . .
256
 
 
We expect another person’s usage of ‘+’ to agree with ours because our lives are dependent upon 
it. Therefore, the meaning-attribution ‘John means PLUS by ‘+’’ doesn’t involve John alone; it 
involves the whole linguistic community that he belongs to. Only when a meaning attribution is 
conceived from this non-individualistic point of view can we make sense of the meaningfulness 
of a meaning attribution.
257
 This is the gist of the skeptical solution that Kripke attributes to 
Wittgenstein.  
 But if this is Kripke’s own solution to the skeptical problem, it is mysterious why he 
objects to the use theory of meaning in the first place.
258
 How can Wittgenstein’s argument 
against private language be different from the dispositional use theory of meaning? There seems 
no way to understand the ‘assertability condition’ associated with an expression independently of 
the way the members of a linguistic community are disposed to use the expression. So, the 
problem with Kripke’s skeptical solution to the skeptical problem isn’t that his solution is wrong; 
it is that his skeptical solution is inconsistent with his criticism of the use theory of meaning. 
Kripke’s skeptical solution supports—rather than criticizes—the use theory of meaning.  
 
4.3 The Commonalities Between Horwich’s and Field’s Deflationist Views of Meaning 
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In this section, I will compare Horwich’s view of meaning with another deflationist’s—
Field’s—view of meaning. In comparing their deflationist views of meaning, I found some 
interesting and complicated dynamics among Wittgenstein, Kripke, Horwich, and Field. First, 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations seems to contain all the important seeds for 
contemporary deflationist views of meaning. Its influence on Horwich’s view is obvious—
Horwich says that the purpose of his book Meaning is to clarify and support Wittgenstein’s view 
that the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
259
 Its influence on Field’s deflationist view 
is less obvious—Field indeed doesn’t mention the later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning at all.260 
Field’s deflationist view of meaning, however, bears interesting similarities with the later 
Wittgenstein’s view of meaning.261 Consider what Dummett says about the later Wittgenstein’s 
view of meaning:  
 
[T]he Investigations contains implicitly a rejection of the classical (realist) Frege—Tractatus 
view that the general form of explanation of meaning is a statement of the truth conditions.
262
 
 
Compare this passage with what Field says in the following: 
 
I see the philosophy of language, and the part of philosophy of mind concerned with 
intentional states like believing and desiring and intending and the like, as pretty much 
bifurcated into two traditions. The traditions differ over the role that the notion of truth 
conditions plays in the theory of meaning and in the theory of the content of intentional 
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states. One of the traditions, whose early advocates include Frege, Russell, the early 
Wittgenstein, and Ramsey, has it that truth conditions play an extremely central role 
in semantics and the theory of mind; a theory of meaning or content is, at least in large 
part, a theory of truth conditions. . . However, it isn't easy to say precisely what this central 
role is that truth conditions allegedly play; that I think is a main motivation for the alternative 
tradition.
263
 
 
Field considers the Frege-Russell-(the early)Wittgenstein-Ramsey tradition the “inflationary” 
tradition, where its distinctive feature is assigning a central role to the notion of a truth condition 
in an account of meaning and content. Field finds this inflationary tradition of meaning and 
content troublesome; he doubts the role that a truth condition allegedly has.  
 Besides, Field denies that there is a fact of the matter about meaning-attributions, which 
concurs with Kripke’s skeptical interpretation of the later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning. 
Relatedly, Field denies that translations and meaning-attributions are matters of being correct or 
incorrect; they are matters of being better or worse.
264
 Again, according to Kripke, this is the 
later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning. According to Kripke, all we can afford for a meaning-
attribution is the assertability condition, and not the truth condition. So, although Field also 
defends a deflationist view of meaning, his view of meaning has more skeptical elements than 
Horwich’s.265 On Horwich’s view, skepticism about a theory of meaning is largely due to 
mistaken constraints placed on an adequate theory of meaning.
266
 Related to this point, Horwich 
disagrees with Kripke’s claims that meaning-attributions have only assertability conditions, and 
not truth condition. Horwich says “[T]he ‘use‐theoretic’ truth conditions for attributions of 
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meaning are entailed—and are certainly not precluded—by the assertibility conditions that 
Kripke endorses”.267 
 In situations like this, a natural way to discuss Horwich’s and Field’s deflationist views 
of meaning may be to take sides with one of them. That’s not, however, how I will deploy the 
discussion in the following—I will rather focus on the commonalities between Horwich’s and 
Field’s deflationist views of meaning. There are two reasons why I take this approach; first, the 
approach is helpful in having an overarching view of what a deflationist view of meaning and 
truth is about. After all, they are two leading deflationists whose views of truth are more or less 
in agreement. So, by focusing on the commonalities of their views of meaning, one can develop 
a holistic understanding of what the deflationary approach to truth and meaning is about. Second, 
Horwich’s and Field’s accounts of meaning have more in common than they appear to. This 
shouldn’t be taken as saying that there is no important difference between their accounts of 
meaning. Many of their differences, however, are not the differences in principle—they are 
differences in how to accomplish the ultimate goal of the deflationary concept of truth; i.e., the 
idea that the role of truth is expressive rather than explanatory. In order to discuss the 
commonalities between Horwich’s and Field’s views of meaning in an orderly manner, I will 
divide the discussion into two large topics: meaning-entities and a fact of the matter (about 
meaning-attributions).  
 
4.3.3 Meaning-Entities 
In Field’s deflationist view of meaning and content, the question of the object of a 
meaning-relation looms large. More precisely, one of the main questions discussed in Field’s 
deflationist view of meaning is whether we are to construe a meaning-attribution as a relation to 
                                                          
267
 P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 223 (“A Straight Solution to Kripke’s Sceptical Paradox”).  
201 
 
a meaning-entity, where a meaning-entity is construed as an extra-mental/extra-linguistic, 
abstract entity. According to the orthodox (traditional) view of a meaning-attribution, we should 
a meaning-attribution as a relation to a meaning entity.
268
 After all, the term ‘mean’ involved in a 
meaning-attribution is a two-place transitive verb just like ‘love’ in ‘Mary loves John’. This 
surface structure of a meaning-attribution—that it has the form ‘x means y’—supports the 
traditional view that there should be something referred to by an expression that replaces ‘y’. 
Moreover, what is referred to by an expression replacing ‘y’ should be an abstract entity—it 
cannot be located in space and time; it should also be a language-independent entity, since what 
is meant by an expression (for example, what is meant by the Korean word ‘개’) isn’t dependent 
on the existence of a particular language; and it should also be a mind-independent entity, since 
the meaning of an expression exists independently of what anyone says or thinks.  
   According to Field, however, we’d better not construe a meaning-attribution as a 
relation to a meaning-entity. Instead, we’d better construe it as a relation to a linguistic entity; 
namely, an expression in a meaning attributor’s language. Field calls this view ‘the linguistic 
view of a meaning attribution’.269 So, if we accept this view, we are to understand ordinary 
meaning attributions of the form 1) and 2) in terms of 1
L
) and 2
L
) in the following 
 
1) x means <dog>.270  
2) x means that snow is white.   
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1
L
)  Means-the-Same-as (x, ‘dog’). 
2
L
)  Means-the-Same-as (x, ‘snow is white’),  
 
where ‘dog’ and ‘snow is white’ are a meaning-attributor’s words as they are computationally 
typed.
271
 On this view, to say that an expression x means 
<
dog
>
 is to say that it means the same as 
the word ‘dog’ does in my own language; also, to say that a sentence x means that snow is white 
is to say that it means the same as the sentence ‘Snow is white’ does in my own language. So, 
this view not only avoids invoking a meaning-entity in an analysis of meaning-attributions, it 
also revises the logical form of meaning-attributions; whereas ‘means’ is a transitive verb, 
‘means the same as’ is a comparative verb on the par with ‘is as tall as’. Both involve relations 
but relations of different kinds; whereas ‘means’ expresses a non-symmetric relation, ‘means the 
same as’ expresses a symmetric relation. Field isn’t the first advocating the linguistic analysis of 
meaning- and content-attributions; it seems that his linguistic view of meaning- and content-
attributions was influenced by Carnap’s linguistic analysis of propositional-attitude 
attributions.
272
 In my thesis, however, I won’t discuss the historical background of Field’s 
linguistic view of a meaning- and content-attribution. Instead, I will devote the discussion for the 
examination of its implication in the debate between the inflationary and the deflationary views 
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of meaning. For that purpose I shall first contrast this view with Horwich’s analysis of a meaning 
attribution.  
 Horwich says that he defends a non-revisionist (traditional or orthodox) approach to a 
meaning attribution; 
 
Attributions of meaning in the style of ‘“dog” means DOG’, ‘“Il pleut” means IT'S 
RAINING’, and so on, will be taken at face value as claiming, in each case, that the relation 
‘x means y’ links a certain noise or mark (such as the English word ‘dog’ or the French 
sentence ‘Il pleut’) with a further, more mysterious entity—a meaning (such as DOG or IT'S 
RAINING).
273
 
 
So, on Horwich’s deflationist view of meaning, meaning attributions of the form 1) and 2) are 
analyzed in terms of 1
M
) and 2
M
) in the following:  
 
1
M
)   Means (x, DOG).  
2
M
)  Means (x, SNOW IS WHITE),  
 
where DOG and SNOW IS WHITE are meaning-entities; they are non-linguistic, abstract 
entities which are the meanings of ‘dog’ and ‘Snow is white’ respectively.274 
 Viewed this way, Field’s and Horwich’s analyses of meaning-attributions are vastly 
different from each other; whereas Horwich analyzes the logical form of a meaning-attribution 
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by invoking abstract meaning-entities, Field analyzes it by invoking a non-abstract, linguistic 
entity. Despite this appearance, however, their analyses of meaning-attributions are not 
fundamentally different from each other. To the least, there are very important commonalties 
underneath the superficial difference. In the debate over deflationism, whether one invokes a 
meaning-entity is less important than how one characterizes the nature of a meaning-entity. As I 
will argue in the following, Horwich characterizes the nature of a meaning-entity in such a way 
that his non-revisionist analysis is compatible with Field’s revisionist analysis of meaning-
attributions. To argue for this point, I shall first explain why Field objects to invoking a meaning-
entity in an analysis of a meaning-attribution.  
 There are three reasons for which Field is opposed to invoking a meaning entity in the 
analysis of a meaning-attribution. First, there is an ontological (or metaphysical) reason: being a 
physicalist, Field is declined to invoke abstract entities such as propositions or concepts. This is, 
however, the least important reason among three.
275
 The other two, much more important, 
reasons are that, first, invoking a meaning-entity tends to create a conflict with the deflationary 
conception of truth; and second, it isn’t a meaning-entity but a linguistic entity that plays an 
explanatory role in an account of meaning. In the following, I shall first elaborate these two 
reasons, and then argue that if these are the reasons why Field objects to invoking meaning-
entities, there is no irreconcilable gap between Field’s and Horwich’s deflationist views of 
meaning.  
 First, why does invoking a meaning-entity tend to create a conflict with the deflationary 
theory of truth? The deflationary theory of truth defends the idea that truth is a purely logical 
notion that serves as an expressive—not as an explanatory—device. Field thinks that this view of 
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truth will get into trouble if meaning-entities are invoked as the objects of the meaning-
attributions. Consider a meaning-attribution of the form 2) illustrated above:   
 
2)  x means that snow is white.  
 
To say that we construe a meaning-attribution of this form as a two-place relation between x and 
a meaning-entity is to say that we construe the ‘that’-clause embedded in 2)—‘that snow is 
white’—as a singular term referring to a meaning-entity.276 In philosophy, we call a meaning-
entity referred to by a ‘that’-clause embedded in a meaning- or content-attribution a 
‘proposition’.277 A ‘proposition’ is a term of art, and therefore, it isn’t defined uniformly—
different theories of propositions define the nature of propositions in different ways.
278
 A 
proposition, however, is a meaning-entity. Therefore, it has the basic features that are attributed 
to a meaning-entity; that it is an abstract, mind- and language-independent entity. These are, 
however, not the features that make Field avoid a proposition. As was mentioned above, Field’s 
main reason for avoiding a proposition isn’t ontological. What makes Field avoid a proposition is 
that a proposition is typically defined as a truth-theoretic entity; as Schiffer says, a proposition is 
typically defined as an entity that has a truth condition essentially and absolutely.
279
 Now, it is 
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clear why Field avoids a proposition in his analysis of a meaning-attribution—as long as a 
proposition is construed as an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity, if we analyze a meaning-
attribution by invoking a proposition, we should assign a central role to a truth-theoretic notions 
(e.g. the notions of truth, reference, and a truth-condition). The central thesis of the deflationary 
theory of truth is that truth-theoretic notions don’t play a heavy-duty explanatory role. Therefore, 
to invoke a proposition as an object of a meaning-relation may contradict the core idea of the 
deflationary theory of truth. To make the point vivid, suppose we analyze 2) (x means that snow 
is white) into 2
P
) in the following: 
 
2
P
)   Means (x, the proposition that snow is white). 
 
Suppose further that a proposition is construed as an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity—that it is 
primarily defined in terms of the notion of a truth-condition. But then, by analyzing the meaning-
attribution 2) in terms of 2
P
), we would assign a central role to the notion of a truth-condition in 
an account of meaning. In this account, to say that a sentence x means that snow is white is to say 
that it stands in a meaning-relation to an entity that has the truth-condition that snow is white 
essentially and absolutely. The consequence is quite unpalatable to the deflationary theory of 
truth; the notion of truth is at the center of an account of the meaning of a sentence. Thus, Field’s 
qualm about invoking a meaning-entity as the object of a meaning-relation is that once we 
invoke a meaning-entity as the object of a meaning-relation, then via the traditional theory of a 
proposition, we would end up assigning a serious explanatory role to truth-theoretic notions.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proposition is an abstract and mind- and language-independent entity—make a proposition essentially different from 
a sentence, a linguistic entity. See S. Schiffer, The Things We Mean, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 14.  
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Field’s argument is compelling, but it is open to one possible objection—a deflationist 
may invoke a proposition in his analysis of meaning-attributions if he defines a proposition in a 
non-traditional way. Horwich attempts this approach by characterizing a proposition as 
something other than an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity. Thus, Horwich suggest that we 
understand the notion of a proposition along the lines of (UP) in the following:  
 
(UP) u expresses the proposition that p ↔ Int(u)  *p*.280    
 
Here, ‘Int(u)’ abbreviates ‘the interpretation of u’, where to interpret u means nothing more or 
less than translating u into a sentence ‘p’ in my language.281 ‘*p*’ picks out the word type with a 
certain shape and a certain meaning, which is motivated in order to handle ambiguous 
expressions. For example, ‘*bank*’ picks out two different sets of that combination; one is 
composed of ‘bank’ and the use-property of a ‘river bank’, and the other composed of ‘bank’ and 
the use-property of a ‘money-bank’. So, on this view, to say that an utterance u in another 
language expresses the proposition that p is to say that u is translated into ‘p’ in my own 
language, where the meaning of ‘p’ is in turn explicated in terms of *p*.  Nowhere is a truth-
theoretic notion such as the notion of reference or truth condition invoked. In this account, 2) is 
analyzed into 2
P
), but 2
P
) is analyzed into 2
M
): x means SNOW IS WHITE. But SNOW IS 
WHITE—which amounts to the proposition that snow is white in Horwich’s sense—is a use-
theoretic, not truth-theoretic, entity. In the same breath, the concept, SNOW or the concept, 
WHITE is a use-theoretic entity which is primarily characterized in terms of a use-property. To 
be sure, from ‘x means SNOW IS WHITE’ we can infer ‘x is true iff snow is white’; and from ‘x 
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means SNOW’ we can infer ‘x stands for (or is true of) the property of being snow’. But this is 
the consequence, not constitutive, of ‘x means SNOW IS WHITE’ and ‘x means SNOW’. So, 
Horwich’s theory of propositions accommodates the ordinary conception of proposition within 
the framework of the deflationary theory of meaning. That is to say, it accommodates the 
commonsense idea that if a sentence expresses the proposition that p, then it has the truth 
condition that p. In doing so, however, Horwich doesn’t assign an explanatory role to a truth-
theoretic notion, because a proposition is primarily characterized in terms of a use-theoretic 
property, and only derivatively in terms of a truth-theoretic property. But then, Horwich’s 
invocation of a meaning-entity—such as a proposition and concept—doesn’t conflict with 
Field’s linguistic view of a meaning attribution. Therefore, although Horwich and Field 
superficially disagree on the logical form and the object of a meaning-relation, they agree at the 
fundamental level—they both object to invoking an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity in an 
analysis of meaning-attributions. That is to say, they both deny that truth-theoretic notions play a 
central role in an account of meaning-attributions.  
 There is, however, another reason why Field objects to invoking a meaning-entity—a 
meaning-entity plays no explanatory role. To invoke a meaning-entity such as a proposition, says 
Field, “obscure(s) the fact that the explanatory role of propositions derives from that of the 
sentences that they ‘shadow’.”282 Consider a meaning-attribution such as 3) in the following:  
 
3) ‘La neige est blanche’ means that snow is white.  
 
What explains our acceptance of 3) is not that we somehow know that ‘La neige est blanche’ 
stands in a meaning-relation to the proposition that snow is white. It is rather that we take the 
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meaning-characteristics of ‘La neige est blanche’ are the same or sufficiently similar to those of 
‘Snow is white’ in our language. Field defines ‘meaning-characteristics’ as the combination of 
the conceptual/inferential roles and indication relations of an expression. But then, what plays an 
explanatory role in an account of meaning-attributions is not a proposition; it is a linguistic entity. 
Therefore, from the perspective of an explanatory role, a proposition is nothing but a shadow of a 
sentence; whatever explanatory roles we may attribute to a proposition, they are derived from the 
explanatory roles played by the meaning-characteristics of a linguistic entity; i.e., a sentence.
283
 
 This argument is appealing; one piece of evidence is that if we don’t understand a 
sentence ‘p’ embedded in ‘the proposition that p’, invoking the proposition that p is of no use. 
For example, if someone tells me that a sentence x means the proposition that eukaryote is 
pelagic, I learn nothing about the meaning of x. On the other hand, if someone tells me that a 
sentence x means that a cell having a nucleus pertains to oceans, I can understand the meaning of 
x. Let’s suppose here that ‘Eukaryote is pelagic’ and ‘A cell having a nucleus pertains to oceans’ 
are synonymous; namely, they express one and the same proposition. If a proposition is more 
than the shadow of a sentence, there shouldn’t any difference between my understanding the 
proposition that eukaryote is pelagic and my understanding the proposition that a cell having a 
nucleus pertain to oceans. But there is a difference; I understand the one, but not the other. So, 
whatever properties a proposition has, they are derived from the properties of a sentence.  
 Field says that he isn’t strongly opposed to an intentional entity as long as an intentional 
entity is construed in a sufficiently bland way.
284
 What he means by this is that if a proposition is 
construed as nothing but a shadow of a sentence, and a concept as nothing but a shadow of a 
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subsentential expression, he isn’t opposed to invoking a proposition or concept.285 But then, 
Field shouldn’t be opposed to Horwich’s invoking a proposition and concept as objects of 
meaning-relations. To see why let’s first consider what the later Wittgenstein says of a 
proposition. He says,  
 
'A proposition is a queer thing!' Here we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of 
logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional signs and the 
facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.—For our forms of 
expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is 
involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.
286
 
 
The later Wittgenstein, the father of the use theory of meaning, invokes a proposition in his 
account of meaning. He objects, however, to the idea of construing a proposition as a mysterious 
entity that is distinct from a propositional sign; he says that our forms of expressions engender 
the misguided idea that a proposition is a sublime, extraordinary, chimerical entity. It isn’t clear 
what he mean by ‘our forms of expressions’ here, but a good example of those expressions may 
be a ‘that’-clause embedded in a meaning- and content-attributions. The surface structure of a 
meaning-attribution such as ‘x means that snow is white’ makes us construe ‘that snow is white’ 
as a singular term referring an abstract entity such as a proposition. Given that we cannot change 
the surface structure of a meaning-attribution, it may be inevitable that we appeal to a 
proposition in an analysis of a meaning-attribution. That said, it isn’t inevitable that we construe 
the nature of a proposition as entirely distinct from the nature of a propositional sign; i.e., a 
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sentence. We may construe a proposition, as Schiffer says, as a pleonastic entity; an entity that 
emerges from our use of a linguistic entity.
287
   
This pleonastic character of a proposition is also found in Horwich’s notion of a 
proposition. Speaking generally, an advocate of the use theory of meaning should admit that the 
primary explanatory role in an account of meaning is played by a linguistic entity, and not by an 
abstract entity such as a concept or proposition. The core idea of the use theory of meaning is 
that a meaning-property is constituted by a use-property. A use-property, however, is a property 
possessed by a linguistic entity, not by an abstract entity. This shouldn’t be taken as saying that 
an advocate of the use theory of meaning isn’t allowed to invoke a proposition or a concept in an 
analysis of a meaning-attribution. Nevertheless, it is a linguistic entity, not an abstract entity, that 
plays a primary explanatory role in the use theory of meaning. Consider what Horwich says of a 
concept:   
 
[G]eneralizing, our concept of concept will be explained by the schematic principle  
 
The concept F = that which is meant (i.e. indicated) by our word “f” and 
by any word with the same meaning-constituting property. 
 
Thus we cannot arrive at the underlying analysis of, for example, ‘x means DOG’ in the way 
suggested by its superficial form—that is, by adding an analysis of the component, ‘x means 
y’, to an analysis of the concept, DOG. Rather, we must first uncover the nature of meaning 
properties and then arrive (by ‘subtraction’ as it were) at the character of meaning entities (i.e. 
concepts).
288
 
 
It isn’t that a meaning-entity exists first, and then we derive a meaning-constituting property 
from the meaning-entity. The order of explanation is the opposite—we first uncover a meaning-
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constituting property—a use-property—and then derive the nature of a meaning-entity from the 
nature of a use-property. A similar account should apply to the nature of a proposition; the order 
of explanation is that we first uncover the use-property constituting the meaning-property ‘x 
means that snow is white’, and then arrive (by subtraction) at the nature of the proposition that 
snow is white. But then, if we didn’t have the concept of a use-property of a linguistic entity, we 
couldn’t have the concept of a meaning-entity such as DOG or SNOW IS WHITE. So, 
conceptually speaking to the least, a meaning-entity such as a concept or a proposition is a 
shadow of a linguistic entity such as a word or a sentence. But then, Field has no reason to be 
strongly opposed to Horwich’s invoking a meaning-entity. Both in Field’s and Horwich’s 
accounts of meaning-attributions, the primary explanatory role is played by a linguistic entity, 
and not by an abstract, meaning-entity. 
 
4.3.4 A Fact of The Matter 
Horwich’s and Field’s deflationist theories of meaning seem to disagree more sharply in 
another aspect of their accounts—whether there is a fact of the matter in virtue of which an 
ordinary meaning attribution of the form 1) or 2) is true:  
 
1) x means <dog>.  
2) x means that snow is white.  
 
As was mentioned, Field denies that there is a fact of the matter in virtue of which a meaning 
attribution of the form 1) or 2) is true; a meaning-attribution isn’t a matter of being correct or 
incorrect but a matter of being better or worse. Horwich, by contrast, claims that there is a fact of 
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the matter by virtue of which a meaning attribution of the form 1) or 2) is true; a meaning 
attribution has a truth condition, and therefore, it is a matter of being correct or incorrect. Viewed 
this way, the difference between Field’s and Horwich’s views of meaning in this respect is too 
big to be reconciled. When we give a closer look at their views of meaning, however, we can 
find room for reconciliation.  
First, what is Field’s argument for denying that there is a fact of the matter in virtue of 
which a meaning attribution is true? In Field’s linguistic view of a meaning attribution, an 
ordinary meaning attribution of the form 2) above— 
 
2) x means that snow is white.  
 
is analyzed into 2
L
) in the following:  
 
2
L
)   x means the same as ‘Snow is white’.  
 
So, on Field’s theory, to say that there is no fact of the matter for a meaning attribution of the 
form 2) is to say that there is no fact of the matter in virtue of which 2
L
) is true. A statement of 
the form 2
L
), however, states that the sentence replacing x and the sentence ‘Snow is white’ in a 
meaning-attributor’s language mean the same; i.e., synonymous. Here, the sentence replacing x 
may be a sentence uttered by a speaker in my own language or in a foreign language. But then, 
2
L
) may be understood in terms of 2
LP
) and 2
LL
) in the following:  
 
2
LP
)   x uttered by another English speaker means the same as ‘Snow is white’.  
2
LL
)  x uttered by a speaker in a foreign language L means the same as ‘Snow is white’. 
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To say that there is a fact of the matter for a statement is to say that there is an objective standard 
for the truth of the statement. But then, to say that there is no fact of the matter by virtue of 
which a meaning statement of the form 2) is true is to say that there is no objective standard for 
interpersonal synonymy (2
LP
) or interlinguistic synonymy (2
LL
). In short, by denying that there is 
a fact of the matter for a meaning attribution, Field expresses his skepticism about interpersonal 
and interlinguistic synonymy. 
 But why is Field skeptical about interpersonal or interlinguistic synonymy? Field offers 
several related arguments all of which point toward one final conclusion. To see what it is, I shall 
first examine what he says about skepticism about synonymy: 
 
The skeptic about interpersonal synonymy holds that though we of course have standards of 
translation, they are a matter of being better or worse, not of right and wrong, and also are 
highly context-dependent (since the purposes for which they are better or worse vary from 
one context to the next); and that these features together keep them from generating any 
useful notion of synonymy.
289
 
  
Let’s consider a claim about interlinguistic synonymy; namely, a claim involving a translation of 
an expression in a foreign language into an expression in our own language. In order to do so, we 
have to compare their meaning-characteristics; i.e., inferential/conceptual roles and indication 
relations. In this sense, Field says that we have standards of translation; for example, translating 
‘Comment ça va?’ into ‘You have just passed your French exam’ grossly violates any reasonable 
standard of good translation, because the meaning-characteristics of these sentence-types are 
vastly different.
290
 But then, why does Field deny that there is an objective standard of 
translation? He offers two related reasons in the passage quoted above; the first is that one and 
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the same expression in a foreign language can be translated into two different expressions in my 
own language, where none of them can reasonably be said to be “wrong”.291 In such cases, there 
is no way of determining which translation is “the correct” one—both of them meet minimal 
objective standards, but beyond that it is a matter of personal taste or preference. Some may say 
that this is better, and others may say the other is better; but there is no objective standard that 
can determine who is right. In this sense, Field claims that the standards of translation are a 
matter of being better or worse, not of right or wrong. Another, related, reason is that translation 
or interpretation is context- and goal-relative—when we compare the meaning-characteristics of 
a foreign expression with those of our own expression, we often do so relative to a certain 
context and a goal (interest or purpose). But then, on Field’s view, we are to understand a 
synonymy-claim such as 2
LL
) above along the line of 3) in the following:  
 
3) x in a foreign language L is translated into ‘p’ in my own language relative to a context and 
a goal.  
 
To say that translation (or interpretation) is often relativized to a context and goal, however, 
doesn’t necessarily show that there is no fact of the matter or objective standard for 
interlinguistic synonymy. We can still talk about “the best” translation within the framework of a 
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given context and goal. Being aware of this, Field gives a much stronger reason than that 
translation is relative to a context and goal. He says: 
 
I'm inclined to think that the problem isn't just that interpersonal synonymy (‘is a good 
translation of’) is a highly vague notion, but that it isn't a fully factual notion at all; rather, it 
is an evaluative notion. This is compatible with many claims of interpersonal synonymy 
being factual relative to the goals of the translator; but not all interpersonal synonymy claims 
need be factual even relative to the goals.
292
  
 
According to Field, meaning-related notions—such as ‘synonymy’ and ‘is a good translation’—
are not straightforwardly factual—they are evaluative notions. So, the main reason why Field 
denies that there is a fact of the matter as to a meaning-attribution is that meaning and synonymy 
are not straightforwardly factual notions—they are evaluative notions.  
 By maintaining that synonymy and meaning are evaluative notions, however, Field 
doesn’t intend to defend “radical relativism”—the view that different people have radically 
different standards for a synonymy-claim and meaning-attribution. Field instead aims to defend 
“moderate relativism”—the view that different people may have slightly different standards for a 
synonymy-claim and meaning-attribution.
293
 Now, if this is Field’s idea behind his ‘no-fact-of-
the-matter’ thesis, there doesn’t seem to be an unbridgeable gap between Field’s and Horwich’s 
views. To see why, l shall consider Quine’s example for the indeterminacy of translation.294  
Suppose a native speaker in a remote language utters ‘Gavagai’. Suppose there are two 
different translation manuals both of which are acceptable according to all available 
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observational evidence.
295
 Suppose further that we don’t accept mentalism: the idea that the 
meaning of an expression is determined in the mind just as a label is attached to an exhibit in a 
museum.
296
 According to Quine, from these premises we can derive the conclusion that there is 
no fact of the matter by virtue of which a statement such as 4
T
) in the following is correct.  
 
4
T
)  ‘Lo, gavagai’ is translated into ‘There is a rabbit’.  
 
Quine’s well-known reason involves a counterfactual consideration; imagine a counterfactual 
world in which people use a different translational manual, T* according to which ‘Lo, gavagai’ 
is translated into ‘There is an undetached rabbit-part’:  
 
     4
T*
)   ‘Lo, gavagai’ is translated into ‘There is an undetached rabbit-part’.297 
 
 
According to Quine, the difference between 4
T
) and 4
T*) wouldn’t be manifested by 
observational evidence. The reason is that if we make a compensatory adjustment in the 
translation of more basic terms in native language, both 4
T
) and 4
T*
) would turn out to be equally 
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acceptable according to all available observational evidence.
298
  To be more precise, if we 
construe ‘is’ in 4T*) in terms of the notion of genidentity, it would compensate for the difference 
between ‘rabbit’ and ‘undetached rabbit-part’ thereby making 4T*) as equally acceptable as 
4
T
).
299
 Therefore, the translation of ‘Lo, gavagai’ is indeterminate between 4T) and 4T*); there is 
no fact of the matter by virtue of which either 4
T
) or 4
T*
) is correct.
300
  
 Now, let’s consider Field’s and Horwich’s responses to Quine’s example in turn. First, 
Field basically agrees with Quine—we cannot say only one of 4T) or 4T*) is correct. Neither can 
we say that both of them are correct.
301
 Rather, we should construe 4
T
) as being inseparably 
correlated with a semantic standard involving the notion of identity, and 4
T*
) with a semantic 
standard involving the notion of genidentity.
302
 So, neither 4
T
) nor 4
T*
) is straightforwardly true; 
4
T
) is acceptable relative to the notion of identity, and 4
T*
) is acceptable relative to the notion of 
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 Field proposed the partial-reference solution to Quine’s indeterminacy (inscrutability) of reference. It isn’t clear, 
however, this solution can be extended to solve the problem of indeterminacy of meaning. Even if it can, it doesn’t 
support the conclusion that both 4
T
) and 4
T*) are correct. Instead, it may support that ‘Lo, Gavagai’ partially means 
that there is a rabbit, and it partially means that there is an undetached rabbit-part. See H. Field, “Quine and the 
Correspondence Theory,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.  
302
 Field says,  
 
[T]he basic indeterminacy is in the identity predicate, and that (putting aside ordinary vagueness) predicates like 
‘rabbit’ get a fixed extension relative to the interpretation of identity. (For example, its extension is the set of 
rabbits relative to identity and the set of time-slices of rabbits relative to genidentity.)
 
(H. Field, “A Reply to Anil 
Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez,” Philosophical Studies, 124, 2005, pp. 105-128.) 
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genidentity.
303
 This view is consistent with Field’s moderate relativism—different people can 
have slightly different standards, and there is sometimes no way of telling who is right in an 
entirely objective sense. We prefer 4
T
) to 4
T*
), but we do so because 4
T
) meets our semantic 
standard, which is different from saying that our semantic standard is “correct” in an entirely 
objective sense. This shouldn’t be taken as saying that our choice of 4T) is entirely arbitrary—
that isn’t supported by any objective evidence. As was stated earlier, Field’s view isn’t that any 
translation will do; an acceptable translation should preserve the meaning-characteristics. For 
example, translating ‘Lo, gavagai’ into ‘There is an apple’ isn’t acceptable, because their 
meaning-characteristics are too dissimilar. Field doesn’t think, however, that a translation and 
meaning-attribution can fully be explained by evidence pertaining to meaning-characteristics. 
Just as Quine says, we cannot choose one of meaning-attributions between 5) and 5*)  
 
5) ‘Lo, gavagai’ means that there is a rabbit.  
5*)   ‘Lo, gavagai’ means that there is an undetached rabbit-part.  
 
as the correct one because if we made an adjustment at a more fundamental level, both 5) and 5*) 
would be acceptable. 5) is acceptable relative to the background assumption that ‘is’ is construed 
as identity, whereas 5*) is acceptable relative to the background assumption that ‘is’ is construed 
as genidentity. Surely, we choose 5), but that doesn’t show that 5) is correct. It only shows that 
meaning isn’t a straightforwardly factual notion; it shows that meaning is an evaluative notion.  
                                                          
303
 This is what Field says about nonfactualism about a moral sentence. Field says, “The factualist/nonfactualist 
debate about evaluatives, then, is the debate about whether evaluatives are straightforwardly true.” See H. Field, 
“Disquotationalism and Factually Defective Discourse,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 436.  
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 Unlike Field, Horwich responds negatively to Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of 
translation. In the section called ‘Quelling Quine’s Qualms’ in his book Meaning, Horwich 
offers a detailed criticism of Quine’s arguments for the thesis.304 I will here discuss only parts of 
Horwich’s argument against Quine’s indeterminacy of translation.  
 First, Horwich argues that even if there are nonequivalent multiple translations all of 
which are acceptable on observational grounds, from this meaning skepticism that Quine intends 
to establish doesn’t follow.305 What Horwich means by ‘meaning skepticism’ is the idea that no 
word means anything. According to Horwich, in order for this radical view to follow from the 
indeterminacy of translation, the thesis (M) in the following has to be assumed:  
 
(M)   If a word has a meaning then an adequate translation of that word must have the same 
meaning.
306
  
 
But the thesis (M) isn’t true; it subscribes to the implausible verificationist view.307 Therefore, 
meaning-skepticism doesn’t follow from Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation.  
 Horwich’s view of (M) seems right—as Horwich says, (M) can easily be refuted by the 
plausible anti-verificationist view that being true (or correct) should be distinguished from being 
justified.
308
 That is to say, although multiple translations are all justified on empirical grounds, it 
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 P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, Ch. 9. The following discussion on Horwich’s criticism of 
Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation is all based on Ch. 9 of Horwich’s Meaning.  
305
 As will be discussed shortly, Horwich raises an objection to the narrowness of Quine’s notion of observational 
evidence. Here, for the argument’s sake, that objection is put aside.  
306
 P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 199.  
307
 See P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 199.  
308
 There is a debate, however, whether Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation rests upon verificationism. 
See P. Raatikainen’s “Is Quine a Verificationist?” The Southern Journal of Philsophy, 41, 2003, pp. 399-409. As 
Raatikainen states, the dispute seems to be concerned with how the notion of verification is to be understood. If the 
notion of verification is construed broadly, the verification theory of meaning amounts to nothing but the empiricist 
theory of meaning. That is to say, by defending the verification theory of meaning, Quine might have defended the 
empiricist approach—as opposed to the mentalist approach—to an explication of meaning. If so, Quine’s approach 
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is still possible that only of them is correct.
309
 Therefore, Quine’s meaning skepticism doesn’t 
follow from his thesis of indeterminacy of translation. Now, given that Horwich’s criticism of 
Quine’s meaning skepticism is correct, how can this be balanced with Field’s moderate 
relativism? According to Field’s moderate relativism, there is no fact of the matter as to the truth 
of a meaning attribution; a meaning attribution isn’t a matter of being correct or incorrect, but a 
matter of being better or worse. But then, isn’t Field’s view of meaning committed to meaning 
skepticism?  
The answer seem ‘no’.310 Field distinguishes two kinds of skepticism; skepticism being 
defined as the view that we should abstain from making all meaning-related claims, and 
skepticism being defined as the view that there is no fact of the matter by virtue of which a 
meaning attribution is true.
311
 Field says that skepticism of the first kind is idiotic—it is foolish 
to say that no word means anything or we are barred from making a meaning-related claim.
312
 
Indeed, a main virtue of evaluativism about meaning is that it enables us to avoid skepticism of 
this radical type; it is intended to render our meaning talk legitimate. On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to meaning isn’t substantially different from Horwich’s. Horwich seems to agree with this point. See P. Horwich, 
Meaning, Ch. 9.  
309
 Horwich says,  
 
[O]ne might distinguish between determinate truth, which requires decidability on the basis of underlying facts, 
and truth simpliciter, which does not. . . And in this way one would be able to hang on to meanings as those 
entities that are preserved in correct (not merely adequate, and not necessarily determinate). P. Horwich, 
Meaning, p. 199.   
 
310
 Field doesn’t discuss skepticism about meaning directly. But he discusses skepticism about epistemology; in 
particular, epistemological properties such as default reasonableness. Field’s view of epistemological properties is 
similar to his view of semantic properties (such as meaning and synonymy)—he argues that epistemological 
properties don’t reduce to either natural or non-natural properties. So, on Field’s view, reasonableness doesn’t 
consist in anything; it is not a factual property but an evaluative property. I extrapolated Field’s view of 
epistemological properties to semantic properties. See H. Field, “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” in his Truth 
and the Absence of Fact.  
311
 H. Field, “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.  
312
 H. Field, ibid., p. 371.  
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evaluativism about meaning denies that there is a fact of the matter as to a meaning-attribution. 
For this reason one might think that Field’s view of meaning embraces skepticism of the second 
type to the least. But Field also objects to this idea—he says that it is a totally “perverse” 
definition of skepticism.
313
 It is perverse because unless one assumes the factualist view of 
meaning, one couldn’t derive skepticism from the absence of a fact of the matter about a 
meaning attribution. From the perspective of an evaluativist, it is only the nature of meaning that 
it doesn’t have a fact of the matter corresponding to a meaning-related statement. So, on Field’s 
view, semantic evaluativism shouldn’t be considered advocating skepticism; to the contrary, it 
should be considered a solution to get out of meaning skepticism.
314
 
 I brought up Quine’s thesis indeterminacy of translation in order to find a commonality 
between Field’s and Horwich’s views of a fact of the matter by examining their responses to 
Quine’s thesis. One commonality found is that neither of them takes Quine’s thesis to support 
meaning skepticism. Although this is an important commonality, it isn’t enough to show that 
their views don’t conflict with each other. The problem is that although they both reject deriving 
skeptical conclusion from Quine’s theis, they seem to do so on different grounds. Field’s reason, 
as was just explained, is that meaning isn’t a straightforwardly factual notion; it is an evaluative 
notion. On the other hand, Horwich’s reason is that Quine’s thesis doesn’t show that there is no 
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 As I stated above, this isn’t what Field states explicitly; I derived this view from Field’s discussion of 
epistemological properties. But I am quite confident that this is what Field would have said about his evaluativism 
about meaning. See H. Field, ibid.  
314
 Field says,  
 
Indeed, a main virtue of evaluativism is that it removes the force of most skeptical arguments. Most skeptical 
arguments depend on assuming that reasonableness is a factual property of beliefs or of rules, and on the 
understandable resistance to stripping away the normative nature of reasonableness by identifying it with a 
natural property like reliability (for rules; or being arrived at by reliable rules, for beliefs) 
 
H. Field, “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” p. 387.  
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fact of the matter as to a meaning attribution. Even if Quine’s right in claiming that two non-
equivalent translation manuals are justified on empirical grounds, from this we cannot infer that 
none of them is “correct”.315 So, one big difference between Horwich and Field seems that 
whereas Field takes meaning to be an evaluative notion, Horwich doesn’t—he seems to take it to 
be a straightforwardly factual notion.  
 I doubt, however, this is correct; I will argue that the notion of meaning in Horwich’s 
account isn’t straightforwardly factual, either. A caveat is needed here; Horwich has never 
expressed his view on this issue explicitly, so what I will argue in the following is my 
interpretation of Horwich’s view of meaning.  
Horwich’s view of a meaning attribution is subtler and more complicated than it appears 
to be. Its subtlety and complexity are well captured by what Gupta says of Horwich’s use theory 
of meaning. Gupta says,  
 
Horwich's theory is unlike any other use theory of meaning in the philosophical literature. 
Whereas the other use theories aim to explain meaning in terms of some aspect of use (e.g., 
inferential or conceptual role), Horwich aims to explain not meaning but meaning properties, 
properties such as "x means RED in English," "x means AND in Paul's language," etc. 
Horwich is not concerned to reduce meaning to use.
316
 
  
Although what Gupta says here is important in understanding Horwich’s deflationist view of 
meaning, he doesn’t elaborate what he means by the distinction—the distinction between saying 
that meaning properties are reduced to use-properties and saying that meaning itself is reduced to 
a use-property.
317
 I will here attempt to provide an explanation of the distinction as follows.  
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 P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 9, “Quelling Quine’s Qualms,” pp. 199-200.  
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 A. Gupta, “Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, 2003, pp. 654-666, p. 655.  
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 Horwich says:  
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 The distinction has to do with the complexity involved in Horwich’s reductionist theory 
of meaning properties. As was explained earlier Horwich denies that the use-property of an 
expression strongly determines (DETERMINES) its truth-theoretic properties; namely, he denies 
that we can derive 7) from 6) in the following:  
 
6) A predicate x has the use-property U(x).  
7) x is true all and only of dogs.318 
 
Neither can we derive 9) from 8):  
 
8) A sentence x has the use-property U1(x).  
9) x has the truth-condition that snow is white.   
 
On the other hand, Horwich claims that the use-property of an expression weakly determines 
(determines) its truth-theoretic properties—if two expressions are synonymous, they have the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
However, as we saw in Chapter 2 (section 2) and Chapter 3 (response to Objection 4), the expectation that one 
will be able to read off (and hence to explain) which particular meaning is engendered by a given meaning-
constituting property is misguided. It has its origin in the Constitution Fallacy —the assumption that constituent 
structure is preserved under reductive analysis. (P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 220.)  
 
Horwich makes the same point over and over again throughout his book Meaning. But he doesn’t say explicitly that 
he distinguishes the notion of meaning from the notion of meaning-constituting properties (meaning properties). I 
think he should have had—that would have made it much easier to understand his deflationist theory of meaning. In 
a sense, I can understand why he didn’t do so—one of his deflationist theses of meaning is that the notion of 
meaning, when it is properly understood by his deflationary account, is no different from the notion of meaning-
properties. That is to say, Horwich’s point is that we’d better understand ‘x means <dog>’ in terms of ‘x means DOG’. 
Nevertheless, to say this is different from saying that ‘x means <dog>’ is reduced to ‘x means DOG’. To say the latter 
isn’t consistent with his claim that the meaning-properties of a predicate don’t strongly determine its extension or 
the claim that we cannot read off which particular meaning is engendered by a given meaning-constituting property. 
This is the reason why I say that Horwich’s deflationist theory of meaning has subtleties.   
318
 As was just pointed out, Horwich denies that we can read off which particular meaning is engendered by a given 
meaning-constituting property. A meaning-constituting property is a use-property. Therefore, we are not supposed to 
read off 7) from 6).  
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same truth-theoretic property.
319
 In Horwich’s view, two expressions are synonymous if and only 
if they have the same use-properties. So, on this view, if two names have the same use-property, 
they are co-referential; if two predicates have the same use-property, they are co-extensional; and 
if two sentences are associated the same use-properties, they have the same truth condition. But 
these truth-theoretic properties are not themselves reduced to the use-properties of expressions. 
For example, the property of being true of all and only dogs in 7) isn’t reducible to U(x) in 6); 
the property of having the truth condition that snow is white in 9) in isn’t identified with U1(x) in 
8).  
 Now, consider conditionals of the forms 10) and 11) in the following:  
 
10) x means <dog> → x is true of all and only dogs.  
11) x means that snow is white → x has the truth condition that snow is white.  
 
Both 10) and 11) are conceptual truths; they are trivially true in the sense that anyone who has 
mastered English would accept 10) and 11).
320
 On Horwich’s account, however, the antecedents 
of 10) and 11) are not reducible to use-properties. For if ‘x means <dog>’ or ‘x means that snow is 
white’ were reducible to use-properties, then we should be able to read off truth-theoretic 
properties such as ‘x is true of all and only dogs’ or ‘x has the truth condition that snow is white’ 
from the use-properties of x alone. Given that we accept 10) and 11) as conceptual truths, if the 
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 This is one of the subtleties that make it hard to understand Horwich’s view of meaning at first glance. It is like 
saying that although we cannot read off which particular disease someone has from his symptom, if two people have 
exactly the same symptom, they must have the same disease. This statement makes perfect sense, but the question is 
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latter—it is, so to speak, committing a category mistake to think that we can read off the meaning and truth-theoretic 
properties of an expression from its use-properties. To think so is to assume that truth is a naturalistic property. It 
isn’t, however, from a deflationary point of view. Therefore, it is committing a category mistake to expect that we 
should be able to read off the meaning and truth-theoretic properties of an expression from its use-properties.  
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 Horwich accepts the triviality of these meaning-to-truth conditionals. See P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 7.  
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antecedents of 10) and 11) were reducible to use-properties such as 6) and 8) above, we should 
be able to read off the consequents of 10) and 11) from the use-properties 6) and 8). As was 
pointed out above, however, Horwich denies that we can do so—we cannot read off the truth-
theoretic properties 7) and 9) from use-properties 6) and 8).  
 The conclusion that we can draw from this is that in Horwich’s account ordinary 
meaning-attributions of the forms  
 
     x means 
<
dog
>
 
    x means that snow is white 
 
are not reducible to use-theoretic statements of the forms 6) and 8) above—‘A predicate x has the 
use-property U(x)’ and ‘A sentence x has the use-property U1(x).’ Indeed, Horwich himself 
makes this point clear; he says,  
 
And finally there is Kripke, whose argument against the naturalistic reduction of 
Meaning-facts is based implicitly on the Strong Relationality Constraint. He assumes 
that in order for some property of a word to constitute its meaning, it would have 
to be possible to, as he puts it, read off from that property exactly which meaning it 
constitutes. And this ‘reading off’ requirement is tantamount to the view that a reductive 
theory of meaning properties would have to have the form: x means F = T(x, f).
321
 
 
Here, Horwich says that in order to read off the meaning of an expression from its use-properties, 
we need a principle such as ‘x means F = T(x, f).’ To read off the meaning of an expression 
amounts to reading off its truth-theoretic properties from its use-properties. If we can read off the 
meaning of an expression from its use-properties, then, via meaning-to-truth conditionals such as 
10) and 11) above, we should be able to read off the truth-theoretic properties of an expression 
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from its use-properties. To do so, we need an inflationary principle such as ‘x means F = T(x, f).’  
A theory of meaning, however, needs this principle only when it assumes an inflationary 
conception of truth. Since Horwich has already freed a theory of meaning from an inflationary 
conception of truth, his theory of meaning isn’t required to show how we can read off the 
meaning or truth-theoretic properties of an expression from its use-property. So, in Horwich’s 
theory of meaning, meaning-attributions of the forms ‘x means <dog>’ and ‘x means that snow is 
white’ are not reducible to facts about use-properties.  
 The reason why I don’t think the notion of meaning in Horwich’s account is 
straightforwardly factual has to do with this feature of his theory—that ordinary meaning-
attributions (e.g. ‘x means <dog> and ‘x means that snow is white’) are not reducible to facts 
about use-properties. As Gupta says above, Horwich’s use theory doesn’t aim to reduce meaning 
to use; it is only concerned with reducing meaning-properties such as ‘x means DOG ’ and ‘x 
means SNOW IS WHITE’ to use-properties. The difference between meaning and meaning-
properties is that whereas meaning is an intrinsically truth-theoretic property, meaning-properties 
are not. As is indicated by 10) and 11) above, we can derive, without an auxiliary hypothesis, ‘x 
is true all and only of dogs’ and ‘x has the truth condition that snow is white’ from ‘x means 
<
dog
>’ and ‘x means that snow is white.’ We cannot derive, however, ‘x is true all and only of 
dogs’ and ‘x has the truth condition that snow is white’ directly from ‘x means DOG’ and ‘x 
means SNOW IS WHITE’. For this reason, the epistemological status of 12) and 13) seems to be 
different from that of 10) and 11):  
 
12)   x means DOG → x is true all and only of dogs.  
13)   x means SNOW IS WHITE → x is true iff snow is white.  
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Horwich says that his use theory of meaning involves a series of reductive analyses such as  
 
 x means DOG = U(x)  
 x means ELECTRON = V(x) 
 . . . and so on.322  
 
Given that meaning-properties are reduced to use-properties in the way above, if we could derive 
truth-theoretic properties directly from meaning-properties, we should be able to read off truth-
theoretic properties from use-properties. As was discussed above, however, this is denied in 
Horwich’s deflationary theory of meaning. Therefore, the consequents of 12) and 13) cannot be 
derived directly from their antecedents—we need some auxiliary hypothesis such as 14) and 15):  
 
14)   ‘dog’ is true all and only of dogs.  
15)   ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white.  
 
Horwich says that although we cannot read off the meaning or truth-theoretic property from a 
use-property, if two expressions have the same use-property, they should have the same meaning 
and truth-theoretic property. In Horwich’s theory, the concept, DOG is by definition the 
meaning-property of the English word ‘dog’; and the concept, SNOW IS WHITE is the 
meaning-property of the English sentence ‘Snow is white.’ 14) and 15) are trivially true in a 
deflationary theory of truth; they are instances of the disquotational schemas. So, unlike 10) and 
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11), 12) and 13) can be made sense of only when they are supplemented with auxiliary 
hypotheses such as 14) and 15).  
 To summarize, in Horwich’s account, meaning is an intrinsically truth-theoretic, but not 
straightforwardly factual notion—the meaning of an expression cannot be reduced to a use-
property. A meaning-property, however, isn’t an intrinsically truth-theoretic, but is 
straightforwardly factual notion—it is reduced to a use-property. Such a discrepancy between the 
ordinary notion of meaning and a meaning-property is also found in Field’s theory of meaning. 
Although Field doesn’t take meaning and synonymy to be straightforwardly factual notions, he 
takes a meaning-characteristic to be a straightforwardly factual notion. It is a straightforwardly 
factual matter whether an expression has a certain meaning-characteristic. It isn’t, however, a 
straightforwardly factual matter which meaning we are to ascribe to an expression on the basis of 
its meaning-characteristics. Neither Horwich nor Field, however, considers the irreducibility of 
meaning an obstacle in the way of developing an adequate theory of meaning. Given that the 
ordinary notion of meaning is intrinsically truth-theoretic, the irreducibility of meaning to a 
factual notion would engender a problem only if truth-theoretic properties were to play important 
roles in an account of meaning and content. The whole point of deflationism about meaning and 
truth is to deny it. But then, the irreducibility of meaning to a straightforwardly factual property 
isn’t a problem at all.  
 
4.4 Field’s Response to The Success Argument: A Different Version 
 
 In this section, I will discuss Field’s response to the success argument against a 
deflationary theory of truth—the criticism that a deflationist cannot accommodate the role of 
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truth in an account of the success of behavior. I discussed Horwich’s response to the success 
argument in Ch. 3. Field’s response to the success argument, however, is a little different from 
Horwich’s—whereas Horwich’s response is focused on explaining the role of truth in a success-
explanation, Field’s is focused on explaining the role of truth conditions. To be more precise, 
Horwich responds to the success argument by showing that the role of truth in a success-
explanation of the form 1) below can be explained within the framework of a deflationary theory:  
 
1) X succeeds in achieving his desire because, among other things, he believes that p, and 
his belief is true.  
The role of truth in 1) is simply that it enables us to infer 2):  
 
2) X succeeds in achieving his desire because, among other things, he believes that p, and p.   
 
In order to explain how 1) entails 2), we need to assume nothing more or nothing less than the 
equivalence schema (E) (<P> is true iff P). To be sure, Horwich’s point isn’t that the notion of 
truth is redundant in a success-explanation—it serves the generalization function.323 A 
deflationist recognizes this function, but she argues that the generalization function can also be 
fully accommodated by what is implied by the equivalence schema.  
Field’s concern with the success argument, in a nutshell, is whether a deflationist can 
explain the role of truth conditions in a similar way—that the truth conditions of an agent’s 
belief play only an expressive or logical function in an account of the success of an agent’s 
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 We appeal to the notion of truth as a device of generalizations over beliefs when we cannot articulate an agent’s 
belief. For example, we may say ‘Warren Bennett succeeds in making money because most of his beliefs about the 
stock market are true.’ Here, the notion of truth cannot be eliminated because we don’t know what Warren Bennett 
believes.  
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behavior. If a deflationist can show this, she can also show that no inflationary theory of truth 
conditions is needed—the role of truth conditions in a success-explanation can fully be explained 
by assuming nothing more or nothing less than the disquotational schema (DS): ‘p’ is true iff p.    
How can a deflationist show that truth conditions play only an expressive role in an 
account of the success of behavior? This is not an easy task, since in order to show this, a 
deflationist needs to replace an ordinary success-explanation of the form 2) with an explanation 
that doesn’t invoke ‘that’-clauses. As Field says, to say that an agent believes that p is to say that 
he is in a belief-state that has the truth condition that p. Suppose we explain the success of a 
pilot’s behavior in the way below:  
 
3) A pilot manages to land a plane safely with regularity because she slows down her plane 
when she believes that the airspeed is too high, and her belief is true.  
 
In the explanation 3), the truth condition of the pilot’s belief plays an important role, since it 
characterizes her belief by invoking a ‘that’-clause—i.e., that the airspeed is too high. To say 
that she believes that the airspeed is too high is to say that her belief is true if and only if the 
airspeed is too high. So, according to 3), the truth-conditional content of the pilot’s belief plays 
an important role in an account of the success of her behavior. The truth-conditional content of 
the pilot’s belief is its representational content—to say that the pilot’s belief has the truth 
condition that the airspeed is too high is to say that it represents the external condition that the 
airspeed is too high.
324
 Field’s concern is whether a deflationist can recognize the explanatory 
role of the truth-conditional or representational content of a belief.  Field says,   
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 Presumably, the truth-conditional content of a belief-state isn’t always equivalent to its representational content. 
In this example, though, it is.  
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A detailed explanation of how the pilot functions would involve the existence of some class 
C of internal representations, intuitively representing airspeed, such that when she believes a 
representation in C that represents too high an airspeed she slows the plane and when she 
believes one that represents too low a speed she speeds it up; and the representations in C 
that she believes tend to be true. The last part can of course be rephrased as a generalization: 
she tends to believe a representation in C that represents too low a speed when the plane is in 
fact too slow, etc. But is this restatement of the claim that she has true beliefs about airspeed 
‘innocent’ from the deflationist viewpoint? What may well seem a problem is that it is put in 
terms of what the pilot's internal representations ‘represent’.325 
 
 
To make a long story short, Field’s answer is that a deflationist cannot recognize the explanatory 
role of truth-conditional or representational content in a success-explanation. A deflationist can 
recognize an expressive or logical function served by the truth-conditional or representational 
content of a belief-state, but she cannot recognize a role that goes beyond that. But then, in order 
to show that the role of truth-conditional or representational content is exhausted by its 
expressive or logical function, a deflationist needs to replace a success-explanation such as 3) 
with an explanation that doesn’t explicitly invoke truth-conditional or representational content. 
This in turn implies that a success-explanation such as 3) should be replaced with an explanation 
that doesn’t invoke ‘that’-clauses in the characterization of beliefs. Thus, Field suggests that we 
replace the success-explanation with one that goes as follows:  
 
An obvious strategy for responding to this argument is to say that talk of representation is 
serving a merely heuristic role in the explanation of the pilot’s ability; put without the 
heuristic, the explanation involves the existence of some class C of internal representations in 
the pilot and two subcalsses C1 and C2 of C such that (i) when she believes a representation 
in C1 she slows the plane and when she believes one in C2 she speeds it up, (ii) there is a 1-1 
function f from C to a certain set of real numbers such that (a) C1 is that subclass of C that is 
mapped into numbers above a certain threshold and C2 is that subclass of C that is mapped 
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into numbers below a certain (slightly lower) threshold, and (b) she tends to believe a 
representation r in C when the airspeed in knots is approximately f(r).
326
  
 
 
What Field suggests here is that we consider the truth-conditional or representational 
characterization of a belief as serving only a “heuristic role”—that is, we characterize a belief-
state by invoking a ‘that’-clause (e.g. ‘believes that the airspeed is too high’) only when we don’t 
have detailed knowledge of an agent’s computational psychology. When we do, we replace the 
truth-conditional or representational characterization of a belief-state with a purely 
computational characterization of the pilot’s internal representations.327 A purely computational 
characterization of a belief invokes only the computational roles (causal-inferential roles) and 
indication relations of an agent’s internal representations. In order to explain the success of the 
pilot’s behavior only by invoking the computational roles and indication relations of the pilot’s 
internal representations, we first identify the class C of her internal representations in terms of 
their computational roles. The class C has two subclasses C1 and C2 which are defined as follows: 
when the pilot believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C1, she slows down 
her plane, and when she believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C2, she 
speeds up her plane. Second, we identify the class C of the pilot’s internal representations in 
terms of their indication relations. The internal representations belonging to the subclass C1 
indicate airspeeds above a certain threshold, and those belonging to the subclass C2 indicate 
airspeeds below a certain threshold.  
Once we identify the computational roles and indication relations of the pilot’s internal 
representations, we explain the success of her behavior by invoking the internal representations. 
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That is to say, the pilot succeeds in landing her plane safely because she slows down her plane 
when she believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C1; and she speeds up her 
plane when she believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C2. Unlike the 
intentional (truth-theoretic) explanation 3) above, this explanation doesn’t invoke a ‘that’-clause 
in characterizing the pilot’s belief-state. Instead of saying that the pilot succeeds because she 
believes that the airspeed is too high when she slows down her plane, we say that she succeeds 
because she believes an internal representation that belongs to the subclass C1. As a result, we 
avoid invoking the truth-conditional or representational content of the pilot’s belief-state in an 
account of the success of her behavior.  
Basically, what Field tries to show is that a deflationist can replace an intentional 
explanation with a non-intentional explanation just in the same way Horwich replaces an 
explanation of the form 1) with an explanation of the form 2). By doing so, Horwich shows that 
the role played by truth in a success-explanation can be accommodated by a deflationary theory 
of truth. In the same way, Field tries to show that the role played by a truth-condition in a 
success-explanation can be accommodated by a deflationary theory. Surely, we cannot always 
replace a success-explanation invoking the notions of truth and truth-conditions with the one that 
doesn’t. When we don’t have detailed knowledge of an agent’s computational psychology, we 
cannot replace an intentional explanation such as 3) with a non-intentional explanation. Even 
when we have detailed knowledge of an agent’s computational psychology, we still need an 
intentional explanation because of its convenience—it is simply too inconvenient to give a 
computational explanation of an agent’s behavior in everyday life. So, we cannot eliminate an 
intentional explanation—we cannot entirely avoid truth-conditional characterizations of belief or 
desire-states. When we invoke them, however, we use them as a merely heuristic device. Just as 
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we invoke the notion of truth when we cannot or don’t want to articulate a proposition or 
sentence, we invoke truth-conditions when we cannot or don’t want to give a computational 
explanation of an agent’s behavior.328   
So, Field’s deflationist view of truth conditions doesn’t advocate an eliminativist view of 
truth conditions or truth-conditional content. It only advocates a deflationist or minimalist view 
of the role of truth-conditional content. In his review of Field’s Truth and the Absence of Fact, 
Loewer says:  
 
The most serious challenges for the deflationist program rather come from issues concerning 
explanation. Can psychological explanations be understood or reconstructed or replaced 
without loss by explanations in which the only semantic notions that figure are D-notions? . . . 
it is not at all obvious that there would be a way of picking out the relevant class of 
computational roles without appealing to R-reference and R-truth conditions.
329
 
 
Loewer is right here—we need to invoke intentional (truth-conditional) content in order to pick 
out relevant class of computational roles and indication relations of internal representations. In 
the pilot example above, we appeal to the truth-conditional content of the pilot’s belief in order 
to pick out the relevant class of internal representations—namely, we appeal to the ‘that’-clause 
characterization ‘The pilot believes that the airspeed is too high when she slows down her plane.’ 
This doesn’t show, however, that the truth-conditional content of the pilot’s belief plays an 
“explanatory role” in an account of the success of her behavior. The success of her behavior is 
exhaustively explained by the computational roles and indication relations of her internal 
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representations. There is simply no room for truth-conditional content to play an additional 
explanatory role. The only way to argue for the explanatory role of truth-conditional content is to 
give a reductive or quasi-reductive account of truth-conditional content—an account that 
systematically connects the truth-conditional content of a belief- or desire-state with the 
computational roles and indication relations of internal representations.
330
 Field is skeptical about 
the prospect of such an account, which I think has to do with his conversion to deflationism in 
the first place. This is not the right place, however, to discuss this issue. Assuming that a 
reductive or quasi-reductive account of intentional content isn’t likely to be forthcoming, Field’s 
non-eliminative and deflationist view of truth conditional content seems to have plausibility. It 
recognizes the important role played by the concepts of intentionality (e.g., the concepts of truth-
conditions, representational content, etc.). In doing so, however, it doesn’t inflate these 
concepts—their roles are purely heuristic or expressive. So, we have arrived at an all-around 
deflationist view of truth-theoretic concepts—they are purely expressive devices.    
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